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Thesis Abstract
According to Mary Ann Glendon, scholars and statespersons have often grappled with
a tension of pursuing their political ideals within practical realities. In The Forum and The
Tower, Glendon examines how the political judgments of prominent public figures illuminates
how conceptions of political ends inform, or do not inform, those decisions. This thesis draws
from contemporary debates on Aristotle’s phronesis to explore how political actors deliberate
between acting with integrity and compromising their political ideals. It develops a theoretical
framework to examine the sources of political judgment in the leadership of Pope John Paul II
towards Communist authority in Poland. The research proposes that John Paul II’s moral
diplomacy draws from his political aim to expand the peoples’ participation in Poland’s
political culture and economic structure. His decisions served as a “catalyst” for the Solidarity
movement, which ultimately helped secure his political aims. However, external pressures on
the Communist Government make it difficult to determine the extent to which John Paul II is
“practically wise” in this context.

Introduction
“What can be more glorious,” [Cicero] asked, “than the conjunction of practical experience
in great affairs of state, with the knowledge of these arts acquired through study and
learning?”1

This thesis examines how Pope John Paul II’s political thought informs his decisions to
influence the Polish Communist government between 1978 and 1989. It argues that the
Pontiff’s philosophical formation under totalitarian regimes helped shape his view that
participation in political, economic and social activities constitute basic human rights. As the
first Polish Pope in the history of the Catholic Church, John Paul II combined the conventional
diplomatic and moral authority of the papacy with knowledge and reflection gained through
his own experiences of totalitarian regimes, to influence events leading to the collapse of the
Polish Communist government in 1989. The project argues that his political philosophy and

Cicero, ‘On the Commonwealth and on the Laws’, trans. James Zetzel (Cambridge: Cambridge
Unviersity Press, 1999), 61 in The Forum and the Tower, ed. Mary Ann Glendon (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 222.
1

5|Page

the Polish context of that period directly informed his political strategy to encourage the Polish
government to increase its citizens’ political, social and economic freedoms, while advocating
nonviolent political organisation. Thus, it studies how John Paul II, as a philosopher, makes
political decisions as a statesperson.
The thesis examines and then adopts Mary Ann Glendon’s main question in her work,
The Forum and The Tower2 about whether it is possible to be politically effective without
compromising too much on principles. In order to do so it develops Glendon’s method into a
theoretical framework, so as to understand the ways that Pope John Paul II brought together
his work in the tower (his thought about the aims of politics) with his activity in the forum (his
political strategy towards Poland in that period). Glendon observes that the kinds of persons
who ponder her question, among them students in the disciplines of philosophy and law,3 are
concerned that politics often requires compromise on personal principles in order to gain, or
retain, some degree of political influence. Glendon recognises that pursuing political goals as
a political actor is difficult and imprecise. It requires skills to deliberate when, how, and to
what extent one should advance a particular goal without damaging one’s effectiveness in the
long-term. Glendon offers Weber’s view that if a political actor focusses “too narrowly” on the
“ultimate good, the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because
responsibility for consequences is lacking.”4 At the same time, if a political actor focusses too
narrowly on immediate success at the expense of political principles, the person’s political aims
become undermined.
The thesis proposes to make two contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it provides an
original analysis of Glendon’s methodology in The Forum and The Tower and develops a

2

Mary Ann Glendon, The Forum and the Tower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Ibid., ix.
4
Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in The Forum and The Tower, ed. Mary Ann Glendon (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), x.
3
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framework applicable to new contexts. Second, it applies the developed framework to a figure
appropriate to Glendon’s question, namely John Paul II, to understand his method of political
judgment. It consists of four chapters. Chapter One and Chapter Two adapt and develop
Glendon’s method to focus on the relationship between political theory and political judgment.
Thus established, Chapter Three and Chapter Four apply the method to John Paul II so as to
examine the extent to which John Paul II retains his political thought in his methods and
strategies to influence Polish politics. It highlights the process of deliberation where John Paul
II considers the short-term advantages of compromising on his political views, versus the
merits of, as Weigel puts it, “thinking long-term” by not sacrificing “core principles to what
seems immediate advantage.”5 The framework also considers the extent to which John Paul
II’s decisions contributed to the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989.
To construct the methodology, the research project makes the dimensions of Glendon’s
framework more explicit, which in turn makes possible an application to future case studies
beyond the present subject. Pursuing this point, Chapter One outlines Glendon’s project in The
Forum and The Tower. It proposes that Aristotelian virtue ethics help understand concepts
central to The Forum and The Tower. Glendon employs classical concepts in Aristotle’s Ethics
and Politics to frame her analysis. Contemporary debates on Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia
(happiness)6 and phronesis (or practical wisdom),7 aid a conceptual understanding of what

George Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft’, First Things 1, no. 247 (2015): 29.
Definitions and arguments on eudaimonia will be drawn from: David Keyt, ‘Intellectualism in
Aristotle’, In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1983) 364–87; Richard Kraut, ‘The Peculiar Function of Human
Beings’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979): 467–78; John McDowell, ‘The Role of
Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), 359–76; Howard J. Curzer, ‘Criteria for Happiness in
Nicomachean Ethics 17 and X 6-8’, The Classical Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1990): 421–432; later
additions to the debate include: Gary M. Gurtler, ‘The Activity of Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics’,
The Review of Metaphysics 56, no. 4 (June, 2003): 801–834; Stephen S. Bush, ‘Divine and Human
Happiness in “Nichomachean Ethics”’, The Philosophical Review 1, no. 117 (January, 2008): 49–75.
7
Definitions and arguments on phronesis will be drawn from: Eugene Garver, ‘After “Virtu”:
Rhetoric, Prudence and Moral Pluralism in Machiavelli’, History of Political Thought 17, no. 2
(1996); Eugene Garver, Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014);
5
6
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constitutes a life of philosophy (the tower), and what constitutes a life of politics (the forum).
Glendon highlights the importance of the classical passions thymos (spiritedness) and eros
(love) as non-rational forces that explain the desire to hold theory and practice with integrity.
These debates reveal a lack of consensus over whether Aristotle believed the best kind
of life was one of theoria (contemplation) as the best and most self-fulfilling activity, or a
combination of the moral virtues, best fulfilled in the life of the statesman.8 The lack of
consensus among scholars provides contextual grounding for Glendon’s claim that scholars
can deliberate “endlessly” about the “advantages and disadvantages” of a particular course of
action, but it is statespersons who must “make decisions, and take responsibility for them.”9
Therefore, Glendon’s framework studies how political thought (in the tower) informs, or is
compromised, in political action (in the forum).
Copleston’s explanation of Aristotelian virtue as a “double position” of mean and
excellence, shows that sound political judgment requires a synthesis of political ends with a
sound understanding and judgment of what means are most likely to contribute towards their
success.10 The virtuous statesperson aims towards the right “ends” through deliberating about
what “means” will succeed. Political judgments that fail to adapt the means to the practical

Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988); Maurice Charland, ‘Lyotard’s Postmodern Prudence’, in Prudence,
Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, ed. Robert Hariman (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2003); Shaun Gallagher, ‘The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics’,
Philosophy Today 37, no. 1 (1993); Richard S. Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political
Judgment’, The American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997); Peter J. Steinberger, The
Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993); David E. Tabachnick,
‘”Phronesis”, Democracy and Technology’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne
de Science Politique 37, no. 4 (2004); Ronald Beiner, ‘Review of Peter Steinberger’s the Concept of
Political Judgment’, Political Theory 22, no. 4 (1994); Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming,
trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).
8
Glendon does not reference which scholars have deliberated this topic, and as such necessitates that
the thesis examine contemporary discussions within Aristotelian virtue ethics to test the soundness of
this claim.
9
Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, x
10
SJ Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books,
1963), 337.
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realities of the political context are excessive, and constitute a vice in relation to practical
wisdom. At the other extreme, decisions that focus only on the present conditions and ignore
the pursuit of political ends, is another form of excess, and is also a vice in relation to practical
wisdom. In Glendon’s view, Edmund Burke and Cicero are examples of the wise statesperson.
They combine a “mastery of philosophy” with experience in “managing great affairs”. 11 This
explanation demonstrates that Glendon’s view of sound political judgment, what can be aligned
with phronesis – or practical wisdom – is Aristotelian. Thus, it is presently argued that scholarly
perspectives on Aristotelian virtue ethics, particularly practical wisdom, enable an original
analysis of Glendon’s understanding of political judgment in The Forum and The Tower.
Chapter Two develops Glendon’s analysis into a theoretical framework that is
applicable to new contexts. Drawing from the explanation of virtue in Chapter One, it shows
that the statesperson able to retain moral integrity and be successful in those aims is “practically
wise”. The practically wise person must deliberate what means best serve the political aims.
Following Copleston, sometimes the right action involves an “excess” rather than a “defect”,
while in other cases the reverse may be preferable.12 Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use
actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of
the right ends.
Additional to Glendon’s terminology, concepts from Maritain’s essay “The End of
Machiavellianism” help identify excessive forms of political judgment, which, Maritain
argues, constitute vices.13 Practical wisdom is understood as both a mean point between what
Maritain calls “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other.14
These terms are employed in the present thesis to highlight how political actors in The Forum

11

Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, 24.
Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 337–8.
13
Jacques Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism?
Perspectives from the Review of Politics, ed. Daniel Philpott and Ryan T Anderson (Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2017), 37–67
14
Ibid., 62–64
12
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and The Tower engage in a moral process of deliberating between moderate and excessive
degrees of political judgment. Such decisions involve deliberation on a course of action when
“apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”15
Building on Glendon and Maritain, Hartmann’s graph of virtue16 is adapted to establish
a new graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom. The graph helps explain how the practically
wise person aims at the mean between excessive forms of what contemporary scholars of
phronesis call “political judgment”.17 It is the visual result of the conceptual integration of The
Forum and The Tower and “The End of Machiavellianism”. Accordingly, the graph is
employed heuristically as a visual aid throughout the discussion, providing the reader with a
reference point that captures the distinctive elements of political judgment being examined.
The current analysis is limited to how perspectives of political ends inform, or do not
inform, political decision-making. Other insights are not considered, such as how one’s
political legacy can change over time. Political thought, in the form of published works, can
also shape future political events. For example, Glendon credits Locke’s political philosophy
with fundamentally shaping the modern American legal and political system, and so in that
sense they can be considered as works from the tower that have practical impact in the forum.18
Aspects of Glendon’s framework in addition to the above are thus excluded from the current
research project.
Applying an adapted Glendon framework as described above fills a gap existing in
research about the thought and political legacy of Pope John Paul II. Specifically, the
framework synthesises studies of John Paul II’s ethical and political thought with analyses of
his political decisions and contributions to the collapse of communism in Poland. Chapter

15

Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38
Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1932), 256.
17
Richard Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment’, American Political Science
Review, 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 409–10.
18
Glendon, The Formum and the Tower, 105–6.
16
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Three primarily engages Gregg,19 Buttiglione20 and Barrett,21 who offer comprehensive studies
of Karol Wojtyla’s / John Paul II’s ethical and political thought. These studies argue that John
Paul II has an intense interest in the fundamental dignity of the human person. His
philosophical thought is built around his analysis of the person as an irreducible subject. These
thinkers argue that his philosophical thought guides his views of political ends. In particular,
John Paul II advocates that all persons have a fundamental right to have their dignity recognised
through participation in the dynamic social, economic and political aspects of their community.
These rights include the right to work and have a sense of ownership of work, to participate in
the determination of the political and economic system in which they live, to exercise freedom
of worship and association of groups without government oversight, and to act in accordance
with their conscience.22 Buttiglione also suggests that John Paul II’s experience of totalitarian
governments in Poland shaped the intensity of his interest in individual rights as the
manifestation of fundamental human dignity.23
Within the understanding of John Paul II’s political convictions, Chapter Four analyses
his political decisions to influence the circumstances of his home country of Poland. The
chapter follows Troy,24 Marshall25 and Hall’s characterisation of papal political influence as

Samuel Gregg, Challenging the Modern World: Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II and the Development
of Catholic Social Teaching (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999).
20
Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II
(Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997).
21
Edward Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy: The Ethical and Political Thought of Karol
Wojtyla/John Paul II (USA: Lexington Books, 2010).
22
Ibid., 50, 60–62.
23
Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 27.
24
Jodok Troy, ‘”The Pope’s Own Hand Outstretched”: Holy See Diplomacy as a Hybrid Mode of
Diplomatic Agency’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 3
(2018):521–39; Alan Chong and Jodok Troy, ‘A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular
Organization: The Holy See and the United Nations’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 12, no. 3
(2011):335–54; Jodok Troy, ‘The Catholic Church: An Underestimated and Necessary Actor in
International Affairs’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (2008): 65–73.
25
Katherine Marshall, Global Institutions of Religion: Ancient Movers, Modern Shakers (London:
Routledge, 2013).
19
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“hybrid”, where the Pope is both the Holy See’s “chief diplomat and moral authority”. 26 This
agency enables John Paul II to make more direct public pronouncements than would have been
possible as a priest under Communist oversight. Weigel,27 Luxmoore and Babiuch,28 and
Gaddis,29 argue John Paul II’s engagement with Poland contributed to the Communist
government’s decision to allow free elections in June, 1989. This event marks the start of its
transition from a communist political and economic system, to a liberal democratic political
system, and an open market economy. John Paul II can be credited as the “catalyst” that
inspired the Solidarity movement, which formed one year after his papal pilgrimage to Poland
in 1979.30 He presented the freedom to worship, to form independent unions, to participate in
the economic and political system through democratic elections, among other freedoms, as
basic human rights. The Solidarity movement drew from his public message to secure these
rights in the form of the first independent trade union under the communist government in
Poland.31 Solidarity and the Polish Catholic Church provided the organisational support that
sustained and developed growing national opposition to the communist political and economic
system. By 1989, the Polish government recognised Solidarity had become “a decisive factor
on the political scene” and that it required Solidarity’s support for any legal act to be effective.32

Rodney Bruce Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power Resource’, International Organisation, 51,4
(1997): 591–622.
27
George Weigel, The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of
Pope John Paul II (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999); George Weigel, The End and the
Beginning: Pope John Paul II—The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy (New York:
Image Books, 2010).
28
Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch, The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul
of Eastern Europe (New York: G. Chapman, 1999).
29
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
30
Gracjan Kraszewski, ‘Catalyst for Revolution Pope John Paul II’s 1979 Pilgrimage to Poland and
Its Effects on Solidarity and the Fall of Communism,’ The Polish Review 57, no. 4 (2012): 27.
31
Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch, The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul
of Eastern Europe (New York: G. Chapman, 1999), 212-13.
32
James E Will, ‘Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland’, Journal of Law and
Religion, 2, no.1 (1984): 154
26
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Synthesizing analyses of John Paul II’s political thought and political action
demonstrates how his political decisions draw from his political philosophy. This suggests that
John Paul II makes political judgments in a way that is consistent with his view of political
ends. Further, it shows how Karol Wojtyla’s formation under totalitarian systems shaped his
cautious and moderated approach to critiquing the communist system. This view follows
Weigel’s insight in his essay, “Lessons in Statecraft”, which argues that John Paul II prioritised
his long-term aim of political autonomy for the Polish people over short-term success.33 The
current research project draws from secondary literature to show how this strategy took form
in the Pope’s public demand that the state uphold basic human rights. John Paul II encouraged
nonviolent political resistance, and shifted Vatican foreign policy – called the ostpolitik
(Eastern politics) – from accommodating government policies he disagreed with, to arguing
for new policies that upheld basic human rights.34 Glendon’s framework emphasises that the
decisions of scholars and statespersons show how ideas about the ends of politics (the tower)
can shape individual efforts at political influence (in the forum). Applied to John Paul II, it
therefore demonstrates he is a political actor who gives preference to long-term aims and
political integrity over compromise for immediate political advantages.
Glendon’s audience – the aspirant statesperson – is also interested in political success
whilst retaining moral integrity. The thesis therefore also considers the extent to which John
Paul II’s decisions contributed to the collapse of the communist government. At the time of his
election to the papacy in 1978, over 90% of Poland’s population adhered to the Roman Catholic
faith, and the Catholic Church wielded considerable political authority in Poland.35 At the same

Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft,’ 29.
The Pope’s strategy under the ostpolitik is explored in John M. Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s
“Ostpolitik”,’ The Review of Politics 42, no. 3 (1980): 283–308; J. B. Hehir, ‘Papal Foreign Policy’,
Foreign Policy, no. 78 (1990): 26–48; Francis Rooney, The Global Vatican: An Inside Look at the
Catholic Church, World Politics, and the Extraordinary Relationship between the United States and
the Holy See (Maryland, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013)
35
James E. Will, ‘Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland’, Journal of Law and
Religion 2, no. 1 (1984): 154–6.
33
34
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time, low wage growth and rising food prices, coupled with increasing government debt to
finance expenditure, stagnated the Polish economy.36 The Soviet Union’s abandonment of its
direct military intervention policy, under Gorbachev, also increased the Polish people’s
confidence to organise mass political opposition.37 These factors contributed to what Glendon
describes as the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and luck”, which facilitated
the effectiveness of John Paul II’s political strategy. 38
The scope of analysis is also limited to the Polish context under communism. It
excludes arguments that link the collapse of communism in Poland with the collapse of the
entire Soviet Union. Some commentators take a linear approach to the events between 19891991,39 extrapolating a kind of domino effect where Poland caused the collapse of the entire
Soviet Union. The literature is not settled on this issue, as scholars argue this is an overly
simplistic analysis.40 Therefore, the present thesis limits the area of analysis to the Polish
context during John Paul II’s papacy – between 1978-1989 – and does not engage the contested
literature on the links between the revolution of 1989 in Poland and the rest of the Soviet Union.

36

Weigel, The Final Revolution, 26–7.
Mary Buckley, ‘The Multifaceted External Soviet Role in Processes Towards Unanticipated
Revolutions’, in The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to
Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 55-72.
38
Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii.
39
See Kraszewski, ‘Catalyst for Revolution’; Matthew McDermott and Kevin Stibbe, ‘The Collapse
of Communism in Eastern Europe: Origins, Processes, Outcomes’, in The 1989 Revolutions in
Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2013), 3.
40
Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, ‘The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the
Communist Collapse’, World Politics 59, no. 1 (2006): 84.
37
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Chapter One
Introduction
Mary Ann Glendon’s The Forum and The Tower examines the lives and decisions of
prominent scholars and statespersons who “grappled with tensions between political ideals and
practical realities.”41 This chapter aims to show that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics
help understand Mary Ann Glendon’s thought about the relationship between political theory
and political practice, outlined in The Forum and The Tower. The aim of the chapter is to
contextualise Glendon’s project within contemporary discussions of Aristotle’s Ethics and
Politics.42
This chapter considers Aristotle’s account of virtue, in particular as to how virtue
applies to Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for
those ambitious with a view to virtue” are “philosophy” and “politics”.43 The thesis draws
mainly from Copletson’s A History of Philosophy to explain how virtue is both a mean point
between extremes of action and an excellence towards the good for the individual.44 The
chapter aims to show The Forum and The Tower draws from Aristotelian concepts to define
the life of philosophy and the life of politics, and the intersection between them. The chapter
will show that within Aristotelian virtue ethics, philosophy and politics intersect in the moral
process of deliberation about how to achieve ends, or goals. Ends will also be defined within
Aristotle’s virtue ethics as goods, things toward which persons aim for the sake of the goal,

41

Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii.
All page numbers and paragraph in-text references of Aristotle’s works are, unless specified in a
footnote, cited in the following translation: Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
43
Cited in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, ix.
44
Frederick Copleston, SJ, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books,
1963).
42
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and not any other object or aim.45 Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue,46 it is possible
to discern that, across the examples in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians
deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and “mean” forms
of political judgment. An excessive commitment to conceptions of ends is one extreme of
political judgment; on the other extreme is an abandonment of moral virtue for the sake of
immediate advantages. The present thesis will show how Glendon’s concept of the ideal
statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise man” to which Aristotle refers as the model of
practical wisdom (EN1106b 36-1107a2).

Section One: An Overview of The Forum and The Tower
In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon presents a vocational dilemma that several of
her students come to her with: is politics such a dirty business, that if I entered I would lose my
moral compass? Glendon lists the kinds of questions men and women interested in public
service grapple with in the face of this tension,
How should one comport himself or herself as a member of a regime that may be far
from being even second best? How much should one compromise for the sake of getting
and keeping a position from which one might be able to influence the course of events?
How much should one compromise for the sake of achieving a higher political goal?
Are private morality and public morality distinct, and if so, what principles should
govern political action?47

Jessica Moss, ‘”Virtue Makes the Goal Right”: Virtue and “Phronesis” in Aristotle’s Ethics’,
Phronesis 56, no. 3 (2011): 211.
46
Aristotle’s account of virtue comes from the Greek arête, which is often also translated as
excellence. For Aristotle, virtue is defined as lying in a mean position between prodigality and
meanness (NE II.6 1107a1-2). Sorabji explains that the mean position is determined by the person
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Glendon’s project is to answer these kinds of questions, primarily for those interested
in holding “theory and practice together with integrity”. 48 Glendon proposes that scholars and
statespersons have deliberated the same kinds of choices throughout history, making them
perennially meaningful and worthy of further analysis. In her words,
For as long as there have been governments and people to study them, statespersons
and scholars have pondered the relative merits of life in the public forum and life in the
ivory tower – the different skills required, the temperaments suited for one or the other
way of life, and the relationship of the study of politics to its practice.49
Glendon frames the deliberations of scholars and statespersons in The Forum and The
Tower within the study of governments. Scholars and statespersons, Glendon writes, consider
the relationship between the study of politics and the practice of politics. Glendon terms the
life dedicated to the study of politics as “life in the ivory tower” and the life dedicated to the
practice of politics as “life in the public forum”. The “merits” of each kind of life, the skills
and temperaments needed to be successful in each are implicitly not the same. Glendon cites
the experiences of the “modern day scholar-statesman”, Henry Kissinger, to illustrate why
integrating the life of the mind with the world of action is challenging,
As a professor, I was responsible primarily for coming up with the best answer I could
divine. As a policymaker, I was also responsible for the worst that could happen. As a
professor, the risk was that the important would drive out the urgent. As a policymaker,
the risk was that the urgent would drive out the important.50
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Kissinger continues that the political actor “lives in the world of the contingent”,
dealing with “partial answers” that “hopefully are on the road to truth.”51 Glendon suggests
that observing the “wise statesman” is a means to learn how to work within situations such as
those Kissinger describes. Glendon describes the ideal statesperson as one who “combines
experience” in making sound judgments on “great affairs” with the “mastery of philosophy”.
In her view, Cicero personified this ideal, and offers his belief that philosophers should “not
stand aloof from the fate of their cities”, but learn how to, as the wise statesman does, “operate
within the limits of the possible”.52 Thus, The Forum and The Tower is a study of how scholars
of political theory attempt to influence the politics of their State.
How does Glendon propose to understand the distinction between and intersection of
theory and practice to guide the intended audience of The Forum and the Tower?53 Glendon
writes a collection of “biographical essays”54 to explore the lives and decisions of twelve
prominent political actors and scholars who face a similar tension to pursue their aspirations to
“make a difference”.55 Within these lives, Glendon’s method focuses on how the aspiration to
“make a difference” manifests itself in the decision-making process. In particular, Glendon
identifies instances where the life of the mind – the “tower” – and the life of political action –
the “forum” – intersect. Her method aims at identifying these moments of political judgment
in varying political circumstances to determine how conclusions from the study of politics
inform political decisions. Each person deliberates whether the circumstances in the present
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moment are favourable to the pursuit of conceived political aims, or are so unfavourable, that,
as Glendon quotes Plato, the only reasonable course of action is to “keep silent and offer up
prayers for one’s own welfare and for that of one’s country”.56

Thymos and Eros
On what basis does Glendon believe that the political theorist desires to influence the
course of political events? Glendon suggests that political theorists can possess a desire to
“make a difference”.57 For example, Glendon states that Cicero thought the life of public
service was “the course that has always been followed by the best men”, and that “brave and
high-minded” persons have no stronger reason for entering politics than a “determination not
to give in to the wicked, and not allow the state to be torn apart by such people.”58 Sometimes,
Glendon states, scholars can possess a desire to influence governments with greater emphasis
on their own political thought as advisers to rulers. Plato is such an example, in Glendon’s
view. Plato, though a distinguished scholar by age forty, believed that he had to be involved in
the decisions of governments lest he “might someday appear to be a mere man of words, one
who would never of his own will lay his hand to any act”.59 Glendon suggests that the
experiences of prominent scholars and statespersons show that desires for a certain kind of life
do influence the process of deliberation.
Abizadeh explains there are rational and non-rational forces, or “passions”, that drive
the wise statesperson, which are fundamental to making choices (prohairesis).60 Glendon’s
framework uses rational and non-rational concepts to suggest that the content of a scholar’s

56

Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 14.
Ibid., 7.
58
Ibid., 6.
59
Plato, ‘Seventh Letter’, in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 4. On the other hand, John Locke,
observes Glendon, was “quite content” to live his life as a scholar at Oxford. However, by his midthirties, chance encounters with prominent politicians had brought him to a kind of influence as an
adviser to governments to which “Plato had aspired in vain”.
60
Arash Abizadeh, ‘The Passions of the Wise: “Phronêsis”, Rhetoric, and Aristotle's Passionate
Practical Deliberation’, The Review of Metaphysics 56, no. 2 (2002): 268.
57

19 | P a g e

political aims are shaped by both “reason and passion”;61 she explicitly uses thymos and eros,
which she simply defines as a “spiritedness” and the “love of fame” that are the “ruling passion
of the noblest minds.”62 Such passions, Glendon argues, drove some of the figures she profiles
“to pursue a life in the public forum”; while others placed the quest for knowledge at the centre
of their energies.63
Glendon offers little to explain what role thymos and eros play in her method. However,
scholarly considerations of these concepts shows that integrating political thought with
political action is desirable; and this does seem to be the sense in which Glendon offers these
concepts. That is, Glendon employs eros and thymos as manifestations of the desire for a
holistic approach to ethics and the realisation of conclusions of ethics in the political life.
To understand how this is the case, Cooper explains both thymos and eros are major
psychic forces within the soul. They are also complex and ambiguous, and he treats them
separately in his essay, “Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of the
Republic”.64 Cooper situates these concepts within Plato’s account of the soul,65 which consists
of three parts – the rational, the spirited, and the desiring. Each part of the soul can be
considered a “faction”, which creates a contest between factions for dominance. This contest
is analogous to life in the polity. Like the city, the soul is subject to faction, each part clashing,
causing harm and ill harmony when it is not resolved. The proper way to understand the soul
is not of different parts pulling in different directions, but rather a contest for the same end:
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rule.66 Thus, a different part of the soul can be dominant in directing the will towards a certain
kind of action.
Cooper’s distinction between two kinds of eros is helpful to understand Glendon’s use
of it in The Forum and the Tower. Cooper suggests there is a “higher, nobler” form and lower,
“base” form of eros - the eros of the philosopher and the eros of the tyrant. These two types
are the most opposite, in terms of the ruling parts. The philosopher is ruled by a well-developed
intellectual part, and the tyrant of the lowest kind of desires.67 They are each united, however,
by a shared desire: eros. The tyrant’s eros is a love of base desires and raw appetites. This eros
directs the tyrant towards pursuing the passions that reside within the desiring part of the soul.68
Conversely, the philosopher’s eros is a love of wisdom. The philosopher is driven towards
wisdom, loving whole classes of things and “desiring wisdom.” Santas describes the feeling of
eros as the “sense of… radical incompleteness and… longing for wholeness.”69 Howland adds
that“Eros is definitive of the human condition: it is not a specific, discrete desire of a part of
the soul or body, like thirst, but a mysterious longing of body and soul as a whole for whatever
it is that will provide us with a comprehensive satisfaction.”70
That the satisfaction aimed for be “comprehensive” is an important aspect of eros.
Howland defines the aim of eros as “a kind of wholeness or unity.” The person with eros thus
“senses” that the object of their desire will provide “comprehensive satisfaction.”71 Such a love
is most proper to the life of the philosopher. Cooper explains that, “The culmination of eros is
in the love of the Good… which manifests itself in the practice of philosophy.72”

Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 345
Ibid., 348
68
Ibid.
69
Gerasimos Santas, Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love (New York: Basil Blackwood, 1988),
72–3
70
Jacob Howland, The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy (New Jersey: Paul Dry Books, Inc.,
1993), 38.
71
Howland, The Republic, 38–9
72
Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 367
66
67

21 | P a g e

With the fullest form of eros, the philosopher desires what is total and comprehensive,
which can only be through the practice of philosophy. The present thesis suggests that Glendon
employs the noble, or holistic understanding of eros. Glendon suggests this force is that which
drives the person towards pursuing the life of the philosopher, which has as its aim the pursuit
of the “highest ideals”.73 The present thesis will explain in the following section how eros is
paired with Aristotle’s statements in NE X6-8 that theoria – the activity of contemplation found
in the life of the philosopher – is the “best and most complete” act.74 This pairing is significant
for Glendon’s project because the theorist aims to work out what the best kind of life is, and
thereby work out the human good for their State. Glendon’s use of thymos shows that the
scholar will desire these conclusions about the human good to have political effect.
Strauss identifies thymos as the political passion.75 Zuckert explains that this
spiritedness can be aroused by a range of slights or insults.76 It has many manifestations, the
most common of which is anger. 77 What causes thymos? Cooper states that thymos is aroused
when eros is thwarted. That is, when the soul is prevented from attaining what it desires, a
raging anger arises that drives the person to rectify the wrong. This raging is thymos.78 Thus,
“thymos is born of and for the sake of eros”, and thymos can be understood as born of a kind
of war, and aims at victory (success).79
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Relevant to Glendon’s project is Cooper’s claim that thymos manifests itself in the
political life when the noble form of eros is denied. Thymos becomes a desire to act in the
affairs of the State when the lover of wisdom, i.e. the philosopher, sees their conceptions of the
good “thwarted” in the management of the State.80 Cooper argues that all persons know
“something” of what victory and honour are in ordinary achievements, but suggests that the
strongest manifestation of thymos is connected to when the best kind of eros, which must entail
the Good, or philosophy, is lacking in the State.81 It is the passion which aims to achieve every
political good, including order, justice, honour, victory, and like things. Thymos can become
the “natural ally of reason” in its effort to direct desire towards the right ends.82 Thus, the soul
that possesses both the thymotic and erotic passions will not be content to “stand aloof from
the fate of their cities” (the State), and aim at the highest political ideals.83
Glendon recognises that either thymos or eros can dominate as a motivating force in the
soul, which affects the political decisions of the scholar.84 In Glendon’s view, De Tocqueville’s
experience illustrates how thymos directs decision-making. Tocqueville was an esteemed
scholar, producing Democracy in America in 1835, which became an instant bestseller.85
Despite his eminence as a theorist, Tocquville confided that he desired political success above
all things. She quotes him, saying: “Do not believe that I have a blind enthusiasm, or indeed
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any kind of enthusiasm for the intellectual life. I have always placed the life of action above
everything else.”86
Glendon cites a passage from Tocqueville’s biographer, Andre Jardin, who states that
Tocqueville “could not conceive of fulfilling his personal destiny in any other way than by
active participation in political life.”87 At the same time, observes Glendon, though he was
convinced that “politics was his destiny”, he was, in Glendon’s view, “poorly suited by talent
and temperament for a political vocation.” De Tocqueville possessed a “fiercely independent
streak” that caused him to isolate himself politically from major political factions, which
ultimately left him largely politically marginalised throughout his twelve years in the French
Chamber of Deputies.88 In light of these experiences, Glendon offers Weber’s perspective, that:
“The qualities that make an excellent scholar and academic are not the qualities that make him
a leader to give directions in practical life, or, more specifically, in politics.”89
On the other hand, Glendon also argues that skilful political judgment absent of eros
causes a mode of decision-making that disregards the aims of philosophy. Machiavelli
exemplifies, in Glendon’s framework, the political actor who prioritises immediate advantages
over the pursuit of “higher ideals”. Machiavelli devised a method of political action that
focused on outcomes, particularly securing power and influence, rather than consistently acting
upon, and aiming towards, “higher ideals”.90 His method, writes Glendon, all but abandoned a
concept of political judgment oriented towards retaining moral integrity. This evidences a lack
of eros, in that integrated, holistic sense that Glendon seems to have in mind, in Machiavelli.91
As such, the example of Machiavelli’s decision-making suggests an approach opposite to Plato
and De Tocqueville: a rejection of the insights of scholarship, in favour of political expediency.
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Glendon observes that it is only rarely that the right combination of thymos and eros
enable the ideal statesperson to emerge. However, she believes Cicero and Edmund Burke are
two such examples where the skills of the politician and the wisdom of the philosopher are
found in the same person.92
It is only rarely that thymos and eros of the mind are as felicitously combined as they
were in Cicero and Burke. Some [in The Forum and The Tower] opted early for
philosophy or statesmanship and seldom looked back. Others… were tugged in many
directions.93
Cicero’s belief expresses that thymos and eros are manifested in the ideal statesman,
who combines excellence in practical decision-making with a deep understanding of
philosophy.
What can be more glorious, than the conjunction of practical experience in the great
affairs of state, with the knowledge of these arts acquired through study and learning?...
the person who has had the will and the capacity to acquire both – that is, ancestral
institutions and philosophical learning – is the one who I think has done everything
deserving of praise.94
Cicero and Burke’s legacies, notes Glendon, are among the few in history where each
are noted for contributions to political theory as well as for distinguished public service. Indeed,
she draws a sports analogy between them and an athlete who has represented at the highest
level in “both major leagues”.95 Therefore, it is Glendon’s view that, across the examples in
The Forum and The Tower, scholars aim at working out the human good through philosophy,
and can be drawn into the political life. The ideal statesperson, the kind of person Glendon’s
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student desires to emulate, will be one who, like Cicero, combines political experience with a
mastery of philosophy.
Part of the skill of operating within the “limits of the possible,” is the political
environment of the State. Unfavourable political conditions provide tension between the
scholar’s “political ideals” and “practical realities”. Indeed, Glendon believes that the “optimal
confluence of gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck” are repeatedly “elusive”. For this
reason, this optimal confluence requires more than just a proper balance of thymos and eros,
but also the skills of deliberation, and knowledge of the right ends of politics. Scholars must
learn how to deliberate when the time is right to “speak [the] truth (of one’s convictions) to
power” and when it is better to “speak the truth with measure” as part of a “prudent
accommodation” to gain or retain, a position of influence.96
To understand how Glendon uses the relationship between political thought and
political action, the present thesis asks, how does Aristotle’s concept of virtue manifest itself
in the deliberations of the examples in The Forum and The Tower? The following section aims
to show how Aristotle’s virtue ethics can help understand the concepts Glendon employs in
The Forum and The Tower. Contemporary debates on Aristotle’s view of the best kind of life
helps contextualise Glendon’s thought about the pursuit of philosophy and politics.

Section Two: Understanding Glendon’s Project through Aristotle
The present thesis employs Aristotelian virtue ethics to understand The Forum and The
Tower because Glendon states her method follows Aristotle’s Ethics.97 Aristotelian influence
can be found in multiple instances in The Forum and The Tower, particularly when considering
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his view that effective statesmanship requires virtue.98 Glendon employs Aristotle’s
observation that a tension exists between political decision-making and a desired political aim
because leaders have to act, and often with only partial information. Decisions must be made
sometimes without the benefit of a symmetry between one’s principles and actions likely to
succeed, when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”99 Such circumstances,
Aristotle observes, drive virtuous men and women away from politics and government because
of the fear of corrupting their moral character.100 However, these persons remain intensely
interested in perennial political arguments – arguments about “human nature, reason and
passion, tradition and innovation, liberty and law.”101 Glendon suggests Aristotle’s Ethics as a
conceptual lens through which to understand the desire to hold theory and practice together
with integrity. Glendon quotes from Aristotle’s Politics as the opening to The Forum and The
Tower,
There is a dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy life is that
accompanied by virtue as to whether the political and active way of life is choiceworthy,
or rather that which is divorced from all external things – that involving some sort of
study, for example – which some assert is the only philosophic way of life. For it is
evident that these two ways of life are the ones intentionally chosen by those human
beings who are most ambitious with a view to virtue, both in former times and at the
present; the two I mean are the political and the philosophic.102

The two ways of life chosen by “human beings who are most ambitious with a view to
virtue” are the path of either study (called the philosophic way of life) or the political, active
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way of life. As the previous section has shown, Glendon’s framework highlights interior
passions of eros and thymos. Glendon uses a holistic view of eros as a passion that directs the
person towards the life of the philosopher, and thymos as the passion that directs the
philosopher towards political action.103 Thus, the passions Glendon uses in The Forum and The
Tower are consistent with Aristotle’s perspective that the best kind of life is either philosophy,
or the political life. Therefore, Aristotle is employed as a starting point to understand how
different scholars and statespersons deliberate the merits of each kind of life – philosophy and
politics – to their goal of making a difference. The present thesis turns to Aristotle’s view of
“virtue” as a concept that can merge the aims of philosophy and politics in the process of
deliberation in Glendon’s framework.

Understanding Aristotle’s Virtue: Mean and Excellence
Aristotle defines virtue as a “disposition to choose, consisting essentially in a mean
relatively to us determined by a rule, i.e. the rule by which a practically wise person would
determine it” (EN1106b 36-1107a2). The person who has “practical wisdom” knows, through
experience and through the orthos logos (the right rule NE II.2 1103b31-34), what action is
required in particular instances.104 In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two
kinds of virtue – intellectual virtue, and character (or moral) virtue (ethike arête).105 Intellectual
virtues are of the “rational part of the soul”, while character virtues are of the non-rational part
of the soul (though this does not mean “irrational”, as this part is still responsive to reason).106
Intellectual virtues aim at truth as its object, for its own sake, while character virtue aims at
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truth, not for its own sake, but for practical purposes.107 The practical nature of the moral virtues
are most relevant to Glendon’s project. Glendon wants to know how to influence the public
sphere in light of reflections on the human good. Copleston explains that Aristotle’s Ethics and
Politics are each concerned with the human good. In the Ethics, Aristotle considers what human
activities are constitutive of a “good life”, and indeed whether there is such a thing as the good
kind of life. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts that the task of political science is to work out the
human good, and that the individual and the State have the same good.108 Copleston states,
Ethics, then, are regarded by Aristotle as a branch of political or social science: we
might say that he treats first of individual ethical science and secondly of political
ethical science, in the Politics.109
Copleston continues that one learns about how to be virtuous through observing the moral
judgments of the person “who was generally looked upon as good and virtuous”. Moss
explains that Aristotle defines virtue as “prohairetic”, which is itself a state of “issuing
decisions.” Virtue is that which makes decisions right.110 Thus, virtue is learned through
observing the decisions of the one generally looked upon as virtuous.111 This kind of moral
learning is evident in Glendon’s project. The aim of The Forum and The Tower is to observe
the decisions, particularly the moral judgments, of those considered able to make judgments
well. Understanding how to identify what the right judgments are of the virtuous person is thus
fundamental to Glendon’s approach.
Copleston argues that Aristotle’s account of virtue has a “double position”. In the
“ontological dimension” virtue is a mean; in the “axiological dimension” virtue is an
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excellence. In the ontological dimension, good actions have an order or proportion, according
to Copleston. This proportion is a mean between two extremes, where each extreme is a vice.
One extreme is a vice through excess, the other is a vice through deficiency. The mean is the
virtue.112 The excess and defect can be in regards to a feeling or an action. For example, with
the feeling of anger, it is proportionate to experience a great amount of anger at the sight of the
innocent being tortured, while the defect would be apathy towards seeing the torture. In the
same vein, it would be an excess to show the same great amount of anger when witnessing
torture, as at dropping one’s ice-cream. The mean is thus a proportionate response. Urmson
explains,
…if a man has excellence of character he likes acting in a proper way, feeling emotions
which he can manifest with pleasure, since there is no internal struggle… To have one's
emotions and actions in a mean, says Aristotle, is to feel and manifest each emotion
when, on what matters, toward such people, for what reasons and in such a manner as
is proper.113
With action, the mean point is determined by the goal. For instance, with the action of giving
money, the excess is “prodigality”, which is a vice, and the defect is “illiberality” or
“stinginess”, another vice. The mean point is liberality, or generosity – which does not give
away too much, to the wrong cause, at the wrong time, nor too little to the right cause. The
virtue of generosity is choosing the mean point between excess and deficiency, giving a
proportionate amount of money to the right cause.114 Sorabji offers a comparable view of the
virtue of generosity to Copleston, noting that phronesis enables a person “in the light of his
conception of the good life in general,” to discern what act constitutes generosity in a particular
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instance. That is, “A picture of the good life will save him from giving away too much, or too
little, or to the wrong causes, in particular instances.”115
Copleston uses a map, or graph, developed by Hartmann,116 that can be used to illustrate
the relationship between ends and means, or excellence and the mean, in Aristotelian virtue.
This relationship will be used to explain how the life of philosophy and the life of political
action intersect in Glendon’s framework. This graph is shown in figure 1 below. The
“ontological dimension” is represented along the horizontal ‘x’ axis, which forms the base of
the semicircular graph. This shows that the extremes of actions are called “excess” and
“deficiency”. These are placed at the extreme right and extreme left of the horizontal axis,
respectively. The middle point is at the centre of the horizontal axis. Hartmann states that the
graph reflects Aristotle’s view that virtue could not be assigned to either the category of “mean”
or the category of “excellence”, but to their “synthesis.”117

Figure 1: Hartmann’s Graph of Virtue
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is this not virtue? Copleston explains that virtue is not just a mean, it is also an excellence. For
Aristotle, excellence is actions aimed towards the good.118 For an act to be virtuous, it is not
simply a matter of choosing a “middle road” between two vices. The act itself must aim at
something desirable in itself – the good, which makes the action “right”.119 That the act aims
towards the good elevates the act from a simple “opposition to both vices” as a middle point
between them, to a synthesis of making the right choice for the right ends.120 At the same time,
the mean point is a practical guide that helps set limits on the right proportionate action or
feeling in a specific context. As Copleston explains,
It is not as though virtue were a composition of vices from a valuational point of view,
since, from this point of view, it stands in opposition to both vices; but it is nevertheless
a mean from the ontological viewpoint, since it combines in itself both the good points,
which, run to excess, constitute vices.121
Copleston argues the Aristotelian “doctrine of the mean” is not simply “an exaltation
of mediocrity” in the moral life.122 Urmson concurs, stating the doctrine of the mean is not a
fixed rule of moderation in all circumstances.123 Simple calculated compromise between vices
is a bad outcome, as the graph illustrates. Moral goodness, or virtue, becomes excellent when
the right ends are sought.124 On the graph, this is reflected in the vertical, or ‘y’ axis. The extent
to which one’s actions aims towards the right ends determines the height one reaches on the
vertical axis, towards goodness.
The map shows that virtue is a “double position”, as Copleston puts it. In one sense,
virtue is a mean point between vices, but it is also an excellence because it aims towards the
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good. Goodness can only be attained when one applies both the mean and excellence rules of
Aristotelian virtue. “Goodness” is both the highest point of the vertical axis and the middle
point of the horizontal axis. This illustrates that virtue is a “synthesis”, in Hartmann’s words,
of the right ends and proportionate means.125
The semicircular boundary around each axis completes the graph. The boundary places
a limit on the extent that extreme actions or feelings can move towards the right ends. The
closer one acts to an extreme on the horizontal axis, the lesser height that action can gain along
the vertical axis. Thus, within the virtuous life the person seeks out not only what ends to
pursue, but also deliberates what means are right in the circumstances to pursue those ends.
Urmson cautions it is a common misconception to consider practical wisdom as limited
to deliberation only in scope. This is not the case, he argues. There are two further skills
required for practical wisdom – which he calls “understanding” and “judgment”.
Understanding is the “capacity to sum up a situation.”126 This skill is exhibited in observation
– the person sees what unfolds before him or her, and assesses it accurately. This activity of
understanding is, on its own, more a “touchline” skill – it is not phronimos to simply sum up a
situation in theory. Practical wisdom is exhibited on the “field of play”; judging what is best to
do brings understanding from the “sidelines” into the “action”.127 In sum, practical wisdom is
a virtue that deals with action. It is a deliberative process that constitutes knowledge of the ends
that are good for the person, a sound understanding of the means available in the present
moment towards that end, and the choice to pursue the right means, towards that end.
The thymos and eros of the mind, as Glendon employs them, can be linked to Aristotle’s
description of “choice” as “reasonable desire” or “the deliberate desire of things in our power”.
This description shows, in Copleston’s view, Aristotle does not identify preferential choice
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with reason by itself, or desire by itself.128 Rather, Aristotle proposes that actions are a
manifestation, and in a certain sense embodiment, of some emotion (NE 1105b 21).129 Between
one’s own formation and understanding of their own desires, the person must work out what
kind of life to pursue. This task requires phronesis, which is a moral virtue that is constituted
by a “disposition towards action, by the aid of a rule, with regard to things good or bad for
man” (EN VI.5 1140a 30). As Copleston explains, practical wisdom is a “moral process”
concerned with a “practical syllogism”, of deliberation on means to achieve ends. For example,
A is the end; B is the means to A here and now; therefore, B should be done here and now.130
Sorabji observes that, to Aristotle, practical wisdom is the chief virtue of the statesman.
Practical wisdom can be applied in a range of settings, from the individual good, to the good
of the family or household, and the good of the State. But it is pertinent to the present thesis
that Sorabji observes that practical wisdom is the virtue responsible for working out the
individual good (called ethics) and the good of the State (called political science). 131 The task
of politics is to work out the human good – both for the individual and for the community (the
common good). Therefore, the task of working out the human good falls to the politician – or
statesperson. (NE 6.13 1144b17-1145a6; 10.8 1178a16-19; Eudemian Ethics 3.7 1234a29).
Therefore, in Glendon’s consideration of the “merits” of the life of the philosopher and the life
of the statesperson, phronesis is an essential practical virtue to help the person deliberate, and
choose, the best kind of life.132
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Eudaimonia as “Happiness”? Contemplation and Moral Virtue
Is there a definitive answer as to which of the two options Aristotle puts forth –
philosophy and politics – is the highest kind of life? Indeed, how does Aristotle determine that
these two kinds of life are the most choiceworthy, and not the life of a doctor, a lawyer, or a
builder?133 The answers to these questions on Aristotle and his account of the highest life
remain contested.134 It is precisely this contested space that Glendon’s arguments address,
making her work particularly appropriate to analysing the case study of John Paul II as both
philosopher and statesman.
To determine the best kind of life, Curzer states one must ask what activity, or activities,
constitute the best way to live?135 Rorty writes Aristotle has often been “charged with
indecision” and with holding incompatible views about the “relative merits of a comprehensive
practical life and one devoted primarily to contemplation”.136 On one interpretation of the
Nichomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics, the highest life is realised in the activity of the
most divine part of man, in accord with its “proper excellence”.137 This is the activity of
theoretical contemplation (theoria).138 On the other dominant account (called “secondary’ at
NE1178a9), contemplation is one activity within a wide range of activities that constitute the
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best kind of life. Contemplation is one good within a life of intellectual and moral virtue.139 Is
Aristotle contradicting himself by stating in one instance the happy life consists in one activity,
and then saying it involves a combination of activities? This seeming contradiction has the
added difficulty of Aristotle requiring other conditions for eudaimonia, including good fortune,
wealth, good looks, slaves and other features scholars find puzzling.140
Scholars have bracketed these competing accounts into the inclusivist interpretation
(moral virtue as the best life) and intellectualist interpretation (contemplation as the best
activity).141 This section will give a brief account of Aristotle’s highest life, and portray some
of the more recent scholarly debates around what his account actually constitutes. Specifically,
it will address the rational basis for the highest life as philosophy and politics. The aim of this
section is to illustrate how the virtue of phronesis enables a “synthesis” of the two kinds of life
in the ideal statesperson.
Aristotle asks what is generally viewed as the end, or ultimate aim, of life. He is
interested in working out if there is some sole end for the sake of which every action is done.142
Aristotle says if there is indeed such an end, then it would be worthwhile to work out what it
is, for it must be the highest good of all (NE I.2 1094a 23). Aristotle tells his audience in the
Nichomachean Ethics that the best or highest end aimed at is eudaimonia.
Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people
of superior refinement say that it is happiness (eudaimonia), and identify living well
and faring well with being happy (NE I.4 1095a 14-19).
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However, as Urmson states, Eudaimonia is a highly complex concept that defies modern norms
of definitions.143 The word eudaimonia does not translate easily to English or other languages
in its complete form. “Happiness” is a common translation; however, with its modern
connotations of feelings or as a disposition of contentment, most scholars agree this is a limited
translation of eudaimonia.144
Is eudaimonia a single end that all actions ultimately aim at, or is eudaimonia a
combination all the goods desired for their own sake? In NE I.7, Aristotle describes what
intellectualists, such as Richardson Lear145, and Bush,146 argue are the criteria for what
constitutes the highest life. These are that eudaimonia is: self-sufficient (autarkes), complete
without qualification (teleion haplos), particular to human beings, involves excellent activity,
and is the best and most complete end.147 And in a later passage at NE X 6-8 Aristotle declares
the life of contemplation to be the sole, highest, most eudaimon life. Tessitore148, Curzer149 and
Ackrill are among the scholars who argue Aristotle’s account of the best life is ambiguous. In
particular, Ackrill argues that it is unclear how a person can live a eudaimon life without moral
virtue.150 The present thesis suggests that within this debate, it is possible to identify philosophy
as that which entails the criteria for the highest activity.
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Levels of Ends for Happiness
On balance, the present thesis suggests the more convincing stance toward Aristotle
concerning this issue is expressed by Richardson Lear and others who hold comparable
intellectualist arguments that Aristotle believes contemplation (theoria) is the best and most
complete activity. However, although contemplation is the highest activity, inclusivists
including Ackrill and Garver point out convincingly that the answer to “what is the best
activity?” does not extend to practical questions of how to best live. The activity of deliberation
requires phronesis, or practical virtue, to deliberate about how to pursue virtue in the present
moment. The virtue of practical deliberation is proper to the moral life, not the contemplative.
The present thesis suggests that this debate reveals that Glendon’s ideal statesperson is drawn
from Aristotle’s “practically wise man”, who combines both the excellences proper to
philosophy and the moral virtues.
In Book I.7 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle proposes happiness, or eudaimonia,
is an end sought in itself, self-sufficient and most complete.151 Richardson Lear proposes that
the highest good must conform to the most complete human activity, which, she argues, is
contemplation. To understand how this might be, Richardson Lear suggests there are degrees
of completeness within goods in the Ethics.152 Completeness means the degree to which a thing
– that is, a good (a thing desirable) – is sought for its own sake.153. Thus the most complete
good will be associated with eudaimonia. Lear discusses Aristotle’s explanation of
completeness, which is:
If there is only one complete end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more
than one, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that
which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit

Howard J. Curzer, ‘Criteria for Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics’, 421.
Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 31.
153
Stephen S. Bush, ‘Divine and Human Happiness in “Nichomachean Ethics”’, 51.
151
152

38 | P a g e

for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of
something else more complete than the things that are both desirable in themselves and
for the sake of that other thing, and we call complete without qualification that which
is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else (NE I.7 1097b2834).154
Richardson Lear argues Aristotle is working out a way to narrow down a single, highest good
from the multitude of practicable goods human beings are able to pursue. This is what the
finality criterion does, in her view. If there are many complete, or final, ends, that which is
most complete will be what is sought as the highest end. 155 Goods must therefore be
distinguished between higher and lower, by their level of completeness. Richardson Lear
distinguishes three levels of ends – lower, middle and highest level ends. The first is goods that
are chosen for the sake of other goods – for example, buying runners to get fit for one’s health.
These are instrumental goods. Their purpose is subordinate to the further end they serve. One
cannot properly explain an account of them without reference to the end. The runners do not
explain themselves – they serve a purpose, to run, which might in turn be chosen for the
enjoyment of running, or for the further end of health. Regardless of where the chain ends, its
instrumental nature subordinates it to goods that do not need to explain themselves in this
way.156
Middle-level ends are those chosen for their own sake. These are goods that we choose
and deem desirable even if nothing further comes from them; they are desirable in themselves.
In achieving them, we have completed our aim fully. For example, medicine aims at health,
and health is desirable for its own sake; the end of health is not more perfectly achieved by the
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addition of another good.157 Such ends are more final than instrumental goods. Intelligence,
honour and pleasure, are also among those that Aristotle considers sought for their own sake.158
However, these ends are not happiness itself, as one does not declare he or she is
eudaimon because he or she has health, or wealth, or intelligence.159 Richardson Lear argues
that Aristotle places all the virtues in this middle-level end category. The virtues are chosen for
the sake of themselves, but they are also chosen for the sake of eudaimonia, supposing that
through them we will live happily.160 However, eudaimonia is not chosen for the sake of these
things (NE I.7 1097a34-b6). The moral virtues then, and their highest expression in the political
life, do not constitute happiness, but rather are middle level ends, which means they cannot be
the highest end in the hierarchy.
At NE X 6-8 Aristotle declares the activity of contemplation to be the sole, highest, and
most complete end.161 The eudaimon life is that which consists of the end which is the “best
and most complete” and is therefore the “super end” on which all other ends converge.162
Walker defines contemplation as an activity that consists in “the exercise of the theoretical
intellect according to its proper virtue of theoretical wisdom, and in actively comprehending
the ultimate explanations of things.”163 Rorty describes contemplation as the “self-contained
activity par excellence”.164 Contemplation is the most “end-like” activity because it is the most
enduring kind of activity, most self-sufficient, and is performed for its own sake.165
Contemplation is “fully and perfectly achieved in the very act” (NE 1177b1-5).166 Walker’s
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view concurs with that of Rorty, as he suggests for Aristotle, “the contemplative life is
happiest” because it is “organised around the properly highest end within a human life.”167 This
account renders contemplation the most complete activity, and the highest good. The task of
ethics is to work out the individual good, which Glendon’s students want to work out in their
discernment about how to best live. The intellectualist account suggests that the best activity a
person can engage in is contemplation. The present thesis has shown that phronesis is needed
to make deliberations in the present based on knowledge of ends. Thus, phronesis must help
Glendon’s student answer: how is the contemplative life to be lived practically? This is the
focus of the following section.

Section Three: Life in the “Forum” & Life in the “Tower”
Political Influence through Life in the “Tower”
Glendon suggests that the person who concludes the contemplative life is best can still
influence the State, and that it is important to remain interested in its affairs. In The Forum and
The Tower, Glendon observes that some of the figures she analyses “opted early for philosophy
or statesmanship and seldom looked back.”168 As the present thesis has argued, Glendon’s
holistic approach to the eros of the mind renders it a force that drives the person towards a kind
of unity or wholeness, found in the life of the mind. In addition to eros, Glendon’s use of
thymos as a spirited force drives the scholar towards involvement in the political life. As a
practical consideration, what is the best life for one who concludes that the life of the mind is
more choiceworthy than the political life? Bostock and Miller are among intellectualist
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scholars who suggest that Aristotle has in mind a certain kind of “lifestyle” or “occupation”
most proper to the contemplative ideal. This kind of life is the life of the philosopher.169
The contemplative life is often characterised as one devoted to studying or teaching, in
whatever mode best leads to wisdom (sophia). Walker notes life in the Aristotelian Lyceum
(where Aristotle taught) cannot be equated with the modern academic’s career. This frees
Aristotle from the claim that the life of the modern professor is happiest. Nonetheless, Walker
claims Aristotle idealises the academic, even “quasi-monastic” lifestyle.170 Urmson echoes this
view, suggesting Aristotle shows “too much enthusiasm for his own profession” in his claim
for the highest life as purely contemplative.171172 That said, Copleston acknowledges that
Aristotle’s “common-sense” approach recognises contemplation is not possible for any person
without certain pre-existing conditions, such as political stability, a reasonable degree of
comfort, friendship, and like things.173 Accepting these conditions as necessarily first
established, the best kind of life is one that organises itself around theoria; this life aims at
wisdom.174 In Glendon’s view, the philosophic and the political intersect in the life of the
philosopher through his or her conception of the ends of politics.175 The person who possesses
thymos and eros considers the individual good (ethics), and the good of the State (political
science). The philosopher in The Forum and The Tower has to use phronesis to work out how
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best to influence the course of political events. Glendon writes that, “scholars have often
exerted considerable influence on politics as advisers to rulers, or, indirectly through their
writings.”176 Further, a scholar’s philosophical legacy can “nourish” and contribute to future
political events.
However, Glendon considers that this mode of political engagement is far from the ideal
of the statesperson. Indeed, Glendon urges caution against efforts to have political influence as
a theorist without practical political experience. She states that, sometimes theories taken out
of a scholar’s context and reapplied in future contexts can have effects they never imagined, or
intended. 177
The ideas taken out of their original contexts can morph into surprising forms…the
ideas that migrate from political theory into political practice are often mere fragments,
yanked out of the context that gave them nuance and balance.178
Glendon’s advice is clear that satisfying thymos by remaining in the “tower” and trying
to indirectly influence the organisation and governance of one’s city or nation is an
unpredictable path. Glendon suggests that scholars emulate Cicero’s advice to philosophers:
Philosophers, Cicero said, should not stand aloof from the fate of their cities. But he
cautioned them that if they want to put their talents at the service of the polity, they
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must learn what the wise statesman knows: how to operate within the limits of the
possible.179
Not to stand “aloof” from the city requires a more direct involvement in operating within the
“limits of the possible”. A philosopher ought to remain interested in the affairs of the state even
only to ensure that conditions remain amiable to philosophy. Glendon has expressed this mode
of thinking in other works.180 She also believes philosophical concepts can have a lasting
impact on the shape of moral and legal norms in a political community.181
The present thesis suggests that Lear’s and comparable intellectualist arguments shows
that a unity of principles, desired through eros, is consistent with aiming for contemplation as
the highest end in the life of the philosopher. This is Glendon’s “life in the ivory tower”.
However, Glendon’s view remains consistent with the likes of Urmson, who argues wisdom
through theoria does not guarantee virtue in moral action. Indeed, a life of contemplation
requires dedication for a long time, as would be the demands of reaching excellence in any
profession.182 It is on this point that inclusivists make a practical observation: can excellent
contemplation provide clear choices to practical questions?183

The Inclusivist Solution to theoria in the “Forum”
Inclusivists suggest there is an intellectual problem with formulating Aristotle’s highest
life as the life of the philosopher. Ackrill observes: how can one good be chosen for its own
sake, and have intrinsic value, and yet be subordinate to another, higher, good? It would seem
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that a good that has intrinsic value in itself, but is also subordinate to a higher good, has no
intrinsic value at all, but only instrumental value. If a good is chosen for the sake of some other
good only, does it not render it an instrumental good?184 Thus, are not the moral virtues,
pleasure, or honour chosen only instrumentally – that is, for the sake of happiness?185
Ackrill proposes the inclusivist solution to the middle to higher-level ends problem.
Ackrill suggests that if eudaimonia is an inclusive end, that is, the composition of all intrinsic
goods (not instrumental goods), then these middle-level ends are all choiceworthy for the sake
of eudaimonia. Each good is a constituent of the whole that is eudaimonia. Ackrill here argues
that this does not render such goods as moral virtue, honour and pleasure to be of mere
instrumental value – that they are for the sake of happiness. Rather, these goods are
instrumental only insofar as they are intrinsically valuable. Happiness is a constitutive good,
inclusive of all noble and good ends.
One can answer such a question as, ‘‘why do you seek pleasure?” by saying that you
see it and seek it as an element in the most desirable sort of life… the answer to the
question about pleasure does not imply that pleasure is not intrinsically worthwhile but
only a means to an end. It implies rather that pleasure is intrinsically worthwhile, being
an element of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the most desirable sort of life, the life that
contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities.186
Ackrill’s view of eudaimonia is inclusive. Happiness is a composite good, achieved by the
performance of all intrinsic goods, including contemplation, but also the life of political
involvement. Roberts summarises, “excellence or virtue is expressed in functioning well as the
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kind of creature one is; humans are, by nature, rational and political beings.” For a human
person, excellence would be to be a good rational and a good political being.187 Moral virtue is
properly expressed in the political life.188 Thus, Walker suggests that Aristotle presents the
political life as the main alternative to the contemplative life. The political life itself is most
properly exemplified by the statesperson (EE I.5 1216a23-27).189 Aristotle’s virtue
countenances a proportionate response to a given situation. In the political life, the person with
excellent character continues to choose “toward the goal” (the end)190, but is able to adapt to
shifting political climates using deliberative judgment to choose according to the orthos logos
(right rule).191
There is no resolution among scholars on Aristotle’s account of the highest life.
Richardson Lear contends that the inclusivist account of the moral life as mot eudaimon cannot
be reconciled with Aristotle’s statement in NE X 6-8, in which he states that contemplation is
true eudaimonia.192 Further criticism made by Richardson Lear and others, including Stephen
Bush and Aristide Tessitore, is that the Greek word for most complete, or final refers to the
highest member of a set, but not the set itself. Thus, in their view, eudaimonia cannot be an
end that is the sum total of all other worthwhile ends.193 This would align more closely to NE
X 6-8, where contemplation is the highest good of all.194

Jean Roberts, ‘Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual’, in A Companion to Aristotle ed.
Georgios Anagnostopoulos (UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2013), 555.
188
Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’, 567.
189
Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’ 561, 567. Walker states that the
political life is commonly construed to mean the life of the statesman. However, he argues that
Aristotle allows for the life of moral virtue to be expressed by citizens and not just statesmen,
particularly at (EN X.8 1179a-3), where Aristotle states virtue can be exercised “even from moderate
resources”.
190
Jessica Moss, ‘”Virtue Makes the Goal Right”, 214–15.
191
Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 208.
192
Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 42.
193
Aristide Tessitore, ‘Aristotle’s Ambiguous Account of the Best Life’, 201.
194
Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 42–3.
187

46 | P a g e

The present thesis does not offer a final judgment on this debate. Rather, its purpose in
employing this discussion has been to illustrate that The Forum and The Tower draws from
Aristotle’s ambiguity on whether the best life is that of the philosopher or the statesperson.
This lack of consensus is the starting point from which Glendon examines the deliberations of
scholars and statespersons about the merits of “a life dedicated to philosophy, of politics, or of
both.”195 The virtue of phronesis helps explain how the person with thymos and eros needs to
deliberate about what “means” are available in the present moment to pursue their views on
the good life, both for their individual good, and for the good of the State.

Political Influence through Life in the “Forum”
Glendon proposes that whatever one concludes about Aristotle’s view that the
philosophic and the political are the two most choiceworthy paths of life to follow, what is
certain is that scholars can debate about great ideas or the “advantages and disadvantages of a
course of action, but statespersons must make decisions and take responsibility for them.”196
Hence, all of the scholars and statesmen profiled in the book “shared the belief that
statespersons should keep in touch with the world of ideas and that political theorists should
attend to what is going on in the life of the polity.”197
The challenge for the scholar is to become involved in the affairs of the state, as advisers
to rulers or, indirectly through their writings. The danger, Glendon suggests, is through an
excess of eros and the corresponding action of a zealous commitment to pursuing one’s
conception of the political good. A failure to operate within the power structures of one’s own
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State can render one politically ineffective. De Tocqueville’s “fiercely independent streak”
caused him to isolate himself politically from major political factions, which ultimately left
him largely politically marginalised throughout his twelve years in the French Chamber of
Deputies. Glendon writes,
[De Tocqueville] confronted the problem facing any politician who refuses to accept
party discipline or follow the party line: how could he maintain his independence
without rendering himself isolated and ineffective? Sadly, Tocqueville was never able
to solve that problem, and thus never achieved the political influence he so desperately
desired.198
Within Glendon’s framework, Copleston’s explanation of Aristotle’s virtue as both a
“mean” and an “excellence”, indicates that Tocqueville’s deliberations erred on the excessive
side of integrity of his own views of “ends”. Tocqueville was unable, in Glendon’s view, to
work out the necessary “means” in the time he served in the Chamber of Deputies to be
politically effective.
On the other hand, the challenge for the political actor is to keep their view of the good
for man – the very reason for their political involvement – in sight while deliberating how to
remain influential. Machiavelli exemplifies the person who chooses the life of statesmanship
over scholarship as their “central preoccupation.” Glendon relays that Machiavelli sought
diplomatic missions as a Florentine public servant during the early 16th century. His method of
deliberation emphasised the means to secure power, over the retention of any private morality,
or notions of the “good life”.199
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Glendon’s view on Machiavelli offers a process of deliberation at the opposite extreme
of virtue to that of Tocqueville. This shows that, among Glendon’s examples, it is possible to
identify different degrees of practical wisdom between the extremes of excessive commitment
to ideals on one extreme, and an excess of expediency over integrity of ends, on the other.
Machiavelli lacked the eros that could have spurred him towards more noble ends. In the
application of Aristotle’s virtue to Glendon’s framework, the present thesis can ask: is this
phronesis? Copleston explains that “prudence”, or “practical wisdom” is not the same as
“cleverness”. On his reading of Aristotle, Copleston views cleverness as the faculty of
deliberation that enables the person to find the right means to any particular end, even if that
end be “ignoble”. Cleverness is not phronesis because it does not aim at moral virtue, nor the
good of the State; rather, it focuses on whatever means can be used to attain whatever end is
desired, however morally perilous.200 On this reading, Machiavelli’s lack of the right ends in
the process of deliberation is more akin to “cleverness” than phronesis. Glendon’s view that
the ideal statesperson is one who combines the mastery of philosophy (knowledge of the good
for the individual and the state) with the experience of political judgment (sound deliberation
and judgment of means) is therefore the phronimos, or “practically wise man”, in Aristotle’s
Ethics (EN1106b 36-1107a2).
Thus, Machiavelli indicates a process of deliberation towards the opposite extreme, or
vice, to the example of De Tocqueville in the virtue of phronesis. Machiavelli and Tocqueville
are examples for the discerning student of less than ideal deliberations and choices about
political judgment. Tocqueville acts with a focus on ends that causes a defect of sound
judgment on means in the hic et nunc; on the other end of the scale, Machiavelli exemplifies
choices towards the opposite extreme of phronesis, displaying an excessive focus on means to
the detriment of the ends of politics and his own moral good. The ideal, most closely reached
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by Cicero among Glendon’s examples, is the figure worth studying as the synthesis between
the aims of philosophy and the aims of the political life. Within Glendon’s framework,
therefore, it is possible to identify the degrees to which scholars and statespersons synthesise
“ends” and “means” in their decision-making. Too great an emphasis on ends over means leans
towards an excess of one kind, and too great an emphasis on means over ends leans towards an
excess of the other.

Conclusion
Glendon’s The Forum and The Tower examines the lives and decisions of prominent
scholars and statespersons who “grappled with tensions between political ideals and practical
realities.”201 This chapter has aimed to show that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics help
understand Glendon’s thought about the relationship between political theory and political
practice, outlined in The Forum and The Tower.
This chapter has demonstrated that Glendon uses Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that
the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue” are
“philosophy” and “politics” as a starting point to answer her students concerns of how to be
politically effective and retain moral integrity. Copleston’s explanation of Aristotelian virtue,
as both a mean point between extremes of action and an excellence towards the good for the
individual, links the philosophic and the political in the ideal statesperson’s life.202 Philosophy
and politics intersect in the moral process of deliberation about how to achieve ends, or goals.
Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue,203 it is possible to discern that, across the examples
in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians deliberate about how to be politically
effective within excessive, defective, and “mean” forms of political judgment. An excessive
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commitment to conceptions of ends is one extreme of political judgment; on the other extreme
is an abandonment of moral virtue for the sake of immediate advantages. The present thesis
has shown how Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise
man” to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom (EN1106b 36-1107a2).
As a practical inquiry, the question of which is the highest life between philosophy and
politics indicates that philosophy is essential for the good life because it enables a grasp of
what is the best thing for human beings. However, it is not proper to philosophy to answer
practical questions of how to best live without reference to a different kind of wisdom – which
the present thesis has suggested is practical wisdom, or phronesis.204
The following chapter aims to examine how phronesis is employed throughout The
Forum and The Tower. This discussion will construct a “Glendon method” through which to
analyse the deliberations of the subjects in The Forum and The Tower. It will aim to establish
a graph of “practical wisdom” that draws from the discussion in this first chapter with
terminology from The Forum and The Tower and Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism”.
This graph is an adaptation of Hartmann’s graph of virtue, through an amalgamation of
Copleston, Glendon and Maritain’s work to illustrate how practical wisdom can be understood
through Glendon’s framework. Thus, the graph will be called the “Glendon graph.” The chapter
aims to show that the graph can be re-applied to a new context, which shall be Karol Wojtyla.
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Chapter Two
Introduction
The current research project has aimed to show how Aristotle’s virtue ethics informs
Glendon’s framework. Chapter One explored how Glendon portrays the intersection of
philosophy and politics. It outlined how concepts from Aristotle’s virtue ethics offers some
conceptual grounding on which to understand the challenge scholars and statespersons face in
The Forum and the Tower. The present thesis has identified that philosophy and politics
intersect in the virtue of phronesis, especially in the life of the statesperson. Glendon’s project
in The Forum and The Tower explores how scholars and statespersons deliberate how to affect
their political contexts towards their conceptions of political ends.
Chapter One identified Plato and De Tocqueville as examples of political actors who,
according to Glendon, exercised an excessive commitment to their own conceptions of political
ends without sound judgment of the political circumstances. It also suggested Machiavelli as
an example of deliberation that eschews moral virtue as essential for sound political judgment.
The thesis has tried to show how Glendon’s ideal statesperson can be understood within
Aristotelian phronesis, as one who combines a “mastery of philosophy” with experience in
managing “great affairs”.205 Within the explanations presented of Aristotelian virtue, this thesis
suggests that Glendon’s analyses of De Tocqueville and Machiavelli can be understood as
examples of political judgment towards the extremes of practical wisdom. Cicero can be
understood as the closest of Glendon’s subjects to the phronimos. Chapter Two aims to apply
these concepts further in close readings of examples in The Forum and The Tower. This
examination aims to establish a clear framework that can analyse political judgment in new
contexts.
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Chapter Two continues the discussion of political influence in the “forum” from
Chapter One. From the discussion on how Glendon’s method provides insights into how
phronesis manifests in the lives and decisions of the subjects in The Forum and The Tower, the
present thesis argues that an identifiable “Glendon method” can be established. This method
analyses the intersection of ends and means, philosophy and politics, thought and action, in the
decisions of the person in question. It aims to answer how it is possible to retain moral integrity
and be a successful political actor. The framework adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue to
Glendon’s project to establish a graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom. The graph helps
explain how the virtue of practical wisdom aims at political ends through a process of political
judgment that aims at the mean between excessive forms of what contemporary scholars of
phronesis call “political judgment”.206
This chapter considers contemporary debates on Aristotelian phronesis207 to help
explain how political actors in The Forum and The Tower engage in a moral process of
deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. Terminology from
Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” will be employed to identify excessive forms
of political judgment, which, Maritain argues, constitute vices.208 Following from this, the
thesis aims to establish a framework in which practical wisdom is understood as both a mean
point between what Maritain calls “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism”
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on the other.209 The method pays special attention to key moments of decision-making where
beliefs about the ends of politics might inform the subject’s judgment in an established political
setting. These are decisions that involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right
clashes with apparent advantage.”210 It argues this framework can be applied to a new case
study, namely on Pope John Paul II. The framework aids an understanding of Pope John Paul
II, specifically in how political principles inform his decision-making, in the established
context of Communist Poland.

Section One: The Glendon Method
Context and Political Judgment
The present thesis proposes that context is a fundamental element in The Forum and
The Tower, and is essential to construct a “Glendon method”. Glendon’s method illuminates
instances of political deliberation, where a judgment involves integrity of a political aim, or a
degree of compromise on those aims for some immediate advantage. Debates on the virtue of
phronesis help to construct a framework that presents “sound political judgment” as a mean
between two extremes, or vices, which constitute “bad” political judgment.211
Glendon adopts a “biographical” format in the essays in The Forum and The Tower.
This contextualisation of political judgments provides a ground map to appreciate how context
can shape conceptions of political ends. For example, Glendon states that Cicero’s preference
for the “primacy of politics” over philosophy as the “more illustrious” kind of life “perfectly
reflected the ethos of Republican Rome”.212 Context also helps explain the kind of political
conditions that generated opportunities, or hindrances, to the pursuit of political aims. For
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example, Glendon observes that Plato’s birth into a “wealthy and influential aristocratic
family” made it natural for Plato to believe himself entitled to a life of prominence in Athenian
politics.213 Conversely, Glendon observes that Edmund Burke faced significant obstacles as an
Irishman attempting to win election to the British House of Commons. Glendon describes
Burke’s context – 18th Century England – as particularly hostile towards Ireland, and especially
suspicious of Irish Catholics. The Penal Laws, for example, declared that no Catholic could
hold public office, among several other conditions. Burke’s Irish heritage hindered, in
Glendon’s view, his efforts the enter British Parliament.214
Glendon’s method aims to understand the conceptions of political ends as a reference
point for the value of moral integrity in the political life. Maritain explains that whatever is
considered the chief end of the state will determine what the statesperson considers the chief
means or “power” of the state. For example, if the aim of politics is the “common good”, then
the chief power of the state are its “organs” or institutions of justice. Peace is the measure of
the state’s “health” – its ability to move towards the common good. Maritain defines peace as
a constructive “struggling through time towards man’s emancipation from any form of
enslavement”. If the chief end of the state is power, which Maritain states Machiavelli believed,
then “military strength” is the state’s primary power, and its capacity to wage “war” is the
indicator of its health.215 The distinction between ends and powers or means has consequences
for the statesperson’s conduct. Glendon’s project emphasises that her audience is concerned
with retaining moral integrity in the pursuit of political success.216 Maritain suggests that what
the person considers the chief end of politics will also shape their prioritisation of moral
integrity in political practice. Should the chief end be the common good, then the statesperson
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recognises that being a person “good in every respect” is essential for retaining “clearsightedness” of the temporal good of human persons in the community. If it is power, it is
necessary, in Machiavelli’s words, to learn to not be good. Thus, in Maritain’s view, moral
excellence is closely bound to the aims of politics.
Glendon’s view is comparable to Maritain’s, as she observes that often the more
“decent” and noble the political aims of the person are, the more they “agonise” over decisions
that require compromise of moral principles.217 Glendon recognises, as Maritain does, that
conceptions of political ends shape the prioritisation of moral virtue in the political life. Thus,
when the political aims are noble, i.e. the common good, the desire for moral integrity is greater
than if the aims are less noble, such as those that Machiavelli espoused, of power and stability.
The implication for the phronimos is that the right conceptions of the aims of politics demand
a method of political judgment that avoids “falsehood” and any “slip of the will” entirely.218
For the purposes of the current research project, a clear explanation of the subject’s
conception of the aims of politics is needed to understand where their political judgments
involve a retention of moral integrity or a degree of compromise on those aims. However,
Glendon provides no definitive account of the right ends of politics. The Forum and The Tower
limits its analysis to where the aims of politics intersect with, or do not intersect with, political
judgments. The book does not compare the political aims with Aristotle’s notion of the
common good, or any other particular conception, of right ends. The method instead aims to
highlight instances of deliberation between acting towards an aim with integrity, or
compromising on an aim for some immediate advantage.219 The thesis adopts terminology from

217

Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 79.
Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 42, 45.
219
Glendon, The Forum and the Tower.
218

57 | P a g e

Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism” to enable an understanding of how political ends
inform, or are tactically ignored, in instances of political decision-making.

Section Two: Maritain and the Glendon Graph
The End of Machiavellianism
The current research project uses Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism”220 to
identify extreme forms of political judgment that constitute vices of phronesis.221 Maritain’s
analysis has the virtue of drawing clear but complex distinctions, which can contextualize
Glendon’s method so as to enable the construction of a framework. He examines the political
philosophy of Machiavelli to explore the interaction between ends and means in his political
judgments. Maritain’s essay identifies the challenges of pursuing the common good through
means that Aristotelian virtue describes as excessive or defective. Maritain labels the excessive
kind of political judgment “hypermoralism”.222 This method of action insists on a purity of
means that fails to produce any tangible political impact. It is an excessive form of practical
wisdom, because it fails to understand what the right means are in the hic et nunc and judge
accordingly.223 Hypermoralism causes political judgment to remain “something impracticable
and merely ideal”, where the practitioner refuses “pharasaically any exterior contact with the
mud of human life”.224
At the opposite extreme is Maritain’s term “Machiavellianism”. This term refers to a
method of political practice that eschews any notion of moral virtue as essential to securing the
chief end of politics. In practice, the person focusses on gaining “immediate success” (power),
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often at the expense of personal convictions (morality).225 Glendon explains that the aspiring
statesperson can try to rationalise pursing immediate political success. The person considers
the advantage of trading silence, on a particular belief about right ends, for a position of power.
The advantage is that from this newfound influence, they might be better placed to pursue those
ends previously abandoned. The risk in this method, Glendon observes, is that one develops a
pattern of trading long-term goals for immediate advantages, and thereby fails to achieve the
very aims one set out to achieve in the first place.226
Chapter One argued that phronesis is the virtue proper to the statesperson, and
combines an accurate understanding of the present moment and the right judgment on the
means to pursue the right ends. Sorabji, among others, argues that the wise statesperson needs
philosophy to work out what are the right ends.227 Phronesis is a deliberative capacity that does
not supply the ends itself. Rather, philosophy is tasked with supplying the human goods, while
phronesis must deliberate how to achieve those ends. Thus, philosophy and phronesis
complement one another in Aristotle’s wise statesperson.228
However, some proponents of Aristotelian phronesis argue that it is prudent judgment
for the statesperson to be “flexible” and avoid “fixed universals” of political theory.229
Ruderman, in his essay “Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment”, 230 argues
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contemporary scholarship among political scientists seeks to appropriate Aristotle’s concept of
phronesis into a model of political decision-making that limits the role of philosophy in
political judgment.231 Barber and Lyotard are among scholars who argue that Aristotle’s
phronesis can be used to produce a mode of political judgment that avoids “logical extremes”
on the one hand and a politics of pure “accident and force” on the other. 232 These arguments
aim to “assign wholly different tasks” to philosophy and political practice.233 Ruderman argues
this design is conceived as an “antidote to reason” – to remove any requirement for the
statesperson to “invent” morality, or rely on principles to base his or her reasons for acting. 234
This argument suggests a loose correlation between moral virtue and political decision-making
directed at achieving political aims.
Maritain proposes that there are degrees to which the statesperson can err on either side
of the mean, which can constitute what contemporary scholars call “sound political
judgment”.235 Maritain argues that the morally virtuous statesperson must use his intelligence
to devise “cunning” ways to achieve the ends in difficult circumstances, without descending
into “falsehood or imposture”.236 The distinction between – to use Aristotle’s terms –
“cleverness” and “falsehood,” in the means one deploys, is both difficult and imprecise.237 This
moral dilemma is the focus of Glendon’s analysis. She highlights the process of deliberation
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on means to pursue a particular aim that recognise the need for compromise, but offers no
precise point at which “prudent accommodation becomes pandering”.238
Maritain’s perspective is congruent to Copleston’s view of virtue; Copleston states that
for virtuous acts, the right choice will sometimes require an “excess” rather than a “defect”,
while in other cases the reverse may be preferable.239 Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use
actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of
the right ends. This section aims to explain how “Hypermoralism” and “Machiavellianism” are
extreme forms of political judgment, and explore how the political judgments of subjects in
The Forum and The Tower demonstrate operating between these extremes. It aims to show how
Glendon’s framework illustrates political judgments that lean towards excess, or defect, on
either side of the mean. It will suggest that the terms “integrity” and “compromise” can be used
to indicate a moderate form of political judgment that errs on the mean side of either of the
“hypermoralist” and “Machiavellian” extremes.
Copleston draws from a graph developed by Hartmann to explain “ends” and “means”
in relation to virtue.240 Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 below show how Hartmann’s graph of virtue
can be adapted to the current research project’s discussion of phronesis. The adapted graph
attempts to highlight how philosophy and politics, or ends and means, intersect in the virtue of
practical wisdom. The graph shows how the wise statesperson acts towards the mean, as a
middle point between extreme forms of political judgment. The graph aims to illustrate that
Glendon’s analysis of scholars and statespersons shows different methods of political
judgment, where some examples operate at the extremes of political judgment, while the ideal
statesperson acts towards the mean.
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Figure 2.1: Hartmann’s original

Chapter One explained Copleston’s argument that the Aristotelian “doctrine of the
mean” is not simply “an exaltation of mediocrity” in the moral life.241 Likewise, Urmson states
the doctrine of the mean is not a fixed rule of moderation in all circumstances. 242 Simple
calculated compromise between vices is a bad outcome, as the graph illustrates. Moral
goodness, or virtue, becomes excellent when the right ends are sought.243 The graph shows that
the extremes of actions are called “excess” and “deficiency”. These are placed at the extreme
right and extreme left of the horizontal axis, respectively. The middle point is at the centre of
the horizontal axis. Hartmann states that the graph reflects Aristotle’s view that virtue could
not be assigned to either the category of “mean” or the category of “excellence”, but to their
“synthesis.”244 This is reflected in the vertical, or ‘y’ axis. The extent to which one’s actions
aim toward the right ends determines the height one reaches on the vertical axis. The graph
below adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue, generally, to the virtue of phronesis, or practical
wisdom.
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Figure 2.2: Hartmann Adapted to a “Glendon Graph” of Practical Wisdom

The thesis proposes that the Hartmann’s labels of “excess” and “defect” can be adapted
to Maritain’s terms “Machiavellianism” and “Hypermoralism” as vices related to the virtue of
practical wisdom. Hartmann’s other terms, “goodness” and “badness,” can also be adapted to
reflect the aim or “end” – “practical wisdom”. “Cleverness” replaces “badness” as the middle
point between the vices, absent the right aims necessary for practical wisdom. Chapter One
outlined that “practical wisdom” is not the same as “cleverness”. On his reading of Aristotle,
Copleston views cleverness as the faculty of deliberation that enables the person to find the
right means to any particular end, even if that end be “ignoble”. Cleverness is not phronesis
because it does not aim at moral virtue, nor the good of the State; rather, it focuses on whatever
means can be used to attain whatever end is desired, however morally perilous.245 On the graph,
cleverness is a “mean” form of political judgment between “hypermoralism” – the absoluteness
of ethical claims – on the one hand, and “machiavellianism” – the denial of ethics and moral
virtue in the political life.246
The present thesis argues that the graph, when applied to The Forum and The Tower,
helps illustrate how Glendon’s examples of political actors make judgments between the
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extremes of practical wisdom. The following section aims to show how the graph provides a
visual representation of practical wisdom as the virtue proper to understanding how philosophy
and politics, theory and practice, and thymos and eros intersect in The Forum and The Tower.
It will argue for a method whereby one can read the political decisions through Glendon and
an amalgam of Hartmann’s graph of virtue, with Maritain’s terminology. When the method is
tested against Plato, his decisions are towards the “hypermoralist” extreme of practical
wisdom. That is, Plato’s decisions exhibited ethical absolutism and lacked immediate success.
Machiavelli can be placed within the “Machiavellian” half of the graph. It should, though, be
clarified that Maritain believes Machiavelli is a more moderate political actor than the term
“Machiavellian” denotes. As will be seen, Glendon considers Cicero and Edmund Burke the
closest among her examples of the “ideal statesperson”.

Hypermoralism
Maritain labels an absolute commitment to ethics and ideals in politics as
“hypermoralism”, which is an Aristotelian vice. Urmson concurs that an excess of commitment
to ideals is one extreme of practical wisdom.247 To Maritain, hypermoralism is an approach to
politics that is highly idealistic and largely impracticable. It involves the refusal to engage in
any form of political activity that is stained with the “mud of human life”.248
The purity of means consists in not using means morally bad in themselves, it does not
consist in refusing pharisaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life, and it
does not consist in waiting for a morally aseptic world before consenting to work in the
world, nor does it consist in waiting, before saving one’s neighbour, who is drowning,
to become a saint, so as to escape any risk of false pride in such a generous act.249

J O Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, .In Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 159.
Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? Perspectives
from the Review of Politics, 62.
249
Ibid., 61–2.
247
248

64 | P a g e

Maritain contends that “ethics” can become a “distraction” in political judgment, when the
person in question applies ethical principles as absolute. Such insistence severs the ethical life
from the political life, which, Maritain argues, ignores the “empirical practical wisdom” of the
nation’s moral and intellectual “instincts”. The “common inherited experience”, which
contains accepted values and beliefs in a kind of national consciousness, is generally more
potent than any “artificial construction of reason”.250
Beiner is among the scholars of phronesis who share Maritain’s criticism of a method
of political judgment that is too reliant on theory. Beiner states that there is a “natural and
unbridgeable gap between theory and practice.”251 Theory, Beiner argues, is rigid, inflexible,
abstract, and the product of “morally disengaged minds” concerned with “fixed universals”
absent of any adaptability to political circumstance.252 Ruderman suggests that this kind of
“rationalist” mindset informs a desire for a “rigorous consistency or intellectual elegance in
one’s mind”.253 This produces decisions that are “unable to elude the seductiveness of logical
extremes”.254
The present thesis proposes that Glendon’s analysis of Plato’s attempts at political
influence exemplifies an excessive commitment to ideals. Glendon highlights Plato’s two
attempts at serving as an adviser to Kings of Syracuse. His attempts to advise King Dionysius
I and later his son, Dionysius II, were his most defining efforts at influencing politics. Glendon
describes Dionysius I as a man who, among other vices, possessed “zero tolerance for
criticism”. Plato’s view on giving advice to rulers was that one should “never pander to
power”.255 The firm application of this principle caused Plato to imply in his discourse on the
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just man to the King that Dionysius was not an example of a “good man”. In Glendon’s view,
this was “not the most politic thing” to say. The king reacted badly and ordered Plato’s death
or sale into slavery.256 Plato’s rigid inflexibility on any kind of compromise on the principles,
or ends, of his own mind is evident in his Seventh Letter:
When government is being carried on the right course, it is the part of a wise
man to advise such people. But when rulers flatly refuse to move in the right
path and order their counsellors to advise them only about how aims can most
readily be accomplished, I should consider unmanly one who accepts the duty
of giving such forms of advice, and one who refuses it to be a true man.257
This kind of decision-making resonates with Maritain’s explanation of hypermoralism as a
“pharasaic refusal” to engage in the “mud of human life”. Plato can be understood as a political
actor who believes that immediate success cannot justify sacrificing moral integrity. Indeed,
Plato’s counsel is clear that it is an “unmanly” thing to advise a ruler on practical means of
pursuing an aim, should the “wise man” consider that aim not right. That he lacked success
through these means suggests this is not practical wisdom. Glendon observes the fault may lie
“not in the stars, but in [Plato himself]”, and the qualities that make an excellent scholar are
not the same as those that make a great statesman.258
The thesis proposes Plato’s decisions can be mapped onto the adapted “Glendon graph”,
which aims to show Glendon’s judgment on the extent to which Plato acts towards the mean,
or the extremes, of practical wisdom. Plato’s advice for when all noble efforts are spent, is to
“be silent and offer up prayers for oneself and for one’s country”.259 Plato could not bear to see
his ideas in their ideal form tampered with and amended, for the purpose of taking at least some

256

Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, 11. Glendon states Plato had to be rescued by a friend, who
repurchased him and brought him back to Athens.
257
Plato, ‘Seventh Letter’, 331 e-331 a., in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 79.
258
Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 166.
259
Ibid., 14, 79.
66 | P a g e

effect. This inability to compromise rendered him politically ineffective.260 Glendon’s view of
the limits of theory in practical judgments is expressed in other works and is similar to
Maritain’s. In Rights Talk, Glendon observes that a part of contemporary American political
discourse relies on abstract language, especially on human rights. This immobilises judgments
about what is practical and sensible, producing a form of “rationalist hyperliberalism”. This
subverts, in Glendon’s view, the skill of judgment to the abstracted sense of rights to a logical
extreme, particularly in the decisions by judges, bureaucrats and other democratically
unaccountable officials.261 The thesis suggests that judgments, like Plato’s, that rely on
principles, or ends, to inform political decisions without understanding what means might best,
move towards the aim are not practically wise. These decisions constitute a vice within the
virtue of phronesis. On the graph, this project proposes that Plato can be placed towards the
“hypermoralist” extreme. Figure 2.3 below shows this mapping.
Figure 2.3: Plato on the “Glendon Graph”

Plato’s political judgments, in Glendon’s view, failed to reconcile his insistence to
“carry out my ideas about laws and constitutions”; with his idea that the statesperson is “like
the navigator of a ship”, who learns to “change tack” as the conditions shift between favourable
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and unfavourable.262 Plato’s decisions show that he could not exercise tact in the form of
flattery or pandering to rulers; nor moderate his views on the just man to win immediate success
in the form of favour with Dionysius. This is reflected on the graph. Plato is placed low on the
vertical axis, to reflect his lack of success and sound judgment in his attempt to advise
Dionysius; he is closer to the extreme of “hypermoralist” than the centre, or mean. This reflects
his insistence on retaining his political convictions, or a “purity of means”, in Maritain’s
words.263 Thus, an idealistic form of political judgment constitutes a vice in relation to the
virtue of practical wisdom. This is relevant because it highlights the limits of theory, and of
principles, in practical wisdom. It indicates that theory is the “touchline skill”, as Urmson
describes, whereas practical wisdom requires additional skills such as good sense,
understanding and experience (NE 1141b17; 1142a14).264
Maritain offers his Catholic perspective that moral integrity is an essential component
in the life of the statesperson, who must also consider the eternal destiny of humanity – eternal
union with God. Maritain’s essay considers this goal as the only “perfect justice”, and therefore
concedes that it is part of the nature of temporal politics that perfect justice cannot be attained.
The “political virtues” aim at the “earthly common good” and such virtues are only “indirectly
related to the ultimate end of man”.265 Thus, part of the practical science of politics requires
the statesperson to make judgments that do not conform perfectly to ethical principles. At what
point, then, does compromise on principles, as an essential part of practical wisdom, become
morally destructive, as Glendon’s students ask?266 Debates on the nature and extent of
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flexibility, compromise and the use of “cunning” can be placed within the half of the graph
between “cleverness” and “Machiavellianism”.

Machiavellianism
Maritain recognizes the same problem that Glendon highlights in The Forum and The
Tower - that acting with moral integrity does not align with immediate political success:
It is true that politics being something intrinsically moral, the first political condition is
that it be just. And it is true that at the same time that justice and virtue do not, as a rule,
lead us to success in this world.267
Political ethics must maintain a “truly realist quality”, which Maritain argues that, when
usurped, is the basis of what he calls “Machiavellianism”. This requires learning how to pursue
political ends within circumstances that are imperfect with regard to the application of ethical
principles. For example, Maritain acknowledges the statesperson must generally learn “the
political toleration of certain evils”, such as new statutes of law that permit the “retention of
long ago ill-gotten gains”. This is because new human ties and “vital relationships” infuse these
relationships with legal legitimacy that are “in reality ethically grounded”.268 The pursuit of the
right political ends, encompassed within the “common good”, enables the statesperson to
resolve the “antimony” between political justice and political expediency. 269 Usurping these
circumstances for the “benefit of immorality”, on the other hand, is the essence of
Machiavellianism.
In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon suggests Machiavelli’s political thought as an
opposing extreme to Plato.270 In The Prince, Machiavelli counsels new leaders on methods and
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practices to secure power in sixteenth-century Florence. Machiavelli advises, “it is necessary
to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able to not be good, and to use this
and not use it according to necessity.”271 Machiavelli’s idea of political virtue is one of courage
and political skill; and rather than the Sophia Aristotle proposes, wisdom is simply canniness.
Moral virtue is a useful tool, but is not an end worth pursuing if it does not assist in the goal of
securing power. And there are even times where it is better not to be virtuous.272
Glendon observes that Machiavelli, though steeped in the thought of Plato, Aristotle,
Cicero, and Augustine, held that the ideals they aimed at to be untenable. These thinkers were
aware of humanity at its worst, and observed that human efforts would always fall short of
ideals. But each insisted on retaining ideals as worthwhile political goals.273 To Machiavelli,
accepting such aims would be disastrous for a statesman. To aim for such ideals, rather than
taking men as they are, Machiavelli wrote, would render a statesman politically ineffective:
[There is so great a distance] from how one lives to how one should live that he
who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than
his preservation: for a man who wants to make a profession of good in all
regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good.274
Politics, says Glendon of Machiavelli, should be based on empirical observation, taking men
as they are and not as they ought to be.275 Maritain argues that Machiavelli is not proposing a
ground-breaking science of politics that is highly practical, taking men as they are and not as
they ought to be.276 He quotes Lerner as “rightly observing” that “power politics existed before
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Machiavelli was ever heard of, [and will] exist long after his name is only a faint memory.”277
Machiavelli’s “radical pessimism regarding human nature” elevates bad politics to a normative
level. 278 Maritain says,
For not only do we owe to Machiavelli our having become aware and conscious of the
immorality displayed, in fact, by the mass of political men, but by the same stroke he
taught us that this very immorality is the very law of politics.279
However, Maritain distinguishes what he calls “absolute Machiavellianism” from
Machiavelli himself. Indeed, Maritain writes that Machiavelli would “pale at the sight of
modern Machiavellianism.”280 Machiavellianism is the rejection of any notion of the moral life
whatever, and seeks to employ “wickedness” at every opportunity for “immediate success”. In
contrast, Machiavelli has in mind the goal of political stability, and advises the prince against
vice and greed, should these threaten the aim of political stability. Machiavelli is thus
revolutionary in elevating a means of political judgment that abandons moral virtue as desirable
for the person, or as a component in the health of the state. However, he does not abandon ends
themselves, as political stability is still important for the state to function well. At the extreme
of Machiavellianism, the aim is the constant pursuit of power, what Maritain calls “immediate
success”, which is destructive for the person’s ethical character and the state.281 Thus,
Machiavelli is not himself an “absolute Machiavellian” as Maritain describes, though he still
rejects the importance of moral integrity in securing the right ends of the state.
Glendon’s quote from Villari, a biographer of Machiavelli, concurs with such a
distinction. Villari acknowledges that Machiavelli pursued an end, a “dream”, of a politically

Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 38.
Ibid., 39. Maritain observes that public custom and tradition encouraged feelings of guilt and
public pressure to be placed on the statesman who commits bad acts. What Machiavelli’s political
philosophy does is remove the guilt altogether, and establish bad action as normative for political
behaviour.
279
Ibid.
280
Ibid., 42.
281
Ibid., 52.
277
278

71 | P a g e

unified Italy as the “holiest of objects”.282 Unlike Machiavellianism, which denies any political
ends, Machiavelli had in mind the aim of a unified Italy. Machiavelli’s distinct political method
is exemplified in his belief that this aim would have been “impossible to achieve… without
recurring to the immoral means practiced by the statesmen of the time.”283
The present thesis proposes Machiavelli can be placed closer to the Machiavellian
extreme of the graph than the mean, shown on figure 2.3. Glendon acknowledges that
Machiavelli’s method of political practice won him important diplomatic missions that were,
in his view, important to the aim of political stability. He enjoyed political favour with some
rulers of Florence. However, Glendon observes towards the end of his life his influence in
politics diminished.284

Figure 2.3: Machiavelli on the “Glendon Graph”

Machiavelli created, in Maritain’s view, “a profound split, an incurable division
between politics and morality”. In the Aristotelian image of the practically wise man,
Machiavelli, though interested in some ends of politics, lacked the eros that Glendon says
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should have encouraged him to higher ideals.285 Hence, on the vertical axis, Machiavelli is
placed higher than Plato, but is still closer to “cleverness” than “Practical wisdom”. In support
of this view, Glendon offers Villari’s comment that it is uncertain whether “the excessive
immorality of the means employed may not, even while momentarily grasping the desired end,
sap the very foundation of society, and render in the long run all good and strong government
an impossibility.”286 On Maritain’s view, this antimony between idealism (wrongly confused
with ethics) and realism (wrongly confused with politics), limits the possibility of achieving
genuine political aims toward the common good,287 and renders the actor who pursues this
method of judgment, clever at best.
Therefore, two nearly diametrically opposed accounts of the “very law of politics” are
manifest in the examples of Plato and Machiavelli. At one extreme is a “hypermoralist”
commitment to ideals, and at the other a total abandonment of those ideals, both to the detriment
of politics and its aim – the common good.288 Glendon suggests that, in light of the experience
of Plato and Machiavelli, the need for “public servants who can negotiate such moral
minefields with wisdom and integrity is more urgent than ever.”289 Therefore, as Maritain says,
a “deadly division [is] created between ethics and politics both by Machiavellians and
hypermoralists”.290 The present thesis suggests such a division is exemplified in Glendon by
Plato and Machiavelli, as the hypermoralist and Machiavellian respectively. The mean point
between these extremes shall thus be the ideal goal for the statesman concerned with retaining
integrity to aim towards. However, as Maritain argues, and the example of Burke testifies, the
mean point itself is difficult to pinpoint.
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Phronesis – the Mean between Hypermoralism and Machiavellianism
Burke’s method of political judgment is a useful illustration of Maritain’s point that the
statesperson must use the skills of intellect, called “cunning”, to discern how to advance the
common good, and when to opt instead for what Glendon calls “prudent accommodation”,291
without “falsehood or imposture”.292 Glendon’s view of Burke suggests that a method of
political judgment that uses compromise and “cunning” without descending into “cleverness”
is possible, though it is difficult to identify the line between a prudent compromise and a full
betrayal of principle. Burke argues that “falsehood and delusion are allowed in no case
whatever. But, as in the exercise of all the virtues, there is an economy of truth. It is a sort of
temperance, by which a man speaks truth with measure, that he may speak it the longer.”293
Burke’s method of political judgment insisted on identifying what means are available in the
present moment to pursue a particular good, even if it only be a partial fulfilment of that good.
“It is a settled rule with me to make the most of my actual situation, and not to refuse to do a
proper thing because there is something else more proper, which I am not able to do.”294
Edmund Burke’s parliamentary career reveals several instances where his values
clashed with that of his government. Particularly, this manifested in Burke’s drafting of a report
on the Penal Laws imposed by the British on Ireland at the time. Though repulsed by them, in
the report, Burke maintained his government’s view that the laws were both “just and
necessary”.295 This example was characteristic of Burke’s continual efforts to navigate the
“tightrope” he had to walk between party policy and personal conviction. In some instances,
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he could advocate for what he believed in,296 but in many cases he needed to remain silent.297
This indicates Burke’s willingness to compromise his beliefs at certain times, to retain his
position as Member for Bristol. Indeed, throughout his career, Burke compromised on personal
preferences to align his views with his party.298 Is this practical wisdom, or too much
compromise? Glendon quotes Burke’s friend, Dr Samuel Johnson, who explains: “I do not say
that he [Burke] is not honest; but we have no reason to believe from his political conduct that
he is honest.”299 This view highlights the imprecision between “falsehood and delusion” and
the “economy of truth”.
Maritain recognises that although it is necessary for the statesman to be just in order to
“procure and further the political common good”, it is not sufficient always to be just.
Sometimes, Maritain observes, it is not necessary to be just, and indeed may be occasionally
more advantageous to be unjust to gain “immediate political success.”300 The debate on
phronesis between scholars such as Gadamer and Gallagher on the one hand, and Lyotard and
Timinaux on the other, highlights that the extent political theory and notions of political justice
ought to direct sound political judgment is unclear.
Lyotard argues that phronesis is “pure judgment”, and involves no reference to theory
to inform decisions. As with Copleston’s description of practical deliberation judging what
means can be pursued in the hic et nunc, Lyotard states that any decision must be considered
“case by case”, because “each situation is singular” and no external criteria can guide the

296

For example, Burke was passionate about free trade with America, which he called for in the
House of Commons. Glendon argues this move had negative consequences for Burke, a Member of a
port city, where his electorate turned on him, and eventually voted him out of office.
297
Burke is criticized for his silence on several causes many believed him to have firm convictions
on, especially the continued repression of his compatriots in Ireland under the Penal Laws. See
Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 137.
298
Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 145.
299
James Boswell, Life of Johnson (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1980), in Glendon, The Forum
and the Tower, 137.
300
Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 61.
75 | P a g e

judgment beyond what appears to be the right means to immediate success “here and now”.301
Lyotard denies wholly that any theory of justice can inform practical contexts, stating, “that is,
after all, what Aristotle calls prudence. It consists in dispensing justice without models. It is
not possible to produce a learned discourse upon what justice is.”302 Instead, Lyotard contends
that sound judgment requires “sensitivity to differences” and the “ability to tolerate the
incommensurable”.303 Within this framework, phronesis is only concerned with particulars,
and not with universal, or objective, concepts.304
Steinberger views practical wisdom a calculative element in the act of deliberation,
where the State sets the boundaries of ethics. Political judgment is “essentially neutral”,
particularly with regard to “specific political arrangements, procedures, or policies… [and
even] on the purposes of political society.”305 Steinberger sees the statesman’s work as
malleable to any political reality. Political judgment accepts political realities, and does not
seek to transform them into an established ideal. It simply acknowledges the system and the
corresponding values of the community, and as such does not critique the framework in any
way.306 The task of the statesman here is simply to clarify the best practice within what is
established as permissible. Barber concurs that phronesis deals with practical circumstances
that necessitate and even justify a “lesser degree of precision” than rigid theory. 307
Conversely, Gallagher and Tabachnick are among the scholars who argue that political
judgment devoid of political theory to provide ends is closer to Aristotle’s view of “cleverness”.
Tabachnick observes that Aristotle states the phronimos is concerned with “universals” as well
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as the “particulars” (NE 1141b15-16).308 To deny the aims of the common good is, in
Tabachnick’s view, detrimental to the health of the State, because it is the precise aim of the
State to secure the good of its members. Gallagher notes that for Lyotard, phronesis is simply
the “ability to play the game with inventiveness, to play ‘master strokes’ – justice is nothing
other than this”.309 Gallagher argues that while sensitivity to “working at the limits of what the
rules permit” is necessary, to then allow the State’s “generally accepted norms” to dictate the
common good denies the legitimate use of reason in politics.310 Indeed, the risk of “public
reason” providing the sole reference point for the “health of the State” leaves rational inquiry
into the human goods unable to correct perversions of public reason.311 The phronimos,
would not be able to share in this sensitivity because they would be focused solely on
the individual, unable to even fathom, let alone provide for, the larger or greater ends
of his shared community, the “human goods” [of which] Aristotle writes.312
Therefore, the “inventiveness” of the statesperson cannot function with respect to
achieving the common good without reason (philosophy) to inform the right ends.313 In contrast
to Lyotard, Maritain states that an approach to politics that denies the aim of political justice is
essentially “destructive” for a “nation as well as a civilisation”, because it gnaws away at the
interior ethical character of the person. The ethical character supports political justice, which
is the chief moral virtue and the very “soul” of human societies. It is through aiming at political
justice, and struggling against defects of it, that society is preserved.314
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In Glendon’s view, however, it is nonetheless necessary to “operate within the limits of
the possible”. The present thesis suggests that this discussion helps understand, though not
precisely, that cleverness and compromise differ through the presence of political ends.
Maritain’s view on the use of cunning without degrading into lying as “exactly the affair of
intelligence” renders some unjust acts permissible, and in some cases, necessary.315 Thus,
where can Burke be placed on the graph of practical wisdom?
Copleston points out that Aristotle believes one should not aim for the same precision
with ethics, as one would expect from mathematics. In the sciences, it is appropriate to search
for, and find, precise answers to mathematical questions. In ethics, however, only general and
approximate accuracy can be expected.316 As mathematical precision cannot be expected,
Copleston states that identifying what actions constitute excess, mean, and defect do not
conform to “hard and fast, mathematical rules”. In some cases, the appropriate action would
involve an excess of one kind of action, rather than a defect, and the reverse in others.317 For
example, in the virtue of courage, the situation might demand a more audacious act, rather than
a reserved one. This act leans towards excess from the ontological viewpoint, but as the
situation required a more audacious act, it was also a better choice. Therefore, it is possible that
actions that lean towards the hypermoralist or Machiavellian sides of the scale can still produce
the right outcome. Furthermore, these more excessive actions may even be the right means in
a particular context. However, the accuracy of the decision, as Glendon points out, is often
known only through hindsight. As such, the wisdom of these decisions is best observed “long
after the person has passed from this life”.318
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Therefore, a “grey area” replaces Hartmann’s vertical line through the centre of the
graph. It covers the full height of the vertical axis, between the areas of “cleverness” at the
base, and “practical wisdom” at the top. The grey area represents the difficulty in assessing
whether an action constitutes cleverness or cunning in the legitimate use of intelligence. In
Burke’s case, this thesis proposes that Glendon’s analysis renders it possible to place Burke
within the grey area of the map, reflected in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Burke on the “Glendon Graph”

Section Three: Reasons for Success or Failure And Limitations
On Success and Failure
Glendon’s use of biography to establish context is important for phronesis, as it
provides insights into the political conditions that the political actor must reflect on to
determine if the conditions either hinder or provide opportunities to advance towards an aim
with integrity, or through compromise. Unfavourable conditions, like those Burke experienced,
help justify Glendon’s judgment that he ought to be considered among the few examples of
statesmen worth emulating. Few opportunities presented themselves to Burke to advance his
aims, and thus, Glendon states, it is difficult to determine how he could have achieved more as
a statesman.319 At the same time, hindsight provides the opportunity to understand that the
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impact of one’s decisions can take effect long after one’s death. For instance, Glendon states
Burke’s accomplishments, though modest in his lifetime, set the forces in motion that
eventually vindicated some of his other aims, such as ending an oppressive system of British
rule in the East India Trading Company. Glendon concludes that “just because one does not
see the fruits of one’s efforts in one’s own lifetime, does not mean those efforts were in vain.”320
In this way, Burke can be placed closer to the “practical wisdom” end of the vertical
axis, rather than towards the “cleverness” end at the base. Burke’s calculated compromise
embodies, in Glendon’s view, the reality that political virtue alone is not enough to generate
successful outcomes. Indeed, she writes that the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable
conditions and plain luck will always be elusive”. Compromise on political aims to service
immediate needs is part of the imperfect and imprecise nature of politics. At the same time,
favourable political conditions can facilitate success in one’s political aims. Thus, part of
Glendon’s method is to offer context on whether the political conditions were favourable or
unfavourable for the specific political ends of the person in question. This enables her to offer
some judgment on the relationship between the political actor’s decisions and the political
conditions in the “reasons for success or failure”.321

Limitations of the “Glendon Graph”
Glendon highlights the impact the scholar’s philosophical legacy can have on future
political contexts. Locke’s contributions to the founding principles of American Democracy;
Cicero’s synthesis of Greaco-Roman legal thought later nourished Western law and politics;
Cicero’s works also inspired future prominent figures such as St Augustine; and Plato’s
philosophical discourses are studied widely today.322 The extent of the “difference” scholars
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and statespersons have made is an aspect of Glendon’s insight that graph cannot take into
account. It is limited to how the political judgments of the subjects in The Forum and The
Tower erred on either the side of integrity or the side of compromise on each side of the mean
in the virtue of phronesis. It tries to highlight how the person aims at an end, and has to
deliberate whether they will deploy an action that is compromising on their views in order to
reach that end, on the side of “cunning”; or if they will opt for a choice on the side of integrity.
The success, or failure, of the means chosen over the course of their political involvement helps
to answer Glendon’s concerned student about how different kinds of political judgment
contribute to success or failure.

Conclusion
The “Glendon graph” helps understand how conceptions of political ends can inform
political decisions. The method used to employ it analyses the intersection of ends and means,
philosophy and politics, thought and action, in the decisions of the person in question. Through
the application of the graph it is possible to retain moral integrity and be a successful political
actor. The framework adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue to Glendon’s project to establish a
graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom. The graph helps explain how the virtue of practical
wisdom aims at political ends through a process of political judgment that aims at the mean
between excessive forms
This chapter has considered briefly how contemporary debates on Aristotelian
phronesis323 help explain how political actors in The Forum and The Tower engage in a moral
process of deliberating the extent to which theory, or conceptions of political ends, can inform
decisions “here and now”. Terminology from Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism”
identified “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other, as labels
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denoting excessive forms of political judgment.324 The present thesis proposes that Glendon’s
method is to identify moments of decision-making where beliefs about the ends of politics
might inform the subject’s judgment in an established political setting. These are decisions that
involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with apparent
advantage.”325 Additional considerations of success and failure are situated within observations
on the political conditions the subject operates within. A key insight of The Forum and The
Tower is that often the circumstances in which the person tries to be of political influence, can
have a greater impact on the success, or failure, of their efforts, than their own choices.
The thesis will now test the construction of the “Glendon graph” and the aspects of
Glendon’s method that it visualises, in an original application of the method in a new context.
It will suggest that Karol Wojtyla, known as Pope John Paul II, is a candidate worthwhile to
situate within this framework. It proposes to offer two studies on John Paul II, in Chapter Three,
and Chapter Four, respectively. Chapter Three aims to describe the central features of John
Paul II’s conception of political ends, as the reference point against which to understand how
his political judgments are informed by his political thought. It situates his political thought
within his political context, in order to establish, as Glendon’s method indicates, how context
informs or shapes his political thought. Chapter Four applies the Glendon graph to a study of
John Paul II’s political engagement with an established context of Communist Poland. It
analyses how his conceptions of political ends inform his political judgments. Finally, it will
comment on the extent to which the political conditions enabled John Paul II to act with a
greater degree of integrity, than compromise, in this context.
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Chapter Three
Introduction
Chapter Three contains the first of two studies aimed at understanding Karol Wojtyla
within the framework. It aims to describe his political context, so as to explain how his
education and formation inform his passionate beliefs, particularly in the dignity of the human
person as the basis of fundamental human rights. In this context, the present thesis aims to
establish Wojtyla’s views about the ends, or aims, of politics. The study identifies Wojtyla’s
development of participation as the primary philosophical concept that informs his political
thought. Within the framework, Wojtyla’s experiences of totalitarianism and his development
as a philosopher produce a political philosophy that elevates the good of the individual person
as the goal toward which politics should be oriented.326 In particular, it aims to show how
Wojtyla’s political thought is critical of political and economic structures – socialism and
capitalism – that he argues produce outcomes that corrode the properly oriented concept of
human dignity, most particularly through the denial of his understanding of basic human rights.
The chapter addresses the first study in three sections. Following Glendon’s
biographical approach, Section One highlights Wojtyla’s intellectual formation in a
biographical essay. It pays particular attention to how the political and cultural dynamics of
Poland under Nazism and Communism inform his interest in the philosophy of the human
person. The thesis argues that Wojtyla’s intellectual development as a philosopher, poet,
playwright and Ethics professor at the University of Lublin help situate him within the “tower”.
Glendon observes that “some [in The Forum and The Tower] opted early for philosophy or
statesmanship and seldom looked back. Others… were tugged in many directions.”327 This
section suggests Wojtyla’s process of discernment, from wanting at first to join the
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contemplative religious order of the Carmelites to becoming a priest and train as a philosopher
demonstrates his choice for a life in the “tower”, rather than the “forum”. According to
Glendon, circumstances sometimes draw scholars from the “tower” into public life. This
insight proves applicable to Wojtyla’s case, given that he was elected to the papacy on October
16, 1978. Section One presents the context for considering how Wojtyla’s political thought is
influenced by his experiences living under Nazism and Communism. Furthermore, his
intellectual training as a philosopher shape his political thought.
Section Two goes on to establish that the human person is the central preoccupation of
Wojtyla’s philosophical development. Following the work of Wilk, Buttiglione, and others, it
shows how Wojtyla draws from the philosophical schools both of phenomenology and of
Aristotelian-Thomism, to develop the anthropology that provides the intellectual basis for his
political thought.328 Wojtyla ultimately aims to provide a philosophical anthropology whereby
the person’s irreducibility, as subject, is central. With this, Wojtyla counters any understanding
of the person through abstract definitions or ideological axioms, which he thinks ultimately
leads to a denial of personhood at the heart of human experience. This argument is the basis
for Wojtyla’s view that human rights need to be derived from the “hic et nunc” – the here and
now of personal experience.329 It suggests that Wojtyla has his own Polish context in mind.
Section Two employs Barrett’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights in
Wojtyla’s political thought, to highlight Wojtyla’s distinction between individual responsibility
and the role of economic and political structures to secure human rights.330
Section Three argues that human rights are fostered at the level of the political
community, or the State, through Wojtyla’s concept of participation. It engages Clark,
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Williams, Gregg, and Barrett, among others, to highlight that “the state exists in order to
protect…rights”,331 which requires statespersons to foster conditions where each person can
fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. 332 Wojtyla’s conceptual antithesis,
alienation, explains his opposition to any form of political system or human behaviour that
fails to treat human persons as ends in themselves. In his political thought, he is particularly
critical of notions of socialist as well as capitalist economic structures that claim to be good in
themselves. The implications of these ideas within the current research project are that Wojtyla
holds passionate and intellectually formed convictions about the ends of politics that are
fundamentally incompatible with the tenets of the political systems under which he was
educated. The analyses of Williams and Murphy show how Wojtyla employed caution and
subtlety in advancing his political ideas, in his philosophical works and in his limited pre-papal
public life, during which he was an archbishop and cardinal, while also a professor of Ethics.333
Arguably, a comparison can be made between Wojtyla’s experience and that which Glendon
locates in Burke, who adopted a comparable caution in his public life. This will be discussed
in what follows.
Chapter Three makes its argument by way of descriptive analysis. It aims to relay
Wojtyla’s political thought clearly, rather than to critique it. This clear explanation will enable
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subsequent analysis, in Chapter Four, of where his thinking can directly be either seen, or not
seen, in his political decision-making.
Before embarking on these three sections, this chapter explains why Karol
Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II is a fitting candidate to study within the established framework. To
resolve potential confusion over interchanging John Paul II and Karol Wojtyla, the present
thesis follows the approach adopted by Guietti and Murphy, in their translation of Rocco
Buttligione’s Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II. Guietti
and Murphy distinguish “Karol Wojtyla’s thought and John Paul II’s teachings.” When
referencing philosophical works, Guietti and Murphy “limit [them]selves to Professor
Wojtyla.” John Paul II is used exclusively for the Pope’s public teachings, such as social
encyclicals and public addresses. John Paul II’s and Wojtyla’s works will be distinguished in
the footnotes.334

Why Pope John Paul II?
Glendon’s method addresses the scholar who is passionately driven toward the highest
life, and tries to work out how to be involved in the practice of politics, whilst retaining integrity
of principles developed in their political thought. Therefore, any study of new figures in new
contexts must pay particular attention to the political ideas held by the person about how to
best live, especially as they apply these beliefs, or perspectives, to their political context. Their
efforts to be involved in the most “pressing political events” of their times constitute the arena
in which their decisions need to examined.335 Glendon argues these figures share both the
intellectual and passionate qualities, and that these traits are desirable for the ideal statesperson.
To establish new contexts to study within her framework, Glendon calls for attention to those
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able to successfully “bridge the gap between scholarship and statesmanship.”336 She suggests
that Karol Wojtyla – Pope John Paul II – is one such candidate worthy of study in her
framework. “One thinks, for example, of extraordinary intellectuals like Vaclav Havel and
Karol Wojtyla who were at the forefront of the movements that brought a nonviolent end to
totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe…”337
Glendon suggests that the “vocational journeys of such persons will one day be
fascinating and instructive to explore.”338 As Glendon herself has suggested Pope John Paul II
– Karol Wojtyla – as a candidate whose “vocational journey” is worth studying within her
framework, the present thesis proposes to take up her suggestion and examine Karol Wojtyla
as she has studied others. Glendon has helpfully suggested that Wojtyla’s involvement in the
collapse of totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe as an appropriate political arena to
examine the intersection of Wojtyla’s scholarship and political action. Therefore, the present
thesis aims to apply the methodology derived from Glendon, to Karol Wojtyla as a political
theorist, with special attention to his engagement as a political actor with totalitarian
governments in Eastern Europe.

Section One: The Biographical Context of John Paul II

The Role of Context in Karol Jozef Wojtyla: A Brief Biography
Karol Jozef Wojtyla (b. 18 May 1920 d. 1 April 2005) was the first non-Italian Pope
elected to the papacy in over 455 years.339 His election to the papacy took the Catholic world
by surprise – Wojtyla was just 58 years old – a relatively young age for a pontiff in the twentieth
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century.340 Further, unlike several of his predecessors he was untrained in the Italian-style
Vatican diplomatic corps; nor was he from a noble family.341 Instead, Wojtyla was the first
Pope from Poland in the Church’s history, and his professional and personal background was
more unconventional for a pontiff than any Pope before him. Wojtyla was a priest, a
philosopher and an Ethics professor, who came from a small town named Wadowice, in
Poland.342 Rowland observes that by 1978, Wojtyla’s curriculum vitae read “something like:
poet, priest, philosopher, playwright, Pope.”343 The present thesis suggests that applying the
Glendon framework shows how Wojtyla’s “unconventional” context shapes his political
thought, especially on how human dignity shapes the rights of individuals in economic, social
and political life in the Polish State.
Suffering marked much of Wojtyla’s upbringing in Poland. He was largely raised by
his father – a middle-ranking officer in the Polish Army – having lost both his mother and his
elder brother while he was still young. He attended the local schools and was raised as a devout
Catholic by his father, as was the experience of many Polish children. When he was just twenty
years old, his father also passed away. On top of the loss of his family, Wojtyla also experienced
the death of several close friends, especially Jews, during the Nazi Occupation of Poland in the
Second World War. Cooper notes anti-Semitism was prevalent in Poland during Wojtyla’s
youth, but that Wojtyla often extended “heroic support” to Jews, especially throughout the Nazi
occupation of Poland, emblematic of his growing passion for the dignity of all persons.344
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Wojtyla later commented following his father’s death that, by the age of twenty, “I had already
lost every person I had ever loved”.345 The personal loss was reflected across Poland, which
had lost one fifth of its national population between 1939-1945.
In this context of war, suffering, and death, Wojtyla contemplated the merits of the
vocation of the Diocesan Priesthood, or a more radical form of spirituality and contemplation
with the religious order known as the Carmelites. Weigel observes that by 1945, Wojtyla had
been “wrestling for some time” with the question of whether to enter the Discalced Carmelite
monastery to pursue a “contemplative life in complete withdrawal from the world.” 346 The
attraction of the contemplative life suggests, in the Glendon framework, the strong presence of
the noble, holistic form of eros in Wojtyla’s deliberation. Further, Maritain’s observation that
the ultimate human good in the Christian context is the eternal union with God, suggests this
kind of contemplative vocation is reflective of a pursuit of the highest, most complete, kind of
life.347 Wojtyla took the advice of his superior and Prince Archbishop, Cardinal Stefan Sapieha,
who counselled him to complete his studies and formation of the Diocesan Priesthood. Wojtyla
was ordained a priest on November 1, 1946 by Cardinal Stefan Sapieha, aged 26.348
Wojtyla retained his interest in the Carmelites, even after his ordination to the
priesthood. Immediately after his ordination, Wojtyla was posted to the Dominican Faculty of
Theology in Rome, known as the Angelicum, to complete his doctorate in Theology. His choice
to complete his Doctorate in Theology on Saint John of the Cross – a Carmelite mystic –
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highlights the retention of his interest in the merits of the order.349 During his studies at the
Angelicum, Wojtyla was exposed to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, through the tutelage
of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.350 Buttiglione states Garrigou-Lagrange was a major influence
on Wojtyla’s early philosophical formation, particularly through introducing Wojtyla to the
thought of Saints Thomas Aquinas and John of the Cross. This influence is reflected in his
doctorate, where Wojtyla attempted to confront the relation between dogmatic faith and
mystical (experiential) faith, expressed in the writings of Aquinas and John of the Cross,
respectively.351 Most importantly, the engagement with John of the Cross solidified Wojtyla’s
conviction in the importance of an anthropology that started from the experience of the
person.352
The eros of the mind that Glendon believes is essential for grasping the right human
goods manifests in Wojtyla’s interest in philosophy generally and ethics in particular. In 1954,
Wojtyla accepted a professorship at the Catholic University of Lublin, 353 where he was
appointed chair of Ethics two years later. Wojtyla also published Love and Responsibility in
1960, which was his first major philosophical work that explored sexual ethics. 354 Williams
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argues that from the beginning of Wojtyla’s clerical career, Wojtyla had been “trained within
the authoritarian context of the occupying Nazi authorities and of the ideologically Marxist
People’s Republic.”355 In this context, in 1959, Wojtyla published his second dissertation on
An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the System
of Max Scheler,356 under the direction of Roman Ingarden at the Jagellonian University in
Krakow.357 Ingarden’s influence exposed Wojtyla to phenomenology and the modern
philosophy of Kant, which were the two schools of thought Wojtyla engaged with to attempt a
construction of a Christian Ethics on the basis of Max Scheler’s phenomenological system.358
As Weigel puts it, Wojtyla inquired how Kant and Scheler could answer the moral
question of doing things that one “ought”, rather than simply what one “prefers”.359 Wojtyla’s
answer was ultimately that “the ethical system constructed by Max Scheler is “not at all suitable
as a means of formulating a scientific Christian ethics.”360 Scheler’s phenomenology, in
Wojtyla’s view, lacked a rigorous metaphysics that could be linked back to an objective
anthropology for a coherent ethical framework, though Wojtyla did acknowledge Scheler’s
importance in bringing “back into philosophy everyday things, concrete wholes, the basic
experiences of life as they come to us.”361
Wojtyla continued to explore the usefulness of phenomenology in understanding ethics
in his principal philosophical work, The Acting Person, published in 1969. Buttiglione states
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The Acting Person contains Wojtyla’s fullest formulation of his philosophy.362 Between 1970
and 1978, Wojtyla delivered several lectures and published papers giving more precise
clarifications of his thoughts in The Acting Person, particularly his most original thinking that
blended phenomenology with Thomism. In 1979, The Acting Person was published in America
in English, which introduced Wojtyla’s work to worldwide audiences.363 From this outline, it
is arguable that Wojtyla’s intellectual formation places him within the “tower”, as a scholar
rather than a statesperson.
However, Glendon also observes that circumstances can introduce political
opportunities to advance one’s own conception of the human goods. Charles Malik exemplifies
this point, as Glendon portrays him in The Forum and The Tower. Malik was a philosopher,
who, like Wojtyla, was also steeped in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Further, Malik was intent
on spending his career as a teacher and professor. Glendon writes that Malik, through chance,
found himself at the centre of the team responsible for drafting and shepherding the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) through successive bodies, competing
interest groups, and approval processes. Through a series of what Malik described as “the
oddest coincidence[s] of my life at the United Nations”, his election to head several United
Nations committees, gave him an unusual degree of influence in moving the UNDHR through
the approval process, and into international law.364
In a comparable way, in 1963, Wojtyla was appointed Archbishop of Krakow. Already
surprising was Wojtyla’s ordination as Bishop in 1958, at just 38 years of age. Weigel observes
that the circumstances surrounding Wojtyla’s appointment were particularly unusual. The
established Polish Communist Party wielded the authority to veto any appointment the Pope
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proposed for a new Bishop in Poland. For eighteen months, from June 1962 to December 1963,
the Vatican and the Polish government had been deadlocked over the appointment of the new
Archbishop of Krakow. The Communist Party’s “chief ideologist” had vetoed seven names,
insisting, “I’m waiting for Wojtyła, and I’ll continue to veto names until I get him.” 365
Wojtyla’s name was finally submitted, and the Communist Party agreed to his appointment.
Weigel comments that the Communist Party regretted this appointment soon after.366 Over the
next fifteen years, Archbishop Wojtyla became “something of a public personality in
[Krakow]”, known for being an outspoken “defender of the human person against persecution
and humiliation.”367 On October 16 1978, Weigel states the implausible again occurred, with
the College of Cardinals responsible for electing the new Pope breaking with centuries of
tradition and electing the first Polish Pope, Karol Wojtyla, who took the name Pope John Paul
II.368
Polish culture had considerable formative influence on Wojtyla’s interests and
formation in those areas more associated with the “forum”. Buttiglione states that Wojtyla’s
participation in “many of the classics of Polish literature” helps draw a “sketch of the
atmosphere in which the cultural and spiritual vocation of Wojtyla came to maturity.” 369 The
themes of resistance in Polish plays helps explain how the theatre was an important tool of
resistance against the Nazi Occupation. Wojtyla, like many other Poles, believed that resistance
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through preserving culture was fundamental to ensure a nation’s survival of an oppressor.
Polish history was a resource Wojtyla frequently drew from for inspiration for the content of
both his poems and plays.370 He published a number of plays and poems, right up until his
election to the papacy, including David, The Jeweller’s Shop (turned into a Hollywood
movie)371 and The Radiation of Fatherhood.372
Buttiglione states that a “unity of the finite and the infinite” is a “recurrent theme in
Wojtyla’s own poetry and philosophy.”373 Buttiglione suggests Wojtyla draws his interest in
this unity from his Polish identity, and that Poland is a reference point for his conclusions about
individual rights and the role of government in upholding those rights.374 Wojtyla’s cultural
and philosophical formation are each linked by his passionate and intellectual formation in the
relationship between the person’s ultimate aim (the infinite) and ethical action (the finite). As
Poland transitioned from a nation under Nazi control to a nation under Soviet Communist
control, Wojtyla’s philosophy emphasised the need for linking sound philosophy with concrete
moments of “action”.375 Wojtyla’s aim to unify the finite and the infinite parallels the likes of
Cicero and Burke’s aim to integrate the “tower” and the “forum”, or ends and means. For
Wojtyla, the reality of choice has a double effect of both the immediate effect of the action,
and the inner formation that act has on individual character. Thus, it is important for actions to
aim at the right ends to develop a sound character, which, Wojtyla believes, is desirable for the
individual.376
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In his approach to the “forum”, Weigel believes that Wojtyla was not especially vocal
about Polish politics, nor did he publish any works directly engaging the Polish Communist
government while he was a priest and ethics professor. Indeed, Weigel argues, “by all accounts,
Father Karol Wojtyła continued to be utterly uninterested in what passed for ‘politics’ in Poland
in the 1950s.”377 This indicates Wojtyla did not contain the same degree of thymos – what
Glendon calls the “noble sort of ambition” that drives political action – as he did eros.378
Nevertheless, his work in the “tower” was concerned with the significance of work in the
“forum,” and could also be considered a response to that domain. For example, he is concerned
that ideologies, among other “evil of our times”, deny each person’s fundamental uniqueness.
In a letter in 1968 to Jesuit friend and theologian Henri De Lubac, Wojtyla confided,
I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to
the metaphysical significance of the mystery of the PERSON. It seems to me that the
debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first
place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverisation, of the fundamental uniqueness
of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical than of the
moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must
oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of “recapitulation” of the mystery of the
person.379
For Wojtyla, the human person-in-relationship as distinct from the “human being” as
member-of-species, or ideologies that reduce human persons to solely material beings, is a
defining feature of his major philosophical works, with profound implications for his political
thought.380 Williams states that John Paul II brings “his experiential, philosophical, and
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theological antecedents”, and the “political situations with which [he] is faced” to the first
“Slavic” papacy.381 How these experiential, philosophical and theological ideas shape John
Paul II’s conception of human rights is the focus of the next section. It aims to understand
Wojtyla’s idea of the “human person” and the implications his philosophical thought has on
individual rights. The section following will then address how human rights are fostered in
Wojtyla’s concept of community, and the obligations fundamental rights place on economic
and political structures, thereby constituting the central aspects of his political thought.

Section Two: Human Persons and Human Rights
The Human Person at the Centre of Wojtyla’s Political Thought
Wojtyla’s philosophical project aims at providing a philosophical anthropology of the
person as an irreducible subject.382 He approaches this through bridging the philosophy of
objective man (ontology) and subjective man (phenomenology). His aim is to present a
philosophy that solves the problem of how to understand man as a subject, in an objective
sense.383 Wojtyla identified a need for applying the tools of phenomenology to enrich the
Thomistic account of the human person. For Wojtyla, the metaphysics of St Thomas Aquinas
left little room to explore the realm of personal experience as a means of recognising objective
values.384 Hence, Wojtyla’s most original thought attempts to incorporate the personalist lens
of phenomenology with the ontology of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.
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Wilk identifies Wojtyla’s concern that sole reliance on phenomenology lacks a sound
ontology, and can lead to subjectivism.385 On the other hand, for Wojtyla, phenomenology
provides a way of enriching the concept of the human person through exploring the “whole
subjective, conscious aspect,” which he claimed had been, to some extent, “levelled by
metaphysical naturalism”.386 Wojtyla’s concern about an intellectual divide between a
“metaphysical naturalism,” on the one hand, and “subjectivism” on the other, highlights his
focus on human goods from the “tower”. The dominant aspects of Wojtyla’s philosophical
thought concern the intellectual understanding of human personhood, which he believes can be
resolved through objectivising subjective human action. Understanding human personhood
through both experience and an objective ontology is essential for Wojtyla’s grasp of human
rights, which shapes his ideas of the ends of politics. Wojtyla writes,
I am convinced that the line of demarcation between the subjectivistic (idealistic) and
objectivistic (realistic) views in anthropology and ethics must break down and is in fact
breaking down on the basis of the experience of the human being. This experience
automatically frees us from pure consciousness as the subject conceived and assumed
a priori, and leads us to full concrete existence of the human being, to the reality of the
conscious subject. With all phenomenological analyses in the realm of that assumed
subject (pure consciousness) now at our disposal, we can no longer go on treating the
human being exclusively as an objective being, but we must also somehow treat the
human being as a subject in the dimension in which the specifically human subjectivity
of the human being is determined by consciousness. And that dimension would seem
to be none other than personal subjectivity.387
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For Wojtyla, the philosophical insight operari sequitir esse, which is to say, action
follows being, necessitates a rich understanding of human action, within a sound account of
being (ontology). Wojtyla explains that “something has to exist to be able to act”, and
“something acts according to its being”.388 The human person is, for Wojtyla, capable of action
that constitutes the person’s identity, within the limits of human nature (as Aquinas theorised).
Human action at once reveals the person as an independent, free-thinking subject whose acts
are unique and irreducible; and at the same time the person is a member of an objectively
ordered species that can experience the same kinds of “inner happenings” as all other human
persons.389 As Wojtyla puts it,
For us action reveals the person, and we look at the person through his action. For it
lies in the nature of the correlation inherent in experience, in the very nature of man’s
acting, that action constitutes the specific moment whereby the person is revealed.
Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to
understand the person most fully.390
All human beings can be distinguished by this potency to both act and be aware of the
inner transformation through the act. Wojtyla argues that the blend of phenomenology with
classical ontology helps gain the insight that human beings have a richer identity than simply
a shared membership in the same species. At the same time, this shared nature enables
subjective human action to transcend itself as a manifestation of an objective nature. Persons
pursue actions that fulfil their good, and this human good is the same for every person.391
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Personal subjectivity recognises persons as “someone”, rather than “something”.392 The status
of “someone” is unique to each person, and therefore imbues him or her with an inviolable
dignity. Buttiglione notes that the core of the human rights movement stemmed from the same
conviction shared by Wojtyla – belief in the “inviolable dignity of each individual human
person”.393 For Wojtyla, this dignity is the source of human rights.
Within the framework, Wojtyla’s approach to political ends through philosophy, rather
than government policy primarily, renders him an “intellectual”.394 To treat a person as a mere
being leads to a limited grasp of the person, with practical complications. Abstract definitions
of beings do not grasp the full essence of being a person. Moving away from this vision can
also reduce human beings to objects.395 For Wojtyla, as for Kant, treating persons as means to
ends is a great moral wrong. He states:
Whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that
person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but also allow for the fact that he
or she too has or at least should have distinct personal ends. This principle, thus
formulated, lies at the basis of all the human freedoms.396
Wojtyla’s central occupation is thus the human person, which is the basis of his
conception of the proper practice of politics. Gregg argues that Wojtyla’s consideration of
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“politically contentious matters”397 includes the role of unions, market limits, socialism and
capitalism as economic systems, in a way that is faithful to the authoritative tradition of Church
teaching and his moral anthropology. Gregg cites Glendon’s interpretation that John Paul II’s
perspective on the human person, “applicable to economics, politics, law and all other
disciplines relating to man – is rooted in a view of the human person which aspires to be
correct.”398 This view is “profoundly anthropological” in its orientation, highlighting the
person as free-thinking and choosing subject, alone and in community with others. Wojtyla
reads the entire political landscape through the lens of his moral anthropology. 399 As Schall
observes, Wojtyla’s insistence on working out the proper human ends is consonant with
Aristotle’s notion of the purpose of politics as working out the human goods. Indeed, Schall
notes that Wojtyla is particularly concerned with identifying proper political ends in response
to the “lowering of sights of which Machiavelli and modern liberalism spoke.”400 This point is
relevant to earlier discussions in Chapter Two, concerning the problems that can be involved
in a so-called Machiavellian perspective on the nature of politics. In his view of political ends,
Wojtyla is not Machiavellian.

Human Rights
From Wojtyla’s phenomenological training, writes Buttiglione, Wojtyla’s solution to
idealistic accounts of personhood is to derive analysis from the hic et nunc – the here and now
of history.401 Beginning with the experiences and actions of human persons is the starting point
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to recognise dignity and is the locus of rights. Abstract (idealistic) accounts of human persons
fail to grasp the needs (and the dignity) of persons in real contexts. Wojtyla argues that all
considerations of human rights must start from this reality. As Urmson explains, failing to
understand what the right means are in the hic et nunc, and to judge accordingly, is an excessive
form of political judgment, and is a vice.402 Thus, Wojtyla is aware of the intellectual problem
of what Maritain calls “hypermoralism”, which causes political judgment to remain “something
impracticable and merely ideal”.403 Figure 3.1 below, illustrates how “hypermoralist” forms of
political judgment are excessive, in relation to the virtue of practical wisdom.
Figure 3.1: Hypermoralism as a Vice

According to Barrett, Wojtyla, as John Paul II, adopts several rights from the United
Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. The basic rights that must be protected and upheld by
governments, and include the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom to found a family, to
gain employment for a just wage, to internal and external migration, the right to participate in
the free choice of the political system to which one belongs, and the right participate in the
community.404 Williams argues that John Paul II promotes these rights because of his formation
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under totalitarian systems. His experience of Polish communism, and the lack of worker rights,
political freedoms, freedom of religion and economic stability informed his approach to the
papal politics.405 Weigel adds that John Paul II’s 1979 address to the United Nations
“unambiguously” committed the Catholic Church to the “cause of human freedom and the
defence of basic human rights as the primary goal of its engagement with world politics”.406
This, then, is where John Paul II’s work clearly intersects between tower and forum. John Paul
II proposed “the Church wishes to serve people also in the temporal dimension of their life and
existence”,407 giving it an interest in the political common good of each nation-state, and the
means used to secure it. Hence, basic human rights are where John Paul II’s work as a
philosopher (in the tower) opts to engage world politics (the forum).
Barrett categorises John Paul II’s list of rights into “positive” and “negative” rights.
The positive rights are basic preconditions needed to guarantee participation in the political life
of the community and “should be received from others.”408 These rights include access to
employment, a just wage, and search for the truth without fear of censorship. Barrett describes
them as “positive” because they require the support of economic and political structures, as
well as the support from the community to secure them.409 Negative rights are those limitations
on behaviours that must be observed not just by government, but by individuals and groups to
ensure the social welfare of those lacking access to basic goods.410 This distinction emphasises
the role and responsibility Wojtyla places on both individual persons and structures of
community, including economics, government and community culture, to secure human rights.
The individual is tasked with pursuing the good, and upholding the good of others, within a
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just political and economic structure or system that enables the full participation of the person
in the life of the community.411
Barrett suggests Wojtyla has a “qualified acceptance” of the liberal democratic order as
the system naturally consistent with “man’s social nature.”412 However, this acceptance of
liberal, democratic rule is “tempered with conditions and critique.”413 Wojtyla believes that the
system itself can never be the political end sought. Rather, “the human person transcends the
political community and constitutes therefore the end to which all political action should be
oriented.”414 This includes an active participation from persons in the political process to avoid
“narrow ruling groups”:
Peoples must be able to choose freely the social organisation to which they aspire for
their own country, and … this organisation should be in conformity with justice, in
respect of freedom, religious faith, and human rights in general. It is a commonly shared
conviction that no people should be treated by other peoples as subordinate or as an
instrument.415
Barrett states that it is precisely because of Wojtyla’s concept of free human action,
when aimed at human goods, as an expression of dignity, that he favours a political system
where political choices are enhanced as good in itself.416
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Barrett compares Wojtyla to Tocqueville regarding the necessity of education about
“true ideals” that form the basis for citizens to make informed political choices. Like
Tocqueville, states Barrett, Wojtyla “stresses the importance of non-state institutions to
suitably educate and form persons.” These “structures” help supply the public knowledge of
political ends.417 Tabachnick concurs that “an educational backdrop” is necessary for citizens
to make “sound judgments.”418 Without institutions to deliver these conditions, however,
Wojtyla believes it is acceptable that rights be secured by rulers who are appointed through
acceptable non-democratic means.419 Thus, for Wojtyla, the “basic organising principle [of the
State] should be the primacy of the good of humanity and of the human person over every other
consideration.”420 The person is more fundamental for Wojtyla than the system in which the
person operates. Any political or economic structure is subordinate to the prior rights of the
human person.421
This brief account of Wojtyla’s perspective on rights aims to highlight that persons and
structures, individuals and the community, are responsible for securing human rights. This idea
has implications in the social, economic and political structures of any society. In the context
of explanations of John Paul II’s concept of participation as the chief end of politics, the present
thesis proposes that John Paul II believes human rights need to be fostered within communities
as well as within structures of both governance and economics. His idea from the “tower” thus
informs and intersects with his activity in the “forum”.
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Section Three: Participation, Alienation and Political Structures

Participation: The Chief End of Politics
The current research project argues that Wojtyla’s formation and education under
totalitarian regimes informs his political thought about the role of economic and political
systems in securing human rights. Wojtyla’s central argument for the end of politics – that is,
the common good – is bound up with his concept of participation. Wojtyla contends that “the
state exists in order to protect…rights”,422 which requires statespersons to foster conditions
where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. Participation for
Wojtyla begins with understanding the person as an individual I as distinct from other I’s. This
I is taken from the school of phenomenology, particularly the work of Max Scheler.423
Participation, in this sense, expresses the way “we as persons exist and act together with others,
while not ceasing to be ourselves in action, in our own acts.”424 Clark identifies participation
and its antithesis, alienation, as Wojtyla’s central concern for humanity. 425 Clark also argues
that it is for this reason participation is the criteria by which to evaluate forms economic, social
and political structures.426 She cites Wojtyla,

John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, in Clark, ‘Integrating Human Rights’, 303.
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The structures of the social existence of human beings in the conditions of modern
civilization... absolutely must be evaluated in the light of this basic criterion: Do they
create the conditions—for this is their only real function—for the development of
participation?427
Conceptually, Wojtyla argues that when persons engage in a “community of acting” as
a group, this dimension is termed by the pronoun “we”.428 The individual simultaneously
displays a readiness to think in terms of, and act towards, the good of the we as the fulfilment
of each individual I.429 The “we” does not diminish the interpersonal relationships already
present in the community; rather, it shifts the direction each member takes towards selffulfilment – which now happens in relation to a commonly held end. Wojtyla explains,
A we is many human beings, many subjects, who in some way exist and act together.
Acting ‘together’ (i.e., ‘in common’) does not mean engaging in a number of activities
that somehow go along side by side. Rather it means that these activities, along with
the existence of those many I’s are related to a single value, which therefore deserves
to be called the common good.430
The distinguishing character of community in Wojtyla’s philosophy is the explicit
identification of individual fulfilment through participation in community with the common
good.431 The fulfilment one receives through genuine interpersonal relationships is in no way

should be structured in such a way that the self, which is included in that form of action, is given the
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diminished, but is rather enhanced and enriched by participating in the shared common end of
the community.432 Therefore, the task of politics is to devise the means for every member of
the community to experience participation.
Gregg explains that Wojtyla believes the person must have a sense of “acting for
himself” as the community works towards achieving its “objective goal”. As a worker, for
example, the employee must have a sense of ownership over his labours that dignifies his
ability to produce a good or service through his actions.433 Participation is a “constitutive factor
of community”.434 In The Acting Person, Wojtyla’s concept of community also distinguishes
the goal of community from the fulfilment of the individual members. Each community has
particular aims that are achieved through actions that aim at, and achieve, the ends. 435 Wojtyla
colours his example of the worker with the example of workers digging a trench. The labourers
come together in a “community of acting” towards a shared goal: digging the trench. 436 But at
the same time, Wojtyla argues that it is vital that the labourer (or any person) “belonging to a
community of acting… is in a position in his communal acting to perform real actions and fulfil
himself.”437 This ability to be fulfilled through the relationships in the community of acting is
what Wojtyla calls “participation”.438
In his political thought, Wojtyla argues that any system that fails to understand the
personalistic and relational foundation of participation is “dangerous for the truth of the image
in question” and “impossible”.439 While Wojtyla locates the problem within personal
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responsibility, he recognises that economic and political structures can contribute to what he
calls “alienation”, which is the antithesis of participation and leads to the perversion of the
common good.

Alienation: The Defect of Economic and Political Systems
For Wojtyla, “alienation basically means the negative of participation, for it renders
participation difficult or even impossible.”440 Practices that subordinate the dynamic, fulfilling
nature of relationships in the communities of being and the communities of acting, to collective
interests (called totalism) or individual interests (called individualism) create alienation. 441 For
Wojtyla, individualism occurs where the person accepts needing other persons as a kind of
means to an end to continue to advance toward their own goals. The individual has no interest
in the fundamental good of other beings, and engages with them only to the extent they can
benefit their goals.442 Such a practice denies Wojtyla’s claim that human persons can only be
fulfilled in mutually self-giving relationships.443 At the opposite extreme is totalism. This defect
prevails when collective interests subvert individual rights. Mejos comments that in totalistic
societies, there is a tendency that persons may be coerced to contribute to the achievement of
the common good. He writes,
It is not surprising that a state or even a small community running on the lines of
totalism will end up committing violations of fundamental rights of human beings as
persons. Persons are not allowed to pursue their own individual growth under the
assumption that it will not bring any contribution to the social group.444
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Schall observes that Wojtyla has market and State systems in mind when describing the
defect of totalism:
People lose sight of the fact that life in society has neither the market nor the State as
its final purpose, since life itself has a unique value, which the State and the market
must serve. Man remains above all a being who seeks the truth and strives to live in that
truth, deepening his understanding of it through a dialogue, which involves past and
future generations.445
Both totalism and individualism, despite their differences, has the same root cause.
Each method promotes a conception of the human good that ignores the essential need of
participation in the social dimension of the community, give the goal of the common good:
participation as essential for self-fulfilment. The means of participation can be diverse, but can
only be pursued through the limits of treating others as other “I’s”.446

Analysing Political and Economic Structures: Socialism and Capitalism
Gregg observes that when he was writing his social encyclicals during the Cold War,
John Paul II unpacked the “structures of sin” in the power structures of the “East” and “West”
blocs. Baum writes that Sollicitudo Rei Socialis refers to
The existence of two opposing blocs, known commonly as the East and the
West. The reason for this description is not purely political, but is also, as the
expression goes, geo-political. Each of the two blocs tends to assimilate or
gather around it other countries or groups of countries, to different degrees of
adherence or participation.447
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Gregg argues that the “blocs” John Paul II refers to are the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.448 Each bloc
“identifies itself with a system of organising society and exercising power which presents itself
as an alternative to the other.” Gregg notes John Paul II identifies the root of the opposition is
ideological in nature. The West promotes a “liberal capitalism” while in the East there exists a
“system of Marxist collectivism.”449 This opposition grew into a “military opposition and gave
rise to two blocs of armed forces, each suspicious and fearful of the other’s domination.”450
Schall observes that in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II affirms the view that
true human development “cannot consist in the simple accumulation of wealth”, but rather
“must be measured and oriented according to the reality and vocation of man seen in his
totality”.451 Linking this to the later encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul II writes that “the
political economy is a means to the end of full personal development of the individual,
institutional and social levels.”452 The purpose of these encyclicals is not to provide a strict
Catholic economic model. Rather, John Paul II offers a moral compass to guide any economic
model, present or future, and to serve as the basis for critique of any model. He does not set
out a list of prescriptions for economic activity and structure, but articulates a detailed
understanding of the human person, which is to provide the “normative basis for the critique
of a political economy.”453 This system is guided by moral precepts that “the State and all of
society have the duty of defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the
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essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each
individual.454
Gregg writes that John Paul II’s declaration in introducing Centesimus Annus sums up
the central thesis of his political thought,
A great commitment on the political, economic, social and cultural level is necessary
to build a society that is more just and worthy of the person. But this is not enough! A
decisive commitment must be made in the very heart of man, in the intimacy of his
conscience, where he makes his personal decisions. Only on this level can the human
person affect a true, deep and positive change in himself, and that is the undeniable
premise of contributing to change and the improvement of all society.455
John Paul II sees the market, political order, and social structures through the lens of
man as the image of God, with a spiritual nature that orients him towards reflection and wonder.
He has a personal identity that cannot be expressed in economic terms alone. He has a personal
character; his needs satisfied through more than the state order. His intermediary groups, such
as family, social, religious and other community groups, are fundamental to full human
development.
Wojtyla writes that, within the “Eastern Bloc”, the good of the group is the most
important, while “the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of
the mechanism.”456 A central tenet of Centesimus Annus suggests, according to Schall, that
socialism’s error is predicated on “this moral-anthropological truth about man”:
The fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature. Socialism considers
the individual person simply as an element, a molecule within the social organism, so
that the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of the
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socio-economic mechanism. Socialism likewise maintains that the good of the
individual can be realised without reference to his free choice, to the unique and
exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil. Man is thus
reduced to a series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the
autonomous subject of moral decision disappears, the very subject whose decisions
build the social order.457
At the same time, John Paul II rejects the self-regulating free market in favour of a
system where certain inherent values cannot be violated. John Paul advocates necessary State
and societal intervention in the Market, as “there are collective and qualitative needs which
cannot be satisfied by market mechanisms… these mechanisms carry the risk of an ‘idolatry’
of the market, an idolatry which ignores the existence of goods which by their nature are not
and cannot be mere commodities.458 Effectively then, Wojtyla’s perspective of the defects of
economic and political systems in securing the common good draws from his analysis of the
prevailing geopolitical structure of the Cold War, which, in turn, is shaped by his personal
experience of totalitarianism. That is, Wojtyla’s idea that the common good is secured through
enhancing individual participation in the economic, political and cultural aspects of national
life is shaped by his education under totalitarian regimes. Buttiglione proposes it is possible to
speak of Wojtyla’s “political praxis”.459 As Glendon emphasises in The Forum and The Tower,
the political context can shape the person’s conceptions of what political ends are and how they
are best pursued. In Wojtyla’s case, Buttiglione argues that Wojtyla’s Catholic formation as a
Priest informs his understanding of how to pursue political ends. He writes,
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It is a matter of course that John Paul II did not make politics in the common sense of
this word if by the word politics you understand a struggle to conquer and defend
power. The man who tells the truth does not enter into the political game. The witness
given to truth produces however political effects which can sometimes be even
revolutionary.460
Guietti and Murphy also add that Wojtyla’s education under Polish communism and
Nazism directly informs these views. They describe Buttiglione’s account of Wojtyla’s
philosophy as “a fiery defence of freedom in an age of political tyrannies. Wojtyla’s awareness
of freedom and of the real possibility of losing it derives from his direct experience [of being
educated under Nazism and Communism].”461 For example, according to Jeffreys, Wojtyla
writes of participation as a “property of the person”.462 It is expressed through the human
capacity to “endow existence and action with a personalistic dimension” when a person acts
together with other persons.463 This affirmation of work as personal property directly contrasts
the socialist notion of state ownership and redistribution of labour. In social matters, Wojtyla
tends to “take the side of unions”, in support of the freedom and dignity of “blue collar
workers”.464 His experience as a labourer in the Slovay Chemical Plant and a limestone quarry
as a student helped Wojtyla appreciate the dignity of labour. The manual labour produces
“solidarity” among the workers, who require a right to unionise as a legal recognition of that
bond, in the service of his belief in a just wage.465
Weigel is of the view that throughout the 1980’s, John Paul II never explicitly identified
the nations being treated as subordinate to others, but was unmistakably interpreted as referring
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to Poland’s denial of these freedoms under the Polish government.466 Guietti and Murphy go
so far as to argue that Wojtyla’s philosophical works are a veiled critique of the communist
totalitarian system in which he was educated. They state that “even the carefully obtuse
Communist censorship would never have suspected that [Wojtyla’s political thought in The
Acting Person] was a really dangerous piece of writing.”467
Guietti and Murphy posit whether Wojtyla’s insistence on human freedom and
individual rights is “so radical that, in retrospect, one might ask if Wojtyla overreacted to his
experience of political slavery.”468 Another assessment can also be considered, however, which
is that this notion of Wojtyla’s subtle critique of the communist political system helps explain
his seemingly “obsessive” defence of human freedom. Some comparison is possible between
Wojtyla’s subtlety and Burke’s notion that “one learns to speak the truth with measure, that he
may speak it the longer”.469 Wojtyla takes the pursuit of “true ideals” as a worthwhile pursuit
of politics. However, under a politically tyrannical regime, little room was offered to Wojtyla
as a philosopher to publish openly about his view on the limits of the communist system.
Indeed, Williams writes that “one can find hardly any explicit references to Marxism and
Communism in Wojtyla’s writings.”470 Instead of critiquing Marxism, Communism, or
materialism, Wojtyla’s lectures as an Ethics professor focussed on the more abstract
“utilitarianism”. Instead of “totalitarianism”, Wojtyla used the more ambiguous “totalism”.471
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Guietti and Murphy cite Strauss’ view that oppressive regimes can create a mode of
writing that critiques the dominant power structure with subtlety:
For the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who
hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing, the technique which
we have in mind when speaking of writing between the lines.472
Unlike Plato, who, as Glendon recounts, failed to say the “politic thing” when engaging
with powerful rulers, Wojtyla’s pre-papal writings suggests that Wojtyla exercises caution in
expressing political ideas that could incite an aggressive response from the prevailing political
power. This approach can be compared to Glendon’s analysis of Burke, who continually
exercised caution in his writings and statements on the plight of the Irish people, who
experienced oppression under English laws and social norms.473 Thus, Wojtyla’s work as a
scholar within the “tower” exhibits some of the cautionary wisdom that Glendon suggests is
important for those who aim at political influence, or find themselves through circumstance in
positions of influence.
On the other hand, as Pope, John Paul II’s encyclicals contain clearer enunciations of
his views on political systems, which suggests he holds a new platform of agency through
which to advance his political ideas. John Paul II’s efforts to advance his political aims in his
home country of Poland is the subject of analysis in Chapter Four. Thus, how Pope John Paul
II approaches political practice through the papacy is of particular interest to the current
research project. In particular, it will examine how his approach influenced Poland under the
Communist system.
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Conclusion
Chapter Three has aimed to describe Karol Wojtyla’s political context to understand
how his education and formation inform his passionate beliefs, particularly in the dignity of
the human person as the basis of fundamental human rights. In this context, the study identified
Wojtyla’s development of participation as the primary philosophical concept that informs his
political thought. It has shown that Wojtyla’s experiences of totalitarianism and his
development as a philosopher produce a political philosophy that elevates the good of the
individual person as the goal to which politics should be oriented.474 In particular, it has given
evidence to suggest that Wojtyla’s political thought is critical of political and economic
structures – especially socialism and capitalism – that produce outcomes that corrode his
conception of human dignity, most particularly in the denial of what he considers basic human
rights.
It has suggested that the method shows Wojtyla’s consideration of whether or not he
should join the Carmelites, and his decision to become a priest and train as a philosopher
demonstrate his choice for a life in the “tower”, more so than the “forum”. Within his vocation
as a philosopher and ethics professor, the thesis has attempted to relay Wojtyla’s understanding
of the human person as the central preoccupation of his philosophical development. Through
Wilk, Buttiglione and others, the chapter has shown how Wojtyla draws from both the
philosophical schools of phenomenology and Aristotelian-Thomism to construct his
anthropology, which provides the intellectual basis for his political thought.475 It has argued
that Wojtyla’s conception of human rights draws from this anthropology, and has implications
for his view on individual responsibility and the role of economic and political structures in
securing human rights.
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Clark, Williams, Gregg, and Barrett, among others, were employed to highlight that
“the state exists in order to protect…rights”,476 which requires statespersons to foster conditions
where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. Within Wojtyla’s
concepts of participation and alienation, the thesis suggests that Wojtyla’s own experiences of
totalitarian regimes under Nazism and Communism directly inform his critique of the limits of
political and economic structures in securing human rights. His education amidst these political
experiences produced a method of political thought that, in the view of Williams, among others,
exercised caution to not openly criticise the Polish communist system. In his limited pre-papal
public life as a philosopher and ethics professor, Wojtyla can be understood as an intellectual
with deep convictions about the dignity of the human person. This dignity grants the person
inviolable rights that, in Wojtyla’s view, must be fostered through ordinary social life, and
fostered through the support of economic and political systems naturally consistent with these
aims.
With his election to the papacy, Chapter Four argues that Pope John Paul II experiences
an increased political agency that enables him to pursue his political aims with a more robust
and direct rhetoric than he employed as a philosopher in Poland. Chapter Four presents a case
study on John Paul II’s engagement with Polish communism to identify how, and to what
extent, the means he pursues to secure human rights for the Polish people are consistent with
the political thought established in Chapter Three. The current research project aims to
understand whether John Paul II operates with integrity, or whether he compromises on his
political aims, within the present thesis’ explanation of phronesis. It will attempt to place him
on the “Glendon graph”, which will help illustrate the extent to which John Paul II can be
considered a phronimos, or can be placed more towards the extremes of “hypermoralism” or
“Machiavellianism” in his method of political judgment.
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Chapter Four

Introduction
Chapter Three argued that political aims are, for John Paul II, actualised through
securing individual rights, recognising workers’ dignity, participation in the process of
selecting government, economic freedoms, and the freedom for religious and cultural
expression.477 These can be understood as John Paul II’s view of political ends. Chapter Four
contends that Pope John Paul II pursued these political aims in the Polish communist context
through means consistent with his political ends. Effectively, this means that he did not
compromise his values from the tower when pursuing his ends in the forum. Chapter Four
discusses this in three sections. The first identifies, through scholarly perspectives, instances
where John Paul II’s engagement with Poland relies on his principle of participation. It argues
that the “hybrid” agency of Pope John Paul II gave him unique agency in communist Poland.
His role as head of the Catholic Church and of the Holy See gave him both international legal
and political status and a moral obligation to defend the convictions of the Church.478 This
section employs the arguments of Troy, Hall and other international relations theorists, on the
nature of papal political influence.479 The inclusion of these scholarly perspectives does not
alter the method of this thesis. Instead, the addition of Troy’s terminology describing the Pope’s
political agency as “hybrid” helps understand the nature of John Paul II’s political influence.
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Glendon’s observation that agency can be facilitated through circumstance applies to John Paul
II’s context. This highlights the transition in agency that Wojtyla makes from his pre-papal
identity as a priest, poet, philosopher and professor of ethics, to his status as “chief diplomat”
and “moral authority” on behalf of all adherents to the Catholic faith. 480 Arguably, within this
mode of agency, the addition of John Paul II’s Polish identity and experience of living under
communism contributed to an unprecedented level of papal influence in Poland, where the
national population was over 90% Catholic.481
Section Two considers John Paul II’s political judgment in Poland as both a diplomatic
actor and a “moral authority”. It explores how John Paul II deploys the tools available to him
to determine the extent to which his decisions reflect an integrity of his convictions, or involve
a tactful compromise on principles for the sake of immediate advantages. The thesis argues
that his shift in papal foreign policy towards Eastern Europe – known as the ostpolitik – and
his papal rhetoric during his public addresses, indicate that there is no conflict between the
means that John Paul II used to influence Polish politics, and the political ends that he wanted
to achieve. Though his decisions were consistent with his political aims, it can also be seen that
that John Paul II exercised caution and used moderated language designed to inspire the Polish
people without causing negative reactions from the Polish government.
The Glendon graph helps to interpret these examples, ultimately showing how John
Paul II’s integrity leans him towards the “hypermoralist” side of the mean. However, his
moderated language and strategic approach renders him closer to the middle point of the map,
rather than the extreme.
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Section Three follows the insight of Glendon’s framework that political circumstances
can facilitate, or hinder, the individual’s political success. She writes that the “optimal
confluence” for political success involves “gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck.”482
Therefore, part of Glendon’s method requires consideration of how the political conditions
were favourable or unfavourable for John Paul II’s political aims. This enables her to offer
some judgment on the relationship between his decisions and the political conditions in the
“reasons for success or failure”.483 Thus, although John Paul II’s actions aim for the right ends,
it is arguable that the political circumstances were highly favourable for John Paul II to pursue
his aims with integrity, and be successful. These circumstances must also be considered to
assess the extent of John Paul II’s success in enhancing political participation through the
communist collapse in Poland.
In light of this view, the section considers the extent to which John Paul II can be
considered “practically wise”, in this context. Luxmoore and Babiuch’s, The Vatican and The
Red Flag,484 and Gaddis’ The Cold War: A New History are among the works that offer
analyses that argue John Paul II’s political engagement with Poland had a considerable impact
on the events that led to the free elections and subsequent collapse of communism in 1989.
John Paul II, then, can be considered central to the foundation of the Solidarity movement in
Poland, which in turn was a major factor in the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989. The
third section also considers perspectives in McDermott and Stibbe’s The 1989 Revolutions in
Central and Eastern Europe,485 which emphasises that a combination of political, economic,
and international factors contributed to the final demise of the Polish government, among other
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governments, within the Soviet Union. When placed within the Glendon framework, these
factors constitute what Glendon calls the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions
and plain luck”. The framework offers some insights, or “lessons” on how John Paul II
approaches decision-making, within the context of political, social and economic pressure on
the Polish government. These factors were essential preconditions for John Paul II to
successfully pursue his political aims in the Polish communist context.
The present thesis does not consider arguments of whether this led to the collapse of
the entire Soviet Union. Some commentators take a linear approach to the events between
1989-1991,486 extrapolating a kind of domino effect whereby Poland caused the collapse of the
entire Soviet Union. The literature is not settled on this issue, as scholars argue this is overly
simplistic analysis.487 Therefore, the present thesis limits the area of analysis to the Polish
context only, not engaging with the contested literature on the links between the revolution of
1989 in Poland and the rest of the USSR.
The thesis concludes that Glendon’s insight into the role of favourable conditions
influencing political success can be applied to Pope John Paul II’s role in the collapse of the
communist system in Poland. The Pope’s agency as diplomat and legitimate moral authority
added additional pressure to the network of forces already pressuring the Polish communist
system. In particular, his papal pilgrimages to Poland served as a catalyst and a unifying force
necessary for the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union. However, it is perhaps more
significant that John Paul II was elected to the papacy at the particular moment in history where
a network of pressures had already undermined the communist system dramatically.
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Section One: The Political Agency of the Papacy
The Pope as a “Hybrid” Political Actor
The framework aims to understand the nature of political influence Pope John Paul II
possessed in the Holy See’s engagement with the Polish communist government between the
Pope’s election in October, 1978 and the partial free elections in Poland on June 4, 1989. As
Glendon contends, in some cases chance and circumstance can elevate a person to new
positions of political influence, sometimes even undesirably.488 Chapter Three briefly
explained that John Paul II’s elevation to the Polish episcopate (the order of Bishops) and then
later his election to the papacy on 16 October, 1978, reflects the kind of circumstances Glendon
considers “chance”, which differs from actively seeking a position of influence.489 This section
aims to explain how Wojtyla’s election to the papacy enhances his political influence, from his
pre-papal political agency as a philosopher and priest, and Archbishop of Krakow. In particular,
it highlights how the papacy is the kind of political platform that enables John Paul II to make
public pronouncements with more integrity than the subtlety he employed as a priest under
communist oversight.
Troy, Marshall, Hall, and other international relations scholars, argue that religious
organisations, and the Catholic Church especially, are engaged actors in political and social
policy. Marshall explains that religious institutions extend their political and religious positions
beyond their constituencies, and seek to be engaged in public policy discussions, regardless of
the percentage of the population that institution claims as adherents.490 Diplomacy is the
primary mode through which religious organisations engage with governments and
488
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stakeholders in public policy discussions.491 Unlike other organised religions, however, Holy
See diplomacy is “highly institutionalised, rests on formal diplomatic representations around
the globe equal to embassies and acknowledged by international law.”492
Troy explains that the Holy See exercises diplomacy in a unique fashion, distinct from
its secular counterparts. Holy See diplomats, writes Troy, do not represent their principal’s (the
Pope’s) immediate possessions, such as territory. Rather, they have a “hybrid” character, at
once exercising an ecclesiastical role as a priest of the Catholic Church, and the representative
of the Pope, and at the same time engaging in ordinary diplomatic practice as the international
legal status of the Holy See enables them.493 Conway states that the Holy See’s two-fold
priorities of individual salvation and temporal well-being keep it relevant to the public square.
“Through [The Holy See’s] supernatural mission of salvation and the mundane reality of world
politics, [the papacy] remains a singular and surprisingly vital factor in the international
scene.”494 Troy proposes that the “hybrid character” of papal diplomacy is generated from
political and religious “entanglements”. Papal diplomacy, therefore, is a unique combination
of universal religious principles with conventional diplomatic practice.495
Gillis argues that papal influence extends into public policy and the decisions of other
States. Popes have the capacity to be of consequence, and must recognize the Papacy has
political implications.496 Gillis states, in The Political Papacy: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and
Their Influence:
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Once elected, all pontiffs recognize that they have the responsibility to make
pronouncements with political implications since silence might mean a lost
opportunity. At the same time, they must do so thoughtfully and carefully, often
balancing the church’s diplomatic needs and the gospel’s demand to be prophetic. What
a pope says is important because, as the leader of more than one billion Catholics, he
commands the most significant international religious voice in the world. What he says
is reported in the press all over the world. And what he says goes beyond pious
platitudes. By his pronouncements, he attempts to influence public policy, other
religions, governments, believers, and nonbelievers alike.497
The Holy See, then, adds moral value to international dialogue through its interest in religious
communities, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, that reside within nation-states.498 The rights of
religious groups, their freedom to worship, to gather as a community of believers and act
according to the convictions of their faith are just some of the interests on which the Holy See
engages governments. Further, the Holy See is a unique actor because it is more than an
advocate for itself and its own interests. It also has a special interest in fundamental rights of
all persons.499 Squaring its interests in the domain of universal values enables the Holy See to
transcend the partisan nature of politics and interest-driven nature of diplomacy.500
Significantly, this elevates its “moral authority” as the chief defender of universal human rights.
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The Pope himself is considered the “chief diplomat and moral authority”.501 The “moral
authority” of the Pope is also termed “soft power” by international relations scholars.502 Moral
authority is considered a resource of power for individuals, organisations and States.503 Hall
argues that “moral authority” can be used as a “power resource” when it becomes
institutionalised as a “convention”. Hall writes that moral authority is institutionalised when it
becomes “socially embedded in a system of actors whose social identities and interests impel
them to recognize it as a power resource.”504 He continues that moral authority can be used as
a tradable asset, like money or “the credible threat of military force,” to the extent each party
values its worth. Moral authority has value among political actors as a medium of arbitrating
disputes between spiritual and temporal authorities. It is a form of “currency” that can be traded
when the political actors involved calculate that “hard power” options, such as military force,
carry undesirable risk.505
Through his election to the papacy of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II
exercises the “hybrid agency” of the Vatican City state as “chief diplomat” and “moral
authority”.506 The Papal authority means he functions “as a political figure as well as spiritual
leader”.507 Troy states that although the Holy See itself has a broad diplomatic apparatus, public
and academic focus remains focussed on the Pope, which serves to publicise the Pope’s agency,
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and enhance it. As former US Ambassador to the Vatican Francis Rooney puts it, “from nuts
and bolts bureaucratic decisions to great theological disputes… the pope is the person in whom
final authority is vested. There is no separation of powers in the Vatican. Every chain of
command leads ultimately to him.”508 Rooney continues that the Holy See participates in
international relations as the governing body of the Vatican City State. As such,
The Holy See, which enjoys international juridical status, is… presented as a sovereign
and independent moral authority, and as such takes part in international relations.
Within nations its action as a moral authority, aims at furthering an ethic of relations
between the different protagonists of the international community.”509
Before his papal election, Wojtyla’s political influence was limited to his office as
Archbishop of Krakow, through which he negotiated with the Communist government for
specific pastoral initiatives.510 The present thesis suggests that, as Pope John Paul II, he
combines the “hybrid” channels of diplomacy and moral witness, with his distinctive Polish
national identity to elevate his political influence in Poland to an unprecedented level. As
mentioned, Will observes that, by the mid-1980s, around 90% of the Polish population was
Roman Catholic. Agnew’s insight that States recognise the usefulness of maintaining
“conventional formal relations” with the Church because of the “sheer number of humans”
involved is relevant to Poland in this context.511 Thus, by the mid-1980s, Will was in a position
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to observe that: “the institutional church in Poland is far stronger today than it was prior to
World War II.”512
In Poland, cooperation between Church and State is arguably more significant than any
other Eastern bloc nation.513 Byrnes adds that the Catholic Church exercises considerable
influence in Polish politics because of the Church’s history of constantly defending Poland
from foreign oppressors. He writes there is a “long-standing, intimate relationship between
Catholicism and Polish national identity”. Within Poland’s particular historical context, the
“uncontested cultural centrality of Polish Catholicism became a major political factor. The
Polish Church is a political institution because history has identified it as an authentically
Polish alternative to an alien governing power.”514 The Church is thus recognised as Poland’s
“principal moral authority”, which provides it with a “new source of strength.”515 The elevation
of Wojtyla as the “first Polish Pope” thus infuses the traditional “hybrid” authority of the
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papacy with the Polish Church’s identity as the “alternate legitimate public authority” to
government rule.516
The following section aims to analyse how John Paul II uses his “hybrid” channels to
advance his political ideas in Poland. It argues that John Paul II conducts a method of political
strategy that is consonant with his own conceptions of political ends. This analysis relies on
the “Glendon graph” to illustrate that John Paul II retains integrity in his political judgment,
and suggests this can be mapped onto the Glendon graph.

Section Two: The Political Judgment of John Paul II
Integrity or Compromise?
Chapter One offered Copleston’s view that for virtuous acts, the right choice will
sometimes require an “excess” rather than a “defect”, while in other cases the reverse may be
preferable.517 Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards excess or
defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends. In some instances,
more excessive actions may even be the right means in a particular context. However, the
accuracy of the decision, as Glendon points out, is often known only through hindsight. As
such, the wisdom of these decisions is best observed “long after the person has passed from
this life”, so that the full impact of one’s decisions can be properly appreciated.518
Chapter Two suggested that Burke’s method of political judgment is a useful
illustration of Maritain’s point that the statesperson must use the skills of their intellect, called
“cunning”, to discern how to advance the common good, and when to opt instead for what
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Glendon calls “prudent accommodation”,519 without “falsehood or imposture”.520 Glendon’s
view of Burke suggests that a method of political judgment that uses compromise and
“cunning” without descending into “cleverness” is possible, though it can be difficult to
identify the line between a prudent compromise and a full betrayal of principle. At the same
time, hindsight provides the opportunity to understand that the impact of one’s decisions can
take effect long after one’s death. As Glendon has argued, Burke’s accomplishments, though
modest in his lifetime, set the forces in motion that eventually vindicated some of his other
aims.521 Thus, to assess John Paul II’s decisions within the framework, it is necessary to
understand whether his political judgments involved actions that lean towards either side of the
mean of practical wisdom. It must also consider, through the lens of historical analysis, whether
his political aims were ultimately successful.
The present thesis suggests that Glendon’s terms “integrity” and “compromise” can be
used to denote actions that lean towards either side of the mean, but are not the excessive
“hypermoralist” or “Machiavellian” extremes.522
Figure 4.2: Between the Mean and Extremes: Integrity & Compromise
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Figure 4.2 shows that political judgments that contain commitment to political aims as
part of the right means fall between the middle point, and the hypermoralist extreme of the
graph. Such judgments can be considered as acting with “integrity”. Political judgments that
consider a lesser commitment to political aims as the right means in the here and now, fall
between the middle point and the Machiavellian extreme of the graph. Such judgments can be
considered a “compromise” on essential aims for the sake of some other “immediate
advantage”, or “immediate success”.
Gaddis, Bernstein, and Byrnes, among others, offer detailed analyses on the role John
Paul II played in the events that led to the first partial free elections in Poland on June 4,
1989.523 Appendix A provides a timeline that links the development of John Paul II with the
events in Poland that lead to the election on June 4, 1989. This section aims to examine John
Paul II’s decisions and public engagements within the Polish communist context. It focusses
on how his political thought from the “tower” informs those decisions in the “forum.” It
highlights that John Paul II employs his “hybrid” agency of diplomacy and moral authority
through means consistent to what he considers the ends of politics in the Polish context. It
assesses the extent to which John Paul II’s judgments lean towards the side of “integrity” or
the side of “compromise” on the Glendon graph. It will argue that John Paul II makes decisions
that consistently retain the integrity of his political aims. However, it supplies evidence in
support of Byrnes’ argument that Pope John Paul II played a significant role in the changing
political landscape in Poland. Furthermore, it makes the case that Polish society shapes “John
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Paul II’s approach to political questions”524 through the “caution” and “moderated” rhetoric he
exercised.525 The present thesis suggests he is attentive to the circumstances “here and now”,
which places him closer to the mean, rather than the extreme of “hypermoralism”.

“Chief Diplomat”: The Ostpolitik and Diplomacy
The strategies John Paul II deployed as part of his foreign policy towards Eastern
Europe demonstrate his method of decision-making prioritises long-term political aims over
short-term advantages.526 The Pope, in consultation with the largely Italian Vatican Secretariat
of State, devises strategies within its foreign policy to conduct its pastoral initiatives
effectively, as well as occasionally to mediate negotiations for preventing, or ending, conflict
between States.527 The Ostpolitik – or “Eastern Politics” – was an inclusive term, employed in
a variety of Vatican policies since 1960, with the purpose of ameliorating the situation of
Catholics in Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Its aim was to provide the Church with
sufficient freedom to carry out its pastoral activities in Eastern European Communist nations.528
The new strategy required a shift in approach for better relations with Communist states. 529 A
realist framework informed the Vatican’s approach to the current system of power. This was
in large part shaped by Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican’s Secretary of State throughout
the Ostpolitik. The Vatican read the landscape of European power created under the Yalta
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system, as largely stable and fixed.530 There was a balance between Eastern and Western
European powers, and the Soviet side of the balance of power would remain as such for the
determinate future.531 As Gaddis writes, the Vatican followed the East/West bloc, as they
“agreed to accept, for the foreseeable future, the world as it was.”532 These beliefs informed
the Vatican Secretariat’s view that silencing its condemnation of communist government
policies that it believed violated human rights could give it “breathing space” for its pastoral
initiatives in communist countries.533
In practice, Vatican diplomacy acknowledged the legitimate authority of the
Communist government in power. Open condemnation of communism as an illegitimate form
of government ceased. The ideological and philosophical differences between the Christian
tradition and the Communist state were no longer emphasized.534 Instead, the Church pursued
an avenue of negotiating for specific, pastoral needs in those countries. Such aims included the
appointment of bishops that the Church considered trustworthy and the Government deemed
acceptable, applicants to the seminary, and other pastoral matters. These goals were considered
more achievable than attempting to pressure communist governments to change their policies
on religious freedom.535 Through downplaying anti-communist rhetoric, the Church hoped to
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gain back some control over its pastoral and ecclesial authority in countries across Eastern
Europe.536
By 1978, the Ostpolitik was a settled method of engagement between the Holy See and
the Eastern European states. By 1980, there were sixty million Catholics in the Soviet bloc
Communist countries.537 Catholics were the majority in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and
held a significant minority in Yugoslavia. Kengor describes the method of compromise to gain
“breathing space” as a Cold War version of détente.538 The strategy had achieved modest
success, which varied between countries.539 Kramer suggests that this approach made The
Vatican a neutral moral voice, critical of “both east and west, with the respect of both
worlds.”540 This neutral approach made it an appealing ally to the Soviet Union nations, and
enhanced the Holy See’s status as a legitimate moral authority. Weigel states that in Poland,
local communities described the situation as “bad, but stable bad.”541
Within the thesis’ understanding of practical wisdom, this approach suggests that the
Holy See considered what Glendon calls “prudent accommodation” of communist government
policies necessary to gain immediate advantages. Weigel describes the approach as
preferencing short-term gains over long-term goals.542 Popes John XXIII and Paul VI
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(predecessors to John Paul II) calculated that accommodating the communist regimes as
legitimate representations of their respective people’s interests would deliver better short-term
results than pursuing a method of open condemnation of communism as an ideological and
political system.543 Figure 4.3 shows that Vatican foreign policy by 1978 can be placed on the
“Glendon graph”. The “compromise” approach of the ostpolitik can be considered one that
leans closer to the centre on the “Machiavellian” half of the graph, rather than on the side of
“integrity”.
Figure 4.3: Vatican Ostpolitik by 1978

That the osptolitik achieved “modest success” means it is placed closer to the base than
the top of the vertical axis, and visibly within the “compromise” area of the horizontal axis,
which indicates the policy delivered only moderate advantages in exchange for a greater degree
of compromise. The ostpolitik received criticism on its decision to rescind permissions for
clandestine ordinations in the Czech and Ukrainian Churches. The compromise on what was
considered by some news sources as a key part of the underground Church’s resistance was
labelled an abandonment of the Church’s responsibilities. The New York Times published that
the Vatican was “[making] a sacrificial lamb out of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in its search
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for improved relations with the Soviet Union.”544 Critics of the ostpolitik also argued that the
lack of Vatican opposition to oppressive measures in Communist countries in return for its
diplomatic support actually served to enhance the Communist regimes internal and external
legitimacy.545 However, Ortaymer notes it is unclear what other policies could have been more
successful during the 1960s and early 1970s.546
In John Paul II’s analysis, this was not a sustainable policy in the long term. Byrnes
proposes that John Paul II,
…used the enormous resources of his office to focus world attention on his homeland.
He targeted his considerable personal energy on radically reformulating Polish politics
and government, as well as using the Polish model to effect systemic change in the
social and political life of the European continent.547
John Paul II’s strategic goal drew from his first-hand experience of living under the
communist system in Poland, which gave him unique insight into its limitations.548 His
perspective was also developed through his own intellectual formation of the concept of the
person. As the previous chapter has shown, John Paul II developed an anthropology that
emphasises the dignity of the person in everyday circumstances as the starting point to
defending each person’s fundamental rights that the Polish government actively restricted.549
This formation, Weigel argues, gave John Paul II the conviction that the primary issue with the
pragmatic aims of the ostpolitik was its failure to properly secure the rights of persons that the
State was obligated to protect. For John Paul II, the communist system was predicated on a
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false conception of the person, which crippled its ability to ensure the rights of the Polish people
in a fundamental way.550 As such, Weigel suggests John Paul II’s policy towards communism
in Poland as, “one had to win, one had to lose.”551
Byrnes argues that John Paul II shifted the emphasis of Papal diplomacy towards a
firmer commitment to human rights in the public sphere, as part of his goal to “reformulate
Polish politics.” Rather than continue the line of political toleration under the ostpolitik, John
Paul II challenged the Polish government to improve its policies on the grounds of human
rights, as the means to “reaching diplomatic agreements.”552 Weigel notes John Paul II made
continual references to both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1975 Helsinki
Act in his diplomatic addresses.553 The Helsinki Act’s provisions required the Polish
government (among other signatories) to permit the exercise of religious and association
freedoms, in the form of permissions to form organisations, among other requirements. The
Solidarity Trade Union cited these provisions in defence of its organising activities, to which
John Paul II gave public support.554
John Paul II’s decision to adopt a human rights stance towards Poland and Eastern
Europe broadly, produced a form of political judgment consonant with his political thought. In
1983, on his second pilgrimage to Poland, John Paul II confronted Polish leader Jaruzelski,
declaring Poland to resemble “one giant concentration camp under martial law.”555 As a
diplomat, John Paul II arguably used human rights language as a less confronting challenge to
the Polish government than directly critiquing communism as a political system. Bernstein
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quotes Polish President Jaruzelski’s recollection of a private meeting between himself and the
Pope:
[The Pope always spoke] in terms of human rights or civil rights. And when we
discussed rights we naturally mean[t] democracy. If there is democracy, then you have
elections; if you have elections, then you have power. But he never put it that way. It
showed his great culture and diplomacy, because in substance he used words and
phrases you couldn’t argue with. Because if he had said, ‘you have to share power with
Solidarity’, we would have argued about it, naturally. But when one simply mentions
human rights, it’s such a general term, such a general notion, that you can have a
constructive discussion, which eventually brought us [the regime] closer to that goal
without losing face.556
Jaruzelski notes that John Paul II’s use of human rights language was an effective
means of facilitating constructive dialogue between the Polish government and the Holy See.
Chapter Three explained that for John Paul II, rights are basic preconditions needed to
guarantee participation in the political life of the community and “should be received from
others.”557 These rights include access to employment, a just wage, and search for the truth
without fear of censorship. Barrett states that for John Paul II, rights require the support of
economic and political structures, as well as the support from the community to secure them.558
As such, John Paul II’s use of rights language in his diplomacy illustrates his commitment to
human rights as an essential political good.
John Paul II arguably shifted Vatican foreign policy to a closer alignment with US
foreign policy objectives. Bernstein proposes John Paul II and Ronald Reagan actively sought
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each other’s mutual support to destabilise the Eastern bloc communist governments, and
especially Poland, where the Church was strongest in number. Bernstein argues that Reagan’s
closest advisors considered the Catholic Church the “crucible of anti-communist
conviction.”559 As such, Reagan sought “both openly and covertly to forge the closest of ties
with the Pope and the Vatican”.560 Bernstein contends that part of the “holy alliance” between
John Paul II and Ronald Reagan involved channelling resources for Solidarity and intelligencesharing through the Vatican.561
Such decisions reflect a decisive shift in the ostpolitik’s diplomatic strategy and tactics.
As Rooney puts it, Pope John Paul II had a “way of moving past the usual diplomatic parlance
to say exactly what he meant.”562 However, despite his belief that the ostpolitik was an
unsustainable policy, John Paul II retained the policy and placed Cardinal Casaroli, who
strongly supported the policy, in charge of bilateral negotiations with communist states. Weigel
argues this decision demonstrates prudential judgment. Rather than abandon the ostpolitik
entirely, John Paul II permitted the Vatican diplomatic service to continue the norms of
accommodationist diplomacy while pursuing his own method of diplomatic engagement.563
Appleby summarises the shift in John Paul II’s strategy towards Poland in these terms,
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[Pope John Paul II] demonstrates both continuity and change in papal policy. His
teaching on human rights, economic justice, and international order develops ideas from
the eras of Pius XII through Paul VI. But his historical experience, his philosophical
convictions, and his personal style of pastoral leadership and diplomacy have all set
John Paul II's pontificate apart from his predecessors…This pope engages world leaders
with a more explicitly geopolitical analysis than his predecessors; he speaks more
openly about power and how it should be directed and contained.564
The extent to which this shift in policy contributed to the collapse of the communist
government in Poland is the subject of further analysis in the next section. However, the
conclusion of this part can fittingly observe that John Paul II employs his political ideas of the
rights of persons consistently in his diplomatic engagement with communist Poland. As Troy
and others have proposed, the Pope exercised a “hybrid” agency that enables him to speak as a
moral authority through diplomatic channels as well as to the global press and his adherents.565
John Paul II’s agency is enhanced through his rigorous public defence of human rights. This
seemingly contradicts the wisdom learned from Plato’s experience, that consistent public
affirmation of political aims, worked out in “the tower” has little traction with totalitarian
authorities.
“Moral Authority”: Rhetoric on Pilgrimage
Throughout his papal pilgrimages to Poland in 1979, 1983, and 1987, John Paul II
deployed a rhetoric that consistently reinforced the idea that Poland’s national history and
identity was inseparable from its religious history and identity. Melady contends that papal
rhetoric is a distinctive style of “sacralising the secular.”566 In The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul
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II: The Pastoral Visit As a New Vocabulary of the Sacred, Melady argues that the “task facing
the Church at the time of Pope John Paul II’s elevation to the papacy was to restore a sense of
the sacred.” John Paul II believed, according to Melady, that emphasis on the Church’s
distinctive lens of viewing reality was an essential tool to shift away from previous Vatican
policy of accommodating secular perspectives of the situation in Poland. In practice, John Paul
II repeatedly “employed images of Polish history” that evoked a form of religious patriotism.
The images of upward “struggle and conflict” serve to entrench the image of “unseen but
omnipresent” spiritual forces that would help Poland overcome the communist system. 567 The
Pope’s rhetoric created a “forward moving and assured future” that “is also a ‘victory’ that
must be won by those who believe that grace is more ‘powerful’ than sin.” Melady states that
the Pope’s rhetoric drew “battle lines” between “life and death, grace and sin,” that could only
be overcome by confronting communism through a more direct rhetoric than previous Popes
had employed.568
Throughout his 1979 visit, John Paul II reminded the Polish State authorities that “an
agreement” of cooperation between the Church and State in Poland “corresponds to historical
reasons of the nation, whose sons and daughters, in the vast majority, are the sons and daughters
of the Catholic Church.”569 In a negotiation with Polish First Secretary Gierek for this
agreement between the Church and State, John Paul II deployed rhetoric that called for national
unity, through the aims of justice and peace, and through the securing of basic human rights
for the Polish people. According to Bernstein, Gierek emphasised international détente as the
primary path to peace. John Paul II, however, “laid down a list of conditions” that were
“designed” to influence the Communist government to make “unprecedented concessions” to
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coexist peacefully with the Church.570 In evidence of the success of this more direct approach,
Sculz states that by the early 1980’s, “The church and [Polish President] Jaruzelski engaged in
a permanent dialogue on every aspect of national life.”571
As Chapter Three argues, John Paul II’s political thought is chiefly concerned with the
ability of people to secure their basic rights, through participating in the determination of their
own political, cultural and economic future.572 In the Polish context, John Paul II is clear that
the situation in his home country required the government to recognise in practical terms the
basic rights of the Polish people to authentic participation in Poland’s social and political order.
He stated that “the drawing together of peoples…can only be achieved on the principle of
respect for the objective rights of the nation, such as: the right to existence, to freedom, to be a
social and political subject, and also to the formation of its own culture and civilisation.”573 To
secure these basic conditions, John Paul II states, “our times demand that we should not lock
ourselves into the rigid boundaries of systems, but seek all that is necessary for the good of
man, who must find everywhere the awareness and certainty of his authentic citizenship.”574
These claims demonstrate a decisive shift from previous accommodationist Vatican approaches
to Eastern Europe to a more confrontational approach. John Paul II’s language emphasises the
central tenets of his political thought – that the Polish people have a right to determine their
own culture, and the political system in which they participate.
Indeed, scholars of rhetoric Melady and Jamieson suggest that John Paul II was
thoroughly deliberate in the location of his speeches, using “dramatic symbols” and linking his
own Polish identity to the assessment that a radical reclaiming of faith was relevant and
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necessary in the immediate historical moment. Melady concludes John Paul II’s rhetoric
rendered him a “credible and compelling” advocate for the Polish people.575 These decisions
appear decisive in leading Soviet leader Gorbachev to fly to the Vatican in 1988 to meet the
Pope to discuss Poland’s future. Weigel notes that at this meeting, Gorbachev described John
Paul II as “the highest moral authority in the world, and a Slav.”576
However, it is also conceivable that John Paul II drew from his experiences in using
caution and subtlety in his statements as a priest and Bishop in Krakow, Poland. Bernstein
observes John Paul II’s rhetoric remained in the abstract realm of rights, rather than citing
specific events. These included the basic rights of workers to a “just salary”, “to security”, and
to “a day of rest” in an address to one million people in the steelworks town of Katowice. John
Paul II connected the area of work to the question of trade unions, stating that all workers had
“the right of free association” and to form unions as “a mouthpiece for the struggle for social
justice”.577 The State, John Paul II proposed, “does not give us this right, it only has the
obligation to protect and guard it” through “whatever system of relations and powers.”578
Throughout the 1979 visit, Weigel observes John Paul II did not mention “politics” or
“economics” once, in any of his thirty-two sermons to an estimated ten million people.579
Instead, he repeatedly welcomed any reference the Polish authorities made to peace and a
united Poland.580 Gaddis writes that “Wojtyła had been working quietly for years—as priest,
archbishop, and cardinal—to preserve, strengthen, and expand the ties between the individual
morality of Poles and the universal morality of the Roman Catholic Church. Now, as pope, he
witnessed his success.” This highlights that John Paul II retained the experiences from his
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cautionary approach as priest, ethics professor and Bishop in Krakow and applied them as
Pope.581
John Paul II’s political judgment through the ostpolitik and his papal visits to Poland
suggests he is aware of and practices a form of prudent accommodation. As Murphy states,
“while martyrdom remains always a free man’s last witness to truth, there is plenty of room for
prudence between conformism and martyrdom.” Murphy continues that “Wojtyla did not seem
an enthusiast for death”, and, as “a general principle, the crown of martyrdom should not be
desired as long as it can be avoided.”582 Therefore, John Paul II makes political judgments with
integrity, but not at the “hypermoralist” extreme. On the Glendon graph, John Paul II’s strategic
approach to “reformulate Polish politics” through the use of “dramatic symbols”, human rights
language and closer collaboration with US administration policies, suggests he can be placed
on the opposite side of the map to the ostpolitik of his predecessors.

Figure 4.4: John Paul II on the “Glendon Graph”

Figure 4.4 indicates that John Paul II’s political judgment involved a greater degree of
integrity, than of compromise in pursuit of his political aims. Barbato writes that Popes exercise
the Church’s agency “most powerfully” when they engage “on principle” and out of “the clear
581
582
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conviction of its confessions”, but is also “wisely discrete on its particularities, policy and
procedure.”583 Gaddis captures how John Paul II’s political thought directly informs his
decisions when he describes that John Paul II, along with US President Reagan and UK Prime
Minister Thatcher, had “destinations in mind and mind maps for reaching them.”584 Byrnes
echoes this view, declaring that “the pope was committed to the establishment of true, absolute
Polish autonomy in both political and cultural terms.”585 These perspectives indicate that John
Paul II’s political thought in the “tower” informs a strategically devised method of rights
rhetoric and diplomacy designed to pressure the Polish government in the “forum”.
The present thesis has followed Copleston’s argument that in some cases virtue requires
the person to act in a way that leans more towards an excess of the mean proper to that action.586
In the virtue of practical wisdom, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards
excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends. John Paul
II arguably uses means that lean on the “hypermoralist” side of the mean, though he is not a
“hypermoralist” by Maritain’s definition. This thesis proposes John Paul II’s method of
political judgment as diplomat and moral authority – the “forum” – draws directly from his
political thought – the “tower”. Thought and practice intersect consistently in the Pope’s
political decision-making. Thus, the framework shows that John Paul II’s method of political
judgment involves “integrity” in the context of Polish communism. However, as Buttliglione
and Murphy argue, John Paul II is sensitive to the needs of the present moment and deploys
his moral and diplomatic agency with a degree of understanding of what means best serve his
political aims.587 Therefore, John Paul II’s actions place him closer to the mean on the
horizontal axis, rather than the hypermoralist extreme on the Glendon graph.
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The extent to which John Paul II’s aims were successful and thus whether the means
were used in the right way, at the right time, has not yet been shown. The following section
aims to understand the extent of John Paul II’s impact on the political events that led to Poland’s
partial free elections on June 4, 1989. The framework engages arguments that suggest John
Paul II exercised unprecedented influence for a Pope on Polish politics throughout the 1980s.
However, the framework also highlights that the political conditions were most favourable for
John Paul II’s actions to be considered the right means at the time. Thus, it will argue that the
framework shows that political conditions enabled John Paul II’s agency, in a way that
validates Glendon’s view that political circumstances are essential components of political
outcomes.

Section Three: Success or Failure – Is John Paul II the “Practically Wise Man”?

This section considers the extent to which John Paul II can be considered “practically
wise” in this context. Luxmoore and Babiuch’s, The Vatican and The Red Flag,588 Gaddis’ The
Cold War: A New History are among the works that argue John Paul II’s political engagement
with Poland had a considerable impact on the events that led to the free elections and
subsequent collapse of communism in 1989. In particular, John Paul II is credited with being
the “catalyst” that caused the Solidarity Trade Union to form in 1980.589 This argument
considers the emergence of Solidarity as both a movement and the Trade Union as a key
contributor to the pressure that caused the communist government to hold free elections on
June 4, 1989.590
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However, the present thesis also considers Glendon’s view that favourable conditions
can facilitate political agency, while unfavourable conditions can hinder effectiveness.591
Therefore, part of Glendon’s method requires consideration of how the political conditions
were favourable or unfavourable for the person’s political aims. This enables her to offer some
judgment on the relationship between the political actor’s decisions and the political conditions
in the “reasons for success or failure”.592 Thus, although John Paul II’s actions aim for the right
ends, the political circumstances must also be considered to assess John Paul II’s success in the
pursuit of enhancing political participation through the communist collapse in Poland.
John Paul II and the Solidarity Movement
During the 1979 papal visit to Poland, John Paul II had “conjured up images of a nation
defiantly reasserting its identity against the external forces of power and coercion.” Luxmoore
and Babiuch contend the impact of the message began to take on an organised, political form
by mid-1980. Solidarity had needed a “spark” to ignite – and John Paul II’s 1979 pilgrimage
functioned as that catalyst.593 In August 1980, at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, the same site
where around forty-five worker protesters were shot in 1970, Lech Walesa led a strike that was
replicated across several factories in Poland. Luxmoore notes that these strikes were distinctly
nonviolent, more organised and more sustained than those in 1970, and 1976. Gaddis states
that Walesa followed John Paul II’s example of “rattling the Polish authorities” when he
announced the formation of Solidarność (Solidarity), the first ever independent trade union
under communism in Poland.594 “The word ‘Solidarity’ appeared on the banners of the 17,000
Gdansk strikers. The Pope’s picture was everywhere. His words were being repeated”. 595 The
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strikers’ organised and peaceful approach forced the communist government into legalising the
Solidarity Trade Union. Gaddis observes that “the pen with which [Walesa] co-signed the
charter for Solidarność bore the image of John Paul II. And from Rome the pontiff let it be
known, quietly but unmistakably, that he approved.”596
Walesa describes Poland prior to John Paul II’s election to the papacy as “in a state of
apathy”. The perspective of the Polish people was one of fear of Soviet intervention, and a
sense that the Communist system could not be undermined, and that social organised resistance
with an alternative, and attractive, narrative could not be established.597 However, when Pope
John Paul II was elected to the papacy, and visited Poland less than a year later, Walesa states
the Polish people could “not help but notice the size of the crowds in attendance.” It is estimated
that nearly ten million Poles saw John Paul II in person on his nine day pilgrimage, and
“virtually the entire country” was engaged through radio and television broadcast.598 This gave,
in Walesa’s view, the Polish people a sense that “there are a lot more of us than there are of
them” – meaning the State.599 Walesa concluded that John Paul II’s 1979 visit to Poland had a
direct impact on the foundation of Solidarity.600
Without the Holy Father [in Poland, 1979], we would not have been able to take note
of our numbers, and to organise, and the Communists would have been able to break
us apart. So [Solidarity] was caused by coming together for prayer, yes, but it also
helped us to count our strength in numbers.601
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Walesa argues that John Paul II’s 1979 pilgrimage had a unifying and awakening effect
on the Polish people. The crowds that attended each of the places he visited gave visible
credibility to the idea that mass social opposition to the regime was possible, through the
unifying force of social solidarity. At the same time, Walesa also cautions not overextending
the role of John Paul II in the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc. Walesa believes that
John Paul II was limited by his religious mission to help Solidarity’s organised activities
throughout the 1980s. However, he concludes that if one “wanted to assess in percentage who
contributed [to the collapse of communism], we would have to give 50 percent of credit for
bringing communism down to the Pope, [and] 30 percent to Solidarity and Lech Walesa, that
means myself.”602
In December 1981, the Polish government banned the Solidarity Trade Union, and
arrested several of its leaders, including Walesa. Appleby states the arrest of intellectuals and
religious leaders, in conjunction with Poland’s economic stagnation, caused a series of worker
and student protests throughout the 1980s. These conditions enabled John Paul II to encourage
continued organised opposition with the support of the Polish Church under a common theme
of solidarity.603 Byrnes links the consistency of John Paul II’s messaging in his 1979 and his
1983 pilgrimages to Poland. When “John Paul II entered Warsaw in triumphant glory in 1979,
and when he defiantly and repeatedly uttered the loaded word ‘solidarity’ before Polish
audiences suffering under martial law in 1983—these were the crucial, purposefully symbolic
acts of a very resourceful subversive.”604 Kraszewski concurs with this view, stating that “from
a situation in Poland of social, moral and economic malaise, in which people felt that nothing
good could happen, [John Paul II] came, and the emotional, psychological consequences were
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inevitable.”605 Thus, Appleby declares it “indisputable” that John Paul II was “central” to the
causing the Solidarity revolution and the communist collapse in Poland.606
Thus, John Paul II is considered an influential actor in the collapse of communism,
owing to his role in igniting the Solidarity Trade Union, and his support of the movement
throughout the 1980s. The Pope’s public messaging gave the Polish people the “raw materials”
through which to forge “tools of liberation” that were essentially “moral and cultural in nature”.
In Weigel’s view, John Paul II’s engagement with Poland helped the Polish people “find tools
of resistance that totalitarianism cannot match”.607 However, the framework also highlights
that the political conditions were unusually favourable for Pope John Paul II, which arguably
enhanced his political impact.
The “Confluence of Gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck”
The present thesis recognises that the causes leading to the collapse of the communist
government, signalled with the elections on 4 June 1989, are complex. Scholars disagree on
the ultimate or even dominant causes of the communist system’s collapse across the nations
under the Warsaw Pact.608 Several questions as to why “1989” occurred that remain contested,
are captured by McDermott and Stibbe, who ask:
Why did the seemingly impregnable fortresses of communism disintegrate so rapidly
in the autumn of that year?; why was this historic transformation achieved so
peacefully?... were internal or external developments the main motor of change?; what
role did ‘the people’ play in the overthrow of communism, or, conversely, did the
machinations of leading individuals account for the extraordinary events?; how far do
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political, ideological or economic factors explain the demise?; was the collapse inherent
in the utopianism of communism’s modernising spirit and its unshakable belief in
hyper-centralist economic and political structures?609
McDermott and Stibbe’s The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe,610
provides a selection of perspectives on the causes and processes of the collapse of communist
governments across Eastern Europe. These viewpoints emphasise a combination of political,
economic, and international factors contributed to the final demise of governments within the
Soviet Union. When placed within the framework, these factors constitute what Glendon calls
the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. These factors were
essential preconditions for John Paul II to successfully pursue his political aims in the Polish
communist context.
Buckley argues that Gorbachev’s introduction of the perestroika (restructuring) and
glasnost (openness) policies in the Soviet Union were fundamental in causing the eventual
collapse of the communist government in Poland - and in the USSR broadly. The centre of
these policies was a shift away from the Soviet Union’s overt influence and exertion of pressure
on its neighbouring allies.611 Within this policy shift was the complete abandonment of the
“Brezhnev Doctrine”,612 which prescribed the use of Soviet force to repress any dissidence in
Warsaw Pact countries – and had been deployed to great effect in Czechoslovakia in 1968.613
Buckley observes that the new “Gorbachev Doctrine” was significant in countries like Poland,
Hungary and Bulgaria’s transitions to more tolerant, open and pluralist regimes. In particular,
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it sent a clear signal to Polish President Jaruzelski that martial law and the banning of the
Solidarity Trade Union were no longer considered good policies.614
Gorbachev’s most significant reform, according to Dahrendorf, was that the “Soviet
army will no longer intervene when its allies go their own way”, and, as an extension, “the
Soviet Party will not insist on the monopoly of the communist party”.615 The effect of this
policy relieved the risk anti-communist forces in Poland faced when mobilising their
opposition.616 In Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Dahrendorf declares that without
Gorbachev and his “remarkable approach, the events of 1989 would not have happened in the
particular way in which they occurred”.617
In the Polish context, Buckley argues that Gorbachev found Polish President Jaruzelski
to be the leader most open to reform, and most adaptable to change.618 Malia states that
Jaruzelski’s attempts at reform communism were instigated as a result of an openness to
Gorbachev’s perestroika. Nonetheless, when these failed and demonstrations began again in
Poland, the Red Army were not sent in – giving credibility to the policy of supporting internal
reform without intervention. This had the effect of enabling the Polish government to negotiate
with internal opposition on its own terms.619 The present thesis concurs that this contributed to
the non-violent means through which Polish communism transitioned to a pluralist, open
market democracy.620 However, Kampleman suggests that the US nuclear weapons
advancement also featured in Soviet calculations on the cost of intervention in Poland. By the
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mid-1980s, it is plausible that the Soviet Union abandoned the interventionist policy because
it was already about to lose the Cold War.621
In addition to Gorbachev’s new foreign policy, the Soviet Union was under pressure to
accept internal reform in Eastern Bloc countries due to its overstretched resources in the Cold
War. War in Afghanistan, East–West agreement on missiles and dealing with strains with
China were higher priorities than internal Eastern bloc issues.622 Further, diplomatic pressure
applied through the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is offered as a major factor. O’Hallaron details
how the Helsinki process created a space where human rights and security issues intersected
between the US and the Soviet Union.623 The Helsinki Act was signed primarily by the US and
the USSR (but not by the Vatican), to codify the status quo of the existing Yalta imperial system
(created in 1945 at the end of the Second World War). The Act contained what became known
as the “Basket Three” conditions. These contained a set of human rights provisions and
compliance review procedures that in effect legalised the formation of organisations to
scrutinise the Soviet Union’s practices and record of human rights violations. Multiple
conferences were held in Europe between 1977-1989, which were used to provide support to
human rights activists in Eastern bloc countries, and amplified pressure on the Soviet Union’s
failures to keep to the commitments on human rights.624
Gaddis, among other historians, also emphasises that Polish economic conditions
placed the government under considerable pressure, which, in turn, also sustained the
motivation for social opposition.625 Will offers a comparable assessment to Gaddis, and
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provides some statistical data to highlight the deteriorating state of the Polish economy during
the 1980s. Will states that Poland’s economy had stagnated by the mid-1980s, where the
national monthly average pay dropped to 107,000 zlotys, which was equivalent to less than
$US20, 57.9% of households did not have any savings, 60% of working age persons were
physically impaired in some way, and just 10% of Polish men lived till retirement age. 626 US
military and economic pressure also contributed to Poland’s stagnant economy. The US
Government cut its loans to the Polish government, which Poland had been using to finance its
expenditure. The lack of US funds created economic pressure that led to mass strikes across
Poland, which further destabilised the Polish regime’s authority.627
Therefore, by the late 1980s, the communist leadership experienced significant
economic, social, and political pressure from a network of forces both internal and external.
These factors, in the present thesis’ view, constitute ideal conditions for John Paul II to engage
Poland through the means, and at the time he deployed them. Junes, Will, and others observe
that the timing of John Paul II’s election as the first Polish pope in history, at a time where 90%
of the country adheres to the Catholic faith, in the context of these pressures, provides him with
an unprecedented influence.628 The network of pressures arguably made it possible for John
Paul II to pursue his aims with integrity, and for those means to have a tangible political impact.
The present thesis considers John Paul II made sound political decisions, based on his
experience as a Pole. It follows Byrnes’ view that “the pope was committed to the establishment
of true, absolute Polish autonomy in both political and cultural terms” as his distinctive political
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aim.629 However, that these aims were successful must be considered within the network of
forces already pressuring the Polish government.
John Paul II’s Lessons for the Aspirant Statesperson
The present thesis has argued that the favourable political conditions facilitated John
Paul II’s political success. Within this context, what lessons do John Paul II’s decisions offer
to the aspirant statesperson? Byrnes argues that by the late 1980s, the Polish Government was
aware it needed the Church’s support to enter negotiations with Solidarity and other resistance
groups, to deliver an acceptable package of economic and political reforms in exchange for
ceasing public protests. Byrnes writes that,
The Church under communism was transformed into an indispensable substitute for the
civil society that Michnik and other dissidents so desired but that the Soviet system so
explicitly disallowed. Therefore, when Polish political autonomy exploded in Poland
in the form of the Solidarity trade union, it did so in a distinctively Catholic idiom.
From the Black Madonna pin in Lech Walesa’s lapel and the striking miners lining up
to receive Holy Communion to the revolutionary rallies held in Father Jerzy
Popieluszko’s Warsaw parish, the articulation of free-thinking opposition to the Polish
communist government was deeply imbedded in the only viable noncommunist
institution to which Poles could turn, the Polish Church.630
The Communist government proposed that the Church act as interlocutor on behalf of
the Polish people to negotiate the reforms. At this point, the regime was offering some degree
of power in the dialogue to the Church in Poland. John Paul II, however, chose to decline the
government’s proposition. Weigel states that John Paul II cited Solidarity as the “proper
representative of Polish society”, and that any negotiations must be conducted with the Trade
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Union. In John Paul II’s view, the Church could not substitute itself as mediator, as this
involved tacitly accepting the regime’s ban of Solidarity.631 This decision highlights John Paul
II’s preference to retain the integrity of his principled view of the Church’s role rather than take
the perceived immediate advantage.632 Throughout his engagement in Poland as Pope, John
Paul II can thus be understood as a political actor who pursues political aims in the “forum”
with consistent reference to his political principles. In Weigel’s view, John Paul II’s decisions
towards communist Poland provide a “lesson” for “the twenty-first-century statesman” that
“moral pressure can be an important lever in world politics, but effective human rights
advocacy and democracy-promotion require dexterity – diplomatic dexterity, and dexterity in
waging the battle of ideas.”633 Within the framework, the thesis concurs with Weigel’s view
that John Paul II’s decisions in this context exemplify “thinking long-term” as he does not
“sacrifice core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”634
The decision to reject playing “the role of opposition party” for the communist regime
increased pressure on Jaruzelski to recognise and engage with the Polish people’s authentic
representative, largely based in Solidarity. As a result, by early 1989 the regime negotiated
directly with Solidarity at the Round Table discussions. The result of the discussions was, most
significantly, the agreement to hold partial free elections on June 4 1989. Only some of the
lower house seats could be contested, but all 100 seats in Poland’s Senate were contestable.635
Solidarity won 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate, with the 100th won by an independent
businessman.636 Will states that the network of pressures produced a re-distribution of popular
support in Poland, which ultimately forced the government to hold Round Table negotiations.
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Solidarity ultimately “became a decisive factor on the political scene. No legal act will be
enforced without Solidarity approval in… the Senate.”637
Does John Paul II’s role within the present thesis’ account render him practically wise?
Willey, a biographer of the pope, concludes that,
“The rise of the Solidarity movement and indeed Poland’s subsequent transition from
Communist dictatorship under Soviet tutelage to the first non-Communist government
in Eastern Europe, can be traced directly back to the sense of patriotism, purpose and
optimism generated by the Pope’s bold visit to Poland a decade before.638
Within the context of economic, social and political pressure on the communist
government, John Paul II’s consistent use of his “hybrid” political influence was essential to
the formation and sustaining of the Solidarity movement. Solidarity’s electoral victory in 1989
arguably vindicates the view that John Paul II’s support of the movement and Trade Union was
an important contributing factor to the result. Thus, John Paul II can be said to have pursued
the right means, at the right time.
However, as Buckley, O’Halloran, and others have shown, the political conditions were
unusually favourable for John Paul II. Scholars such as Weigel acknowledge John Paul II could
not have had the same kind of effect without certain external factors that eventually forced the
regime into negotiations with Solidarity in 1989.639 On the Glendon graph, the present thesis
suggests it is both difficult and imprecise to consider the extent to which John Paul II can be
considered “practically wise” in this context. On the one hand, scholars such as Appleby,
Kraszewski, and Bernstein, among others, argue that John Paul II exercised exceptional
political judgment that was central to the communist collapse. Indeed, Kraszewski’s declares
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that, of all the contributing forces to the collapse of the Communist government in Poland, “no
factor… was more important that John Paul II.”640 Kraszewski claims that “the pope’s 1979
pilgrimage proved more powerful than any nuclear weapons, politics, or economic
restructuring package could ever be.”641 On the other hand, Buckley and Malia are among those
who emphasise political and economic pressure as most determinant. Figure 4.5 maps John
Paul II between these points.
Figure 4.5: Perspectives on John Paul II as “Practically Wise”

Figure 4.5 shows that John Paul II falls squarely within the half of the map that leans
towards an integrity of means, rather than a method of compromise. As has been argued,
decisions that lean towards the excess of the mean can still produce the right outcome, and be
the right means – though to a limited extent. There are three red marks, the highest mark on the
vertical axis represents Kraszewski and others view that John Paul II’s decisions were
strategically devised and correctly executed. The lowest mark on the vertical axis represents
Buckley and others view that emphasises the political and economic conditions external to John
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Paul II as more determinant. The centred mark is the middle point between these two
perspectives, which, is where the present thesis suggests John Paul II can be placed.
The present thesis hesitates to offer a definitive conclusion on the extent of John Paul
II’s strategic decision-making in the collapse of communism in Poland. Analyses that are more
thorough, cited in the present thesis, offer more detailed and considered perspectives. An
assessment of his impact is a secondary component of the present thesis; its primary concern
is understanding the nature of John Paul II’s political decision-making with respect to his
political thought. This is the fundamental area of analysis the method has set to understand –
as Glendon terms them, the tension between the “forum and the tower.” The present thesis
suggests, therefore, that John Paul II can be placed between the higher and lower points already
given here.
In a final analysis, then, the Pope’s agency as diplomat and legitimate moral authority
added additional pressure to the network of forces already pressuring the Polish communist
system. In particular, his papal pilgrimages to Poland served as a catalyst and a unifying force
necessary for the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union. However, it is perhaps more
significant that John Paul II was elected to the papacy at the particular moment in history where
a network of pressures had already undermined the communist system dramatically. Thus, was
John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism a feature of political luck and good timing?
The factors observed here lend support to the idea that John Paul II fits within Glendon’s
assessment that statespersons who aim for the right ends, at the right time, using the right
means, can be aided by felicitous political conditions.

Conclusion
John Paul II can be understood as a political actor through the framework developed in
this thesis. The developed and adopted method has highlighted that John Paul II used political
means in the “forum” in a way that retained the integrity of his political aims from the “tower”.
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As a “hybrid” political actor, John Paul II engaged Poland under Communism through “moraldiplomacy”.642 As part of his new political agency as Pope, he shifted the Vatican’s policies
under the ostpolitik towards his own political aims. It is credible that John Paul II’s overt
references to human rights and his own philosophic convictions throughout his pilgrimages to
Poland, especially in 1979, were strategically conceived to pressure the communist
government. His moderated language avoided open confrontation with the regime that,
arguably, was designed to “revitalise the human spirit” and inspire a “revolution of
conscience”.643 The impact this had on the formation of Solidarity is tangible. This was backed
up by continual public affirmation of the rights of the Polish people to live in solidarity, that
there could be “no freedom without solidarity”.644
However, the present thesis highlights that the network of political, social and economic
pressures arguably facilitated John Paul II’s ability to pursue his aims with integrity, and for
those means to have a tangible political impact. These pressures constitute what Glendon calls
the “optimal confluence” of “gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. John Paul II’s role
in the collapse of communism in Poland reflects that unique confluence of circumstances, and
John Paul II’s efforts. Therefore, that these aims were successful must be considered within the
network of forces already pressuring the Polish government. The Glendon graph illustrates that
John Paul II acts with integrity as a political actor in this context, and preferences long-term
aims over immediate advantages. It is difficult to measure the extent of his effectiveness
through this framework. However, it is arguable that John Paul II achieved his political aims,
and that favourable political conditions facilitated that success.
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Conclusion
“At sea it is good sailing to run before the gale, even if the ship cannot make harbour;
but if she can make harbour by changing tack, only a fool would risk shipwreck by holding
the original course rather than change it and still reach his destination.”645

This thesis has examined how Pope John Paul II’s political thought informs his
decisions to influence the Polish Communist government between 1978 and 1989. It has argued
that his philosophical formation in the shadow of totalitarianism helped shape his view that
participation in political, economic and social activities are basic human rights. As the first
Polish Pope in the history of the Catholic Church, he combined the conventional diplomatic
and moral authority of the papacy with his own experiences of totalitarian regimes to influence
events leading to the collapse of the Polish Communist government in 1989. The present
research has shown that John Paul II’s political philosophy and Polish context directly informed
his political strategy to encourage the Polish government to increase its citizens’ political,
social and economic freedoms, while advocating nonviolent political organisation. Thus, it has
demonstrated that John Paul II, as a philosopher in the tower, made political decisions as a
statesperson in the forum that were consistent with his philosophical influences and
convictions.
The thesis drew from Mary Ann Glendon’s The Forum and The Tower to examine the
lives and decisions of prominent scholars and statespersons who grappled with tensions
between political ideals and practical realities. For Glendon, the tower conveyed philosophy,
specifically political theory, whereas the forum represented political decision-making and
action.646 It argued that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics helped understand Glendon’s
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thought about the relationship between political theory and political practice, outlined in The
Forum and The Tower. For example, it observed that Glendon used Aristotle’s claim in the
Politics that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue”
are “philosophy” and “politics” as a starting point to answer her students concerns of how to
be politically effective and retain moral integrity. Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue,
it showed that, across the examples in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians
deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and mean forms of
political judgment. Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically
wise man”, to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom.
Aristotelian phronesis provided a reference point for how political actors in The Forum
and The Tower engage in a moral process of political deliberation. The process considers the
short-term advantages of compromising on political views, versus the merits of retaining moral
integrity by not sacrificing “core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”647 Maritain’s
essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” identified “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and
“Machiavellianism” on the other, as labels denoting excessive forms of political judgment.
Hypermoralism causes political judgment to remain something impracticable and merely ideal,
where the practitioner refuses pharisaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life.
Machiavellianism, which is at the other extreme, denies the value of moral integrity in political
practice. The practically wise statesperson must begin by acting between these two extremes.
Indeed, it is both difficult for the statesperson to act precisely at the middle point between these
extremes; by its very nature, political action is imprecise. It proposed that, for this reason,
ethical action can only provide general and approximate accuracy. As such, in some cases, the
appropriate action would involve an excess of one kind of action, rather than a defect, and the
reverse in others. For example, in the virtue of courage, the situation might demand a more
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audacious act, rather than a reserved one. The challenge for the statesperson is to identify
whether circumstances in the present moment are favourable for acting on the side of strongly
held moral principles, or whether an act that involves a tacit compromise on principles, better
serves their aims.
The Glendon method has enabled consideration of the extent to which the political
decisions of subjects analysed in The Forum and The Tower demonstrate the virtue of practical
wisdom. Investigation via this method highlights how political actors engaged in a moral
process of deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. These
are decisions that involved deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with
apparent advantage.”648 Applied to John Paul II, the method highlighted his political thought
is built on his intense interest in the fundamental dignity and rights of the human person. This
formed the basis of his political thought, which argued that all persons have a fundamental
right to participate in the dynamic social, economic and political aspects of their community.
John Paul II used political means in the forum in a way that retained his political aims
from the tower. As a “hybrid” political actor, John Paul II’s ostpolitik revealed a strategic shift
in the Vatican’s policies towards Poland. It is credible that John Paul II’s overt references to
human rights and his own philosophic convictions throughout his pilgrimages to Poland,
especially in 1979, were strategically conceived to pressure the communist government. As has
been proposed, his moderated language avoided open confrontation with the regime that,
arguably, was designed to “revitalise the human spirit” and inspire a “revolution of
conscience”. The thesis has also proposed that the network of political, social and economic
pressures at the time made it possible for John Paul II to pursue his aims without compromising
his integrity in terms of means, and for those means to have tangible political impact. These
pressures constitute what Glendon calls the optimal confluence of “gifts, favourable conditions
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and plain luck”. Thus, John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism in Poland is aided by
the unique confluence of circumstances that met his efforts.
The thesis has found that the adapted Glendon framework and the corresponding graph
of practical wisdom can be reapplied heuristically into to new contexts. It has tested the
framework in an original study on Pope John Paul II, focussed to one historical context of his
decision-making as Pope. Future studies might well pick up this work, seeking to provide
insights into other prominent political actors who grappled with the same tension between their
principles and the demands of practical politics. In other words, one could follow this thesis’
example, and take up another candidate that Glendon suggests is worth studying, such as
Thomas More.649 The framework would in this case enable a study of how More used silence
on his beliefs to retain his Chancellorship under King Henry VIII, but ultimately refused to
compromise on his views to the point of his own execution. Alternatively, more recent
statespersons, such as former US President Barack Obama, show how contemporary
perspectives of political judgment emphasise compromise. Obama’s reflections in The
Audacity of Hope650 provide his view that prudent decision-making must err on the side of
compromise, to be politically effective in modern democracies. The framework thus enables
an understanding of how different political actors prioritise retention of moral integrity when
faced with challenging political realities.
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APPENDIX A: Timeline
Timeline of Karol Wojtyla and Polish Communism 1920-1989651
MAY 18, 1920

Karol Józef Wojtyła is born in Wadowice and baptized on
June 20.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1939JANUARY 1945

World War II begins as Germany invades Poland. The
German Occupation abandons Kraków in 1945 and the Soviet
Union’s Red Army takes control of Poland.

NOVEMBER 1, 1946

Karol Wojtyła is ordained a priest by Cardinal Sapieha.

MAY, 1955

Establishment of Warsaw Pact joining Poland to the USSR

MARCH 8, 1964 & JUNE 28,
1967

Karol Wojtyła installed as Archbishop of Kraków, and made a
Cardinal three years later by Pope Paul VI.

AUGUST, 1968

‘Prague Spring’ anti-communist reforms in Czechoslovakia
aborted by Soviet-led military invasion

DECEMBER, 1970

Mass strikes begin in the Gdansk shipyard, Poland. 46 Polish
workers shot and killed by Polish soldiers.

OCTOBER 16, 1978

Wojtyla is elected as the first Polish Pope and takes the name
John Paul II.

JUNE 2-10, 1979

Pope John Paul II visits Poland for his Nine Day Pilgrimage.
Seen by an estimated 10 million people in person.

JULY 2, 1980

Mass strikes in Poland in protest of economic stagnation, low
wage growth, worker conditions and price increases of thirty
percent to one hundred percent on beef, pork, and high-grade
poultry.
Strikes cease with formal legalising of ‘Solidarity’, the first
“independent self-governing trade union”. Solidarity gains 10
million members within 10 months.

AUGUST 31, 1980

Dates and information taken from Weigel, Witness to Hope, and McDermott and Stibbe, ‘The
Revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe’, xiv-xvi.
651
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